During the past 25 years, independent regulatory agencies have become widespread institutions for regulatory governance. This book studies how they have diffused across Europe and compares their formal independence in 17 countries and seven sectors. Through a series of quantitative analyses, it finds that governments tend to be more prone to delegate powers to independent regulators when they need to increase the credibility of their regulatory commitments and when they attempt to tie the hands of their successors. The institutional context also matters: political institutions that make policy change more difficult are functional equivalents of delegation. In addition to these factors, emulation has driven the diffusion of independent regulators, which have become socially valued institutions that help policymakers legitimize their actions, and may even have become taken for granted as the appropriate way to organize regulatory policies. Providing a broad comparison of independent regulatory agencies in Europe, Delegation in the Regulatory State will be of great interest to researchers and students in political science, public policy, and public administration.

Delegation is an ubiquitous social phenomenon linked to the growing differentiation of modern societies. Delegation is one of several different modes of organisation that exist to make collective action successful, but has been overlooked and under-researched.
Using a rational choice institutional analysis and principal agent models, this book brings literature on delegation to bureaucracy, electorate to legislature to government within representative democracy together with literature on new forms of delegation such as non-majoritarian institutions, to provide a more complete and synthetic analysis of delegation in political systems.
With a broad and comparative approach, this is an important volume for advanced students, researchers and professionals concerned with delegation in the areas of public policy, public administration and democratic theory.

The Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Science series is published in association with the European Consortium for Political Research - the leading organisation concerned with the growth and development of political science in Europe. The series presents high-quality edited volumes on topics at the leading edge of current interest in political science and related fields, with contributions from European scholars and others who have presented work at ECPR workshops and research groups. Delegation is a ubiquitous social phenomenon linked to the growing differentiation of modern societies. Delegation is one of several different modes of organisation that exist to make collective action successful, but has been overlooked and under-researched. Using a rational choice institutional analysis and principal agent models, this book brings literature on delegation to bureaucracy,

This element shows, based on a review of the literature, how digital technology has affected liberal democracies with a focus on three key aspects of democratic politics: political communication, political participation, and policy-making. The impact of digital technology permeates the entire political process, affecting the flow of information among citizen and political actors, the connection between the mass public and political elites, and the development of policy responses to societal problems. This element discusses how digital technology has shaped these different domains, identifies areas of research consensus as well as unresolved questions, and argues that a key perspective involves issue definition, that is, how the nature of the problems raised by digital technology is subject to political contestation.

During the past 25 years, independent regulatory agencies have become widespread institutions for regulatory governance. This book studies how they have diffused across Europe and compares their formal independence in seventeen countries and seven sectors. Through a series of quantitative analyses, it finds that governments tend to be more prone to delegate powers to independent regulators when they need to increase the credibility of their regulatory commitments and when they attempt to tie the hands of their successors. The institutional context also matters: political institutions that make policy change more difficult are functional equivalents of delegation. In addition to these factors, emulation has driven the diffusion of independent regulators, which have become socially valued institutions that help policymakers legitimize their actions, and may even have become taken for granted as the appropriate way to organize regulatory policies.Providing a broad comparison of independent regulatory agencies in Europe, Delegation in the Regulatory State will be of great interest to researchers and students in political science, public policy, and public administration.

This innovative research design text will help you make informed choices when carrying out your research project. Covering both qualitative and quantitative approaches, and with examples drawn from a wide range of social science disciplines, the authors explain what is at stake when choosing a research design, and discuss the trade-offs that researchers have to make when considering issues such as: - causality - categories and classification - heterogeneity - interdependence - time This book will appeal to students and researchers looking for an in-depth understanding of research design issues to help them design their projects in a thoughtful and responsible way.