This volume gathers essays from leading scholars to discuss partiality in ethics. The chapters examine the virtuous and vicious ways in which we relate to those close to us. There has long been a puzzle in ethics concerning the balance between our general moral obligations to everyone and our specific moral obligations to a smaller subset of people: our family, our nation, and our friends. There has been longstanding tension between the moral intuition that equality entails that we have the same moral duties to everyone and the moral intuition that special obligations entail that we have much greater duties to those close to us. The chapters in this volume discuss varying perspectives on partiality within a wide range of relationships. Part 1 offers overarching visions of partiality. Part 2 examines how roles and relationships might shape partiality. Part 3 focused upon the potential moral dangers and pitfalls of partiality. Finally, Part 4 looks at specific applications of partiality expressed as our loyalty to country, religion, sports teams, and employers. Virtuous and Vicious Expressions of Partiality will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in ethics, social and political philosophy, and philosophy of religion.

The Prudence of Love: How Possessing the Virtue of Love Benefits the Lover focuses upon the intersection of philosophical, theological, and psychological issues concerning love. Eric Silverman advocates an account of the virtue of love derived from Thomas Aquinas's account of charity and makes three claims concerning love's effect on a person's happiness. First, he argues that there are at least five distinct ways that possessing the virtue of love contributes to the lover's happiness. Surprisingly, only one of these benefits is primarily relational, while the other benefits are largely psychological. Second, Silverman argues that the combination of love's benefits typically increases the lover's overall level of happiness. Finally, he argues that possessing a loving disposition is a more reliable strategy for increasing one's overall happiness than possessing an unloving disposition. Throughout The Prudence of Love, Silverman demonstrates that love's benefits are identifiable according to all four major views of happiness.

Thirty-five years ago Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue established virtue ethics as a major challenger to competing visions of morality, but there is still considerable disagreement concerning which version of virtue ethics provides the best approach. The Supremacy of Love describes and advocates an agape-centered vision of Aristotelian virtue ethics that portrays love as the most important moral virtue, and the goals of love as a partial constituent of every genuine virtue. This structural improvement to Aristotelian virtue ethics—found originally in the ethics of Thomas Aquinas—enables this account to address several controversial topics in contemporary virtue ethics, including why the virtues cannot be used badly, in what sense is there a unity between the virtues, how the virtues benefit the virtuous person, and how virtues provide action guidance. Eric J. Silverman demonstrates how and why a distinctly love-centered approach to virtue ethics should make the view widely attractive in comparison to alternative accounts of virtue ethics, duty based deontological theories, as well as results-based consequentialist views.

Paradise Understood: New Philosophical Essays about Heaven systematically investigates heaven, or paradise, as conceived within theistic religious traditions such as Rabbinic Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. It considers a variety of topics concerning what life in paradise would, could, or will be like for human persons. The collection offers novel approaches to questions about heaven of perennial philosophical interest, and breaks new ground by expanding the range of questions about heaven that philosophers have considered. The contributors wrestle with questions about human life in paradise that span the spectrum of the major subfields of philosophical enquiry. By employing both historical and contemporary philosophical resources, the volume makes a pioneering contribution toward answering pressing questions about human life in paradise. It will serve as a platform for future research, reinvigorating philosophical investigation into these neglected topics within philosophy of religion.

The Ultimate Game of Thrones and Philosophy treats fans to dozens of new essays by experts who examine philosophical questions raised by the Game of Thrones story. This ultimate analysis provides the most comprehensive discussion to date and engages the Game of Thrones universe through the end of Season Six of the HBO series. Ned Stark, Tyrion Lannister, Jon Snow, Joffrey, Cersei, Brienne, Arya, Stannis, and many other characters are used to apply the traditional philosophical questions that everyone faces. How should political leaders be chosen in Westeros and beyond? Is power merely an illusion? Is it immoral to enjoy overly violent and sexual stories like Game of Thrones? How should morally ambiguous individuals such as Jamie Lannister: The Kingslayer and Savior of King's Landing be evaluated? Can anyone be trusted in a society like Westeros? What rules should govern sexual relationships in a world of love, incest, rape, and arranged marriage? How does disability shape identity for individuals like Tyrion, Bran, and others? How would one know whether there is a God in the Game of Thrones universe and what he is like?

Thirty-five years ago Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue established virtue ethics as a major challenger to competing visions of morality, but there is still considerable disagreement concerning which version of virtue ethics provides the best approach. The Supremacy of Love describes and advocates an agape-centered vision of Aristotelian virtue ethics that portrays love as the most important moral virtue, and the goals of love as a partial constituent of every genuine virtue. This structural improvement to Aristotelian virtue ethics-found originally in the ethics of Thomas Aquinas-enables this account to address several controversial topics in contemporary virtue ethics, including why the virtues cannot be used badly, in what sense is there a unity between the virtues, how the virtues benefit the virtuous person, and how virtues provide action guidance. Eric J. Silverman demonstrates how and why a distinctly love-centered approach to virtue ethics should make the view widely attractive in comparison to alternative accounts of virtue ethics, duty based deontological theories, as well as results-based consequentialist views.

The Prudence of Love: How Possessing the Virtue of Love Benefits the Lover focuses upon the intersection of philosophical, theological, and psychological issues concerning love. Eric Silverman advocates an account of the virtue of love derived from Thomas Aquinas's account of charity and makes three claims concerning love's effect on a person's happiness. First, he argues that there are at least five distinct ways that possessing the virtue of love contributes to the lover's happiness. Surprisingly, only one of these benefits is primarily relational, while the other benefits are largely psychological. Second, Silverman argues that the combination of love's benefits typically increases the lover's overall level of happiness. Finally, he argues that possessing a loving disposition is a more reliable strategy for increasing one's overall happiness than possessing an unloving disposition. Throughout The Prudence of Love, Silverman demonstrates that love's benefits are identifiable according to all four major views of happiness.