Comparable worth-the idea that women ought to be paid the same wages as men performing comparable although not the same jobs-has generated a firestorm of controversy. This analysis of the comparable worth debate takes up its pros and cons in an extraordinarily disciplined and fair-minded manner. After outlining the debate, Paul attempts to resolve this deeply divisive debate in terms of larger philosophical underpinnings. To do so, she develops a sophisticated analysis of the American economic marketplace as well as the general marketplace of ideas. The volume initially sets forth the case for comparable worth by a wide-ranging review of the difference between the fairness of the marketplace and the demands for wealth redistribution. The author squarely addresses the toughest issues in the comparable worth debate: the persistence of a wage gap; undervaluation of jobs as a result of gender; and social conditioning into subordinate and superordinate roles. She then shifts into an analysis of the essentially economic counter-arguments against the largely social arguments in favor of comparable worth. An exhaustive history of the legislative, judicial, and regulatory history that underlies the comparable worth debate is given exhaustive treatment. Paul concludes with the belief that efforts to replace the market for setting labor and wage priorities would lead to misalignments and misalliances of such severity that calls for more central planning would be the predictable result. Paul shows that for the most part efforts at artificially leveraging wages between men and women would have unanticipated consequences, such as restricting free choice among working people and innovation among entrepreneurs. Professor Paul cites such present advantages as freedom of job entry or the United States' ability to compete in international markets would be early victims in an environment dominated by strong regulation, which for her is at the heart of the comparable worth debate. The author argues that equity is best insured by women entering all areas of the work force from which they have been blocked in the past. To encourage women to enter new and challenging occupations rather than to seek artificial shifts in compensation should be the goal of an equity-oriented society. This volume is not an argument against equity, but against the artificial regulation and control of free economies to the ultimate detriment of women. It should be of great interest to professionals interested in political economy, social policy and planning, and women's studies.

In a country built on the institution of private property, property-owner rights have been under attack. By arguing that private property is a fundamental liberty whose protection deserves the highest priority, Ellen Frankel Paul challenges one of the dominant trends of the past half century: the erosion of property rights via zoning and land use restrictions, carried on by government exercising its "police power" or promoting "the public interest."

Paul begins by examining the arguments of environmentalists in support of land-use legislation, and explores a few particularly troubling examples of the exercise of eminent domain and police powers. She traces the philosophical arguments for the two powers as well as their tortuous judicial history, the meaning of property rights and investigates how previous thinkers have defended these rights is detailed, and Paul suggests a more adequate defense for them. In the concluding portion of the book, the very legitimacy of eminent domain is questioned and the author offers recommendations for its reform.

This analysis is wide in scope and makes creative use of historical, legal, economic, and philosophic methodologies. It not only gives an account of the present power regulations on land, but also provides an exhaustive history of the development of the law in these two areas and of the philosophical ideas of the thinkers who helped shape this process. This book is distinctive because it places a theory of the just acquisition of property at the heart of the answer to the question of the extent to which governments can rightfully exercise the powers of eminent domain and police.

"Amazingly, in a country built on the institution of private property, the right to property in land has been under increasing assault, and has seldom been defended. Paul's book--by arguing that private property is a fundamental liberty whose protection deserves the highest priority--is a major step toward filling the void."--Robert Hessen, Stanford University

"Ellen Frankel Paul" is Deputy Director of the Social Philosophy and Policy Center, and is professor of political science and philosophy at Bowling Green State University. She is also an adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute.

Whether it is a result of nature, the consequence of a choice to escape the state of nature, or the outcome of some other process of deliberation, the fact of human association gives rise to recurrent themes in political and social philosophy. The character and requirements of justice, the profile of political legitimacy, and the relationship between the powers of government and the rights of the governed are some of the subjects of ongoing consideration and debate in the disciplines of philosophy, political theory, economics, and law. This volume represents a contribution to the investigation of these issues of perennial interest and import, featuring essays whose authors hope to extend, deepen, and, in some cases, move in new directions, the current state of discussion.

The essays in this collection investigate two political traditions and their critical interactions. The first series of essays deals with the development of natural rights individualism, some examining its origins in the thought of the seminal political theorist, John Locke, and the influential constitutional theorist, Montesquieu, others the impact of their theories on intellectual leaders during the American Revolution and the Founding era, and still others the culmination of this tradition in the writings of nineteenth-century individualists such as Lysander Spooner. The second series of essays focuses on the Progressive repudiation of natural rights individualism and its far-reaching effect on American politics and public policy.

Modern industrial societies have achieved a level of economic prosperity undreamed of in earlier times, but in the view of the contemporary environmental movement, the prosperity has come at the cost of serious degradations to the natural world. For environmental advocates, problems such as resource depletion, air and water pollution, global warming, and the loss of biodiversity represent due threats to the well-being of human societies and the planet itself. But just how serious are these threats, and how should we go about confronting them? Do environmental problems call for more extensive government controls over industrial activity, energy policy, and the like, or is it possible to find solutions by harnessing the incentives of the free market? The essays in this collection address these questions and explore related issues.

Do we desire things because they are good, or are they good because we desire them? Objectivists answer that we desire things because they are good; subjectivists answer that things are good because we desire them. Further, does it make sense to account for moral disagreement by claiming, as the moral relativist does, that something might be good for one person but not for another? Some essays in this book consider whether objective moral truths can be grounded in an understanding of the nature of human beings as rational and social animals. Some discuss the ethical theories of historical figures-Aristotle, Aquinas, or Kant-or offer critical assessments of the work of recent and contemporary theorists-such as Moore, Putnam, Ayn Rand, Philippa Foot, and Rosalind Hursthouse. Other essays ask whether moral principles and values can be constructed through a process of practical reasoning or deliberation. Still others consider what the phenomenology of our moral experiences can reveal about moral objectivity.

What constitutes a just tax system, and what are its moral foundations? Should a society's tax regime be designed to achieve a just distribution of wealth among its citizens, or should such a regime be designed to promote economic growth, rising standards of living, and increasing levels of employment? Are these two goals compatible or incompatible? Why should justice not require, or at least lead to, an increase in general prosperity? The essays in this volume examine the history of tax policies and the normative principles that have informed the selection of various types of taxes and tax regimes; economic data to discover which tax policies lead to economic growth; particular theories of justice or property rights regarding the design of tax systems; and other essays propose specific tax reforms. Still others challenge traditional theories of taxation, offering new ways of understanding the fiscal relationship between governments and their citizens.

What is a person? What makes me the same person today that I was yesterday or will be tomorrow? Philosophers have long pondered these questions. In Plato's Symposium, Socrates observed that all of us are constantly undergoing change: we experience physical changes to our bodies, as well as changes in our 'manners, customs, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains, [and] fears'. Aristotle theorized that there must be some underlying 'substratum' that remains the same even as we undergo these changes. John Locke rejected Aristotle's view and reformulated the problem of personal identity in his own way: is a person a physical organism that persists through time, or is a person identified by the persistence of psychological states, by memory? These essays - written by prominent philosophers and legal and economic theorists - offer valuable insights into the nature of personal identity and its implications for morality and public policy.

Whether free speech is defended as a fundamental right that inheres in each individual, or as a guarantee that all of society's members will have a voice in democratic decision-making, or as 'marketplace of ideas' that facilitates the emergence of truth by allowing vigorous competition among diverse points of view, the central role of expressive freedom in liberating the human spirit is undeniable. Enshrined in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution with a brevity that would belie its subsequent history of intricate judicial parsing, freedom of expression will, as the essays in this volume illuminate, encounter new and continuing controversies in the twenty-first century. Advances in digital technology raise pressing questions regarding freedom of speech and, with it, intellectual property and privacy rights. As the expansion of the Internet tests, and often confounds, legal statutes and precedents established in the era of the printing press, cyberspace looms as a relatively uncharted frontier for free speech and copyright law. Campaign finance reform limits the formerly sacrosanct category of 'political speech', while campus speech codes have spawned debates over '

A central idea in moral and political philosophy, ‘autonomy’ is generally understood as some form of self-governance or self-direction. Certain Stoics, modern philosophers such as Spinoza, and most importantly, Immanuel Kant, are among the great philosophers who have offered important insights on the concept. Some theorists analyze autonomy in terms of the self being moved by its higher-order desires. Others argue that autonomy must be understood in terms of acting from reason or from a sense of moral duty independent of the passions. Autonomy seems closely related to the notion of freedom, but in what sense: freedom from coercion, freedom from psychological constraints, or freedom from material necessity? Various approaches to these and similar questions yield different implications for public policy. Is capitalism, social democracy or socialism more favorable to autonomy? The essays in this volume address these important questions.

The essays in this volume assess the empirical and theoretical questions raised by inequalities of income and wealth. Some consider empirical claims about the amount of equality in modern market economies, assessing the allegation that income and wealth have become more unequally distributed in the past quarter-century. Others consider the extent to which various government initiatives can ameliorate the problems inequality putatively poses. They consider which standards of equality meet the requirements of distributive justice. They also ask if inequality is intrinsically immoral, regardless of its consequences.

The essays is this volume--written by prominent philosophers and academic lawyers--examine various aspects of both the right to privacy and the roles that this right plays in moral philosophy, legal theory, and public policy. Some of the essays discuss possible justifications for privacy rights, basing them on classical liberal principles or the considerations of moral pluralism. Other essays examine the role that privacy plays in American consitutional theory. Still others assess how privacy considerations affect certain issues in medical ethics, such as the proper extent of access to medical information and the normative status of the right to die.

The essays in this volume address questions about responsibility that arise in moral philosophy and legal theory. Some analyse different theories of causality, asking which theory offers the best account of human agency and the most satisfactory resolution of troubling controversies about free will and determinism. Some essays look at responsibility in the legal realm, seeking to determine how the law should assign liability for negligence, or whether the courts should allow defendants to offer excuses for their wrongdoing or to claim some form of 'diminished responsibility'. Other essays explore libertarian views about political freedom and accountability, asking whether libertarian positions on consent, contract law, and responsibility are consistent, or whether restitution is superior to retribution or deterrence as a basis for a theory of corrective justice. Still others examine the notion of partial or divided responsibility, or the relationship between responsibility and the emotions.

This volume examines human flourishing and its relationship to other key concepts in moral theory. Some essays question whether a theory of human nature can allow us to develop an objective list of goods valuable to all agents. Some look at the role of relationships in a good life, or ask whether an ethical theory based on human flourishing can accommodate concern for others. Other essays analyze the function of social-political institutions in promoting the flourishing of individuals. Still others explore the implications of flourishing for political theory and principles of social justice.

The essays in this volume assess the strength and impact of market liberal or libertarian political theory, which, broadly conceived, advocates a more carefully circumscribed role for the state and a greater reliance on the ability of individuals and voluntary, private-sector institutions to confront social problems. They offer insights into the limits of government, develop market-oriented solutions to pressing social problems, and explore some defects in traditional libertarian theory and practice.

These essays examine the nature of self-interest and the relationship between rationality and morality. Some challenge the assumption that morality is exclusively concerned with the pursuit of the good of others, arguing that self-interest can be a legitimate moral motive. Some ask whether it is possible to resolve the apparent conflict between self-interest and morality by appealing to some third, overarching standard, or by showing that self-regard and regard for others share significant common features or spring from a common source. Others explore the relationship between self-interest and practical reason, or between self-interest and virtue.

With the collapse of Communist totalitarianism, the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union face political instabililty and an uncertain economic future. The people of the region are struggling to emulate the success of the West by moving toward Western-style democracy and markets. The essays in this volume address the liberal transition currently underway. Some of them explore the models offered by political theorists to guide the course of reforms. Some discuss obstacles to change posed by existing attitudes, institutions, and cultural traditions. Some examine the nature of liberalism itself, and consider whether democratic politics and free-market economics can coexist without undermining one another. Some offer alternatives to specific Western institutions, arguing that in certain cases it would be unwise for the East to follow the West. Addressing the issues from a variety of perspectives, the contributors to this volume offer valuable insights into the nature of liberalism and the problems facing liberal reformers today.

What are the core values of liberalism and how can they best be promoted? Liberals in the classical tradition championed individual freedom, limited government and a capitalist economic system with strong rights to private property. Contemporary liberals, in contrast, embrace more egalitarian values and allow for a far more prominent role for government intervention in the market to reduce inequality, redistribute wealth and regulate economic activity. What accounts for these very disparate liberal views of property rights and economic freedom? How should we understand the transition from the classical view of liberalism to its more egalitarian modern version? And what, ideally, should the relationship be between the central values of liberalism and the economic institutions of capitalism? The eleven essays in this volume address these questions and examine related issues.

The essays in this volume--written by prominent philosophers, political scientists, and legal scholars--address these questions and explore related issues. Some essays examine the basic purposes of constitutions and their status as fundamental law. Some deal with specific constitutional provisions: they ask, for example, which branches of government should have the authority to conduct foreign policy, or how the judiciary should be organized, or what role a preamble should play in a nation's founding document. Other essays explore questions of constitutional design: they consider the advantages of a federal system of government, or the challenges of designing a constitution for a pluralistic society--or they ask what form of constitution best promotes personal liberty and economic prosperity.

The notion of obligation--of what an agent owes to himself, to others, or to society generally--occupies a central place in morality. But what are the sources of our moral obligations, and what are their limits? To what extent do obligations vary in their stringency and severity, and does it make sense to talk about imperfect obligations, that is, obligations that leave the individual with a road range of freedom to determine how and when to fulfill them? The twelve essays in this volume address these and other questions and explore related issues. Some of them discuss broad theoretical questions, some essays look at moral reasons for action. Others discuss specific moral obligations or the tensions that may exist between our obligations and our other concerns.

This collection of essays is dedicated to the memory of the late Harvard philosopher Robert Nozick, who died in 2002. The publication of Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia in 1974 revived serious interest in natural rights liberalism, which, beginning in the latter half of the eighteenth century, had been eclipsed by a succession of antithetical political theories including utilitarianism, progressivism, and various egalitarian and collectivist ideologies. Some of our contributors critique Nozick's political philosophy. Other contributors examine earlier figures in the liberal tradition, most notably John Locke, whose Second Treatise of Government, published in the late seventeenth century, profoundly influenced the American founders. The remaining authors analyze natural rights liberalism's central doctrines.

Fifteen philosophers, social scientists, and academic lawyers assess various aspects of bioethics. Some detail its development and challenge the field's basic assumptions. Others consider bioethics's role in contemporary society and examine it in policy administration as well as in its interaction with other branches of philosophical inquiry. Chapters also focus on specific issues, including the responsibilities of researchers to subjects in clinical trials; the proper criteria for determining when a living organism has died; the allocation of scarce, life-saving medical resources; and the subsidization of pharmaceutical products for those who may be deprived of the benefits of modern medicine.

The essays in this volume address some of the most enduring questions involved in the search for moral knowledge. Can morality be founded upon facts about human nature, social agreement, volition, subjective preference, a priori reasoning, intuition, or some other basis? Is morality knowable in any objective sense that would make it universal and, therefore, binding on humans in all times, places, and circumstances? Or, rather, is morality inherently subjective, culture bound, or more radically still, uniquely determined by each individual for that individual? Is there an answer to those who maintain that it is misguided even to think in terms of moral knowledge, on the grounds that moral utterances are expressions of feelings or attitudes rather than claims that can be known to be true or false?