During the past 25 years, independent regulatory agencies have
become widespread institutions for regulatory governance. This book
studies how they have diffused across Europe and compares their
formal independence in 17 countries and seven sectors. Through a
series of quantitative analyses, it finds that governments tend to
be more prone to delegate powers to independent regulators when
they need to increase the credibility of their regulatory
commitments and when they attempt to tie the hands of their
successors. The institutional context also matters: political
institutions that make policy change more difficult are functional
equivalents of delegation. In addition to these factors, emulation
has driven the diffusion of independent regulators, which have
become socially valued institutions that help policymakers
legitimize their actions, and may even have become taken for
granted as the appropriate way to organize regulatory policies.
Providing a broad comparison of independent regulatory agencies in
Europe, Delegation in the Regulatory State will be of great
interest to researchers and students in political science, public
policy, and public administration.
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