In January 1973, for the first time in American history, principal participants in a major election met to discuss the science and the art of campaign strategy: the planning, calculation, contrivance, miscalculation, and mischance that determine what the electorate sees. Here campaign managers, pollsters, and journalists met to compare notes on their techniques and tactics and on their successes and failures as they reviewed the events of the primaries and election:

the poor decisions made in the face of complex state primary laws;

the decline of Muskie and the rise of McGovern;

the significance of issues versus Nixon's image;

the effects of party reform on the Democratic convention;

the credentials fights;

the twists of strategy during the final months of the campaign;

the way the press covered the campaign and how reporters were treated by the various staffs;

the lessons for 1976 drawn by reporters and campaign people.

The straightforward exchanges took place at the Harvard Conference on Campaign Decision-Making. Eighteen key people participated, including those in the campaigns of Nixon, McGovern, Wallace, Muskie, Humphrey, Jackson, and McCloskey. Four political correspondents--David Broder, James Naughton, Al Otten, and James Perry--expertly guided the conversation, probing for additional insights.

The transcript of the conference--oral history at its best--has been carefully edited and makes absorbing reading. Included are brief sketches of the participants, a chronology of major events of the campaign, tables of campaign statistics, and a full index.

In essays that illuminate not only the recent past but shortcomings in today's intelligence assessments, sixteen experts show how prospective antagonists appraised each other prior to the World Wars. This cautionary tale, warns that intelligence agencies can do certain things very well--but other things poorly, if at all. Originally published in 1985. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

In essays that illuminate not only the recent past but shortcomings in today's intelligence assessments, sixteen experts show how prospective antagonists appraised each other prior to the World Wars. This cautionary tale, warns that intelligence agencies can do certain things very well--but other things poorly, if at all.

Originally published in 1986.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Contributing Authors Include Procter Thomson, Dwight D. Eisenhower, James M. Landis, And Others. The American Image Series.

Neorealists argue that all states aim to acquire power and that state cooperation can therefore only be temporary, based on a common opposition to a third country. This view condemns the world to endless conflict for the indefinite future. Based upon careful attention to actual historical outcomes, this book contends that, while some countries and leaders have demonstrated excessive power drives, others have essentially underplayed their power and sought less position and influence than their comparative strength might have justified. Featuring case studies from across the globe, History and Neorealism examines how states have actually acted. The authors conclude that leadership, domestic politics, and the domain (of gain or loss) in which they reside play an important role along with international factors in raising the possibility of a world in which conflict does not remain constant and, though not eliminated, can be progressively reduced.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 left Americans wondering how such a breach of security could have occurred. Relatives and friends of the victims pushed for the creation of a National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States to investigate the government's preparedness for and response to the attacks and to provide recommendations for preventing future disasters. As Senior Advisor to the 9/11 Commission, Ernest R. May provides students with a firsthand account of the commission's methods and actions. His introduction, which describes the drafting process and the collaboration of the commissioners despite the bitter political divisions surrounding them, allows students to view the report as an historical document. The report itself has been carefully abridged for the classroom while preserving the essence of the complete version. A cast of characters, a glossary of political acronyms, a chronology, a selected bibliography, and questions for consideration make this edition ideal for students.

In 1944, as the end of World War II approached, an important series of talks was held to plan the formation of postwar international institutions. The site for the conversations was Dumbarton Oaks in Washington, D.C., a research institute administered by Harvard University. In a spirit of optimism, Secretary of State Cordell Hull said that the purpose was "to create the institutional foundations for a just and enduring peace," while Soviet ambassador Andrei Gromyko spoke of an international organization that would "guarantee for the peoples peace, security, and prosperity in the future." The meetings, which included debates on a variety of issues, were a first step toward the creation of the United Nations.

In 1994, the "Dumbarton Oaks Conference, 1944-1994" brought together scholars and policymakers who have been involved with the study of international organizations or have played important roles in them. The conference papers in this volume examine both the formation of the United Nations and a number of current issues, including human rights, collective economic sanctions, peacekeeping operations, and the evolution of the role of the secretary-general.

Neorealists argue that all states aim to acquire power and that state cooperation can therefore only be temporary, based on a common opposition to a third country. This view condemns the world to endless conflict for the indefinite future. Based upon careful attention to actual historical outcomes, this book contends that, while some countries and leaders have demonstrated excessive power drives, others have essentially underplayed their power and sought less position and influence than their comparative strength might have justified. Featuring case studies from across the globe, History and Neorealism examines how states have actually acted. The authors conclude that leadership, domestic politics, and the domain (of gain or loss) in which they reside play an important role along with international factors in raising the possibility of a world in which conflict does not remain constant and, though not eliminated, can be progressively reduced.