This study offers a thorough analysis of what determines the level of executive compensation in one corporation as opposed to another. Challenging prior research which has tended to focus solely on the influence of coporate financial performance, the authors argue that structural characteristics of the firm--size, internal organization, and ownership--are equally decisive in influencing the level and structure of executive compensation which allows for the investigation of both the direct and indirect effects of each of these factors on executive compensation and offer a guide to the assessment of executive compensation in the large corporation that will be of significant value to financial analysts, investors, and researchers interested in the role and ramifications of executive compensation policies.

Following a review of theoretical considerations and recent findings on the determination of executive compensation, the authors present a model of executive compensation which integrates the concepts of corporate performance, organizational structure, size, and ownership structure. This path model is then tested by utilizing data from a sample of over 200 Fortune 500 firms. Both regression results and path analysis results show significant direct and indirect effects of the structural variables tested. Based upon their results, the authors offer policy suggestions for those involved in determining executive compensation or evaluating the financial status of organizations under investment consideration.

This unique book examines conceptual, empirical, and practical issues associated with corporate reputation. Emphasizing the importance of the roles of corporate social disclosure and organizational effectiveness, the authors emphasize the need for an integrative framework in explaining the nature of corporate reputation. Utilizing valuable data provided by Fortune magazine, the book provides both a historical evaluation of reputational rankings of Fortune 500 firms for the period 1987-1991 and insights as to the market reaction to disclosure of these rankings. These can be utilized by firms in building reputation, investors in evaluating their strategies, and public policy officials in dealing with corporations.

Following an extensive review of the conceptual foundations of corporate reputation, namely corporate social performance and disclosure and organizational effectiveness, the authors present explanatory and predictive models of corporate reputation. They then examine the potential relationship between corporate reputation and shareholders' wealth--the market reaction to reputation signals. Their findings suggest that a firM's benefit from the disclosure of reputation signals will depend on size and expectations, and that such disclosure appears to lead to a significant, lagged market reaction. Based on a detailed analysis of the 1987-1991 performance of U.S. firms on eight key attributes of reputation, the authors conclude with insights that can be utilized by corporations and investors alike.