This collection focuses on the ontology of space and time. It is centred on the idea that the issues typically encountered in this area must be tackled from a multifarious perspective, paying attention to both a priori and a posteriori considerations. Several experts in this area contribute to this volume: G. Landini discusses how Russell's conception of time features in his general philosophical perspective; D. Dieks proposes a middle course between substantivalist and relationist accounts of space-time; P. Graziani argues that it is necessary to provide an account of the "synthetic procedures" implicit in the recourse to diagrams in Euclid's Elements, while E. Mares comes to the conclusion that in Euclid's Elements we should treat the parallel postulate as empirical and the postulate that space is continuous as a priori. M. Arsenijevic/M. Adzic present an important formal result concerning two theories of the infinite two-dimensional continua, which sheds new light on the current dispute between gunkologists and pointilists; F. Orilia discusses two problems for presentism, one regarding the duration of the present and the other related to Zeno's paradoxes. A. Iacona delves deep into logical matters by focusing on the so-called TxW modal frames in order to deal with the deteterminism-indeterminism controversy. D. Mancuso outlines a non-standard temporal model compatible with time travel, and V. Fano/G. Macchia discuss time travels in the light of an important foundational principle of modern cosmology, Weyl's Principle.

The ontological debate on the nature of properties is alive as ever. Mainly, they are viewed either as universals or tropes (abstract particulars), an alternative with an immediate impact on what events are taken to be. Although much inquiry in philosophy of mind is done without a full awareness of it, some recent works suggest that the choice may have far-reaching consequences on central topics of this discipline, e.g., token physicalism, multiple realizability, mental causation, perception, introspection, self-awareness. This book explores the extent to which this is true with novel contributions by philosophers who have played a major role in bringing to the fore this interplay of foundational metaphysics and philosophical psychology and by other experts in these fields.

Thought, Language, and Ontology: An Introduction Francesco Orilia William J. Rapaport Dipartimento di filosofia e scienze umane Department of Computer Science, Universita di Macerata Department of Philosophy, 62100 Macerata, Italy and Center for Cognitive Science orilia@unimc. it State University of New York at Buffalo Buffalo, NY 14260-2000, U. S. A. rapaport@cs. buffalo. edu 1 DeRe Hector-Neri Castaneda, the Mahlon Powell Professor of Philosophy at Indiana Univer- sity, died on September?, 1991, at the age of66, after a year-long illness. In his lengthy and intense philosophical career, Castaneda deeply influenced analytic philosophy. In the last part of his life, he was also committed to spreading his views beyond the circle of analytic philosophy and to bridging the gap between analytic and so-called continen- tal philosophy, convinced as he was of the overall unity of good philosophical theoriz- ing. The importance and influence of his work is witnessed by three Festschriften ded- icated to him, which included critical examinations of his theories by leading philoso- phers, along with Castaneda's replies (Tomberlin 1983, 1986; Jacobi & Pape 1980). Castaneda's humanity and devotion to philosophy is evidenced in his fascinating autobiography, contained in Tomberlin 1986. He was also the founding editor of Nous, one of the world's best philosophical journals, now published by Blackwell Publishers. From the beginning, Nous emphasized the analytic tradition in philosophy, but has al- ways been open to all kinds of serious philosophy, as its Latin motto witnessed: Nihil philosophicum a nobis alienum putamus.

Downward causation plays a fundamental role in many theories of metaphysics and philosophy of mind. It is strictly connected with many topics in philosophy, including but not limited to: emergence, mental causation, the nature of causation, the nature of causal powers and dispositions, laws of nature, and the possibility of ontological and epistemic reductions. Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation brings together experts from different fields-including William Bechtel, Stewart Clark and Tom Lancaster, Carl Gillett, John Heil, Robin F. Hendry, Max Kistler, Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum -who delve into classic and unexplored lines of philosophical inquiry related to downward causation. It critically assesses the possibility of downward causation given different ontological assumptions and explores the connection between downward causation and the metaphysics of causation and dispositions. Finally, it presents different cases of downward causation in empirical fields such as physics, chemistry, biology and the neurosciences. This volume is both a useful introduction and a collection of original contributions on this fascinating and hotly debated philosophical topic.

This collection focuses on the ontology of space and time. It is centred on the idea that the issues typically encountered in this area must be tackled from a multifarious perspective, paying attention to both a priori and a posteriori considerations. Several experts in this area contribute to this volume:G. Landini discusses how Russell's conception of time features in his general philosophical perspective;D. Dieks proposes a middle course between substantivalist and relationist accounts of space-time;P. Graziani argues that it is necessary to provide an account of the "synthetic procedures" implicit in the recourse to diagrams in Euclid's Elements, while E. Mares comes to the conclusion that in Euclid's Elements we should treat the parallel postulate as empirical and the postulate that space is continuous as a priori.M. Arsenijevic/M. Adzic present an important formal result concerning two theories of the infinite two-dimensional continua, which sheds new light on the current dispute between gunkologists and pointilists; F. Orilia discusses two problems for presentism, one regarding the duration of the present and the other related to Zeno's paradoxes. A. Iacona delves deep into logical matters by focusing on the so-called TxW modal frames in order to deal with the deteterminism-indeterminism controversy. D. Mancuso outlines a non-standard temporal model compatible with time travel, andV. Fano/G. Macchia discuss time travels in the light of an important foundational principle of modern cosmology, Weyl's Principle.

Thought, Language, and Ontology: An Introduction Francesco Orilia William J. Rapaport Dipartimento di filosofia e scienze umane Department of Computer Science, Universita di Macerata Department of Philosophy, 62100 Macerata, Italy and Center for Cognitive Science orilia@unimc. it State University of New York at Buffalo Buffalo, NY 14260-2000, U. S. A. rapaport@cs. buffalo. edu 1 DeRe Hector-Neri Castaneda, the Mahlon Powell Professor of Philosophy at Indiana Univer- sity, died on September?, 1991, at the age of66, after a year-long illness. In his lengthy and intense philosophical career, Castaneda deeply influenced analytic philosophy. In the last part of his life, he was also committed to spreading his views beyond the circle of analytic philosophy and to bridging the gap between analytic and so-called continen- tal philosophy, convinced as he was of the overall unity of good philosophical theoriz- ing. The importance and influence of his work is witnessed by three Festschriften ded- icated to him, which included critical examinations of his theories by leading philoso- phers, along with Castaneda's replies (Tomberlin 1983, 1986; Jacobi & Pape 1980). Castaneda's humanity and devotion to philosophy is evidenced in his fascinating autobiography, contained in Tomberlin 1986. He was also the founding editor of Nous, one of the world's best philosophical journals, now published by Blackwell Publishers. From the beginning, Nous emphasized the analytic tradition in philosophy, but has al- ways been open to all kinds of serious philosophy, as its Latin motto witnessed: Nihil philosophicum a nobis alienum putamus.

Singular reference to ourselves and the ordinary objects surrounding us is a most crucial philosophical topic, for it looms large in any attempt to understand how language and mind connect to the world. This book explains in detail why in the past philosophers such as Frege, Russell and Reichenbach have favoured a descriptivist approach to this matter and why in more recent times Donnellan, Kripke, Kaplan and others have rather favoured a referentialist standpoint. The now dominant referentialist theories however still have a hard time in addressing propositional attitudes and empty singular terms. Here a way out of this difficulty emerges in an approach that incorporates aspects of the old-fashioned descriptivist views of Frege, Russell and Reichenbach without succumbing to the anti-descriptivist arguments that back up the current referentialist trend. The resulting theory features a novel approach to the semantics and pragmatics of determiner phrases, definite descriptions, proper names and indexicals, all treated in uniform fashion in both their anaphoric and non-anaphoric uses.

This work will be of interest to researchers in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and theoretical linguistics. The wealth of background information and detailed explanations that it provides makes it also accessible to graduate and upper level undergraduates and suitable as a reference book.

Singular reference to ourselves and the ordinary objects surrounding us is a most crucial philosophical topic, for it looms large in any attempt to understand how language and mind connect to the world. This book explains in detail why in the past philosophers such as Frege, Russell and Reichenbach have favoured a descriptivist approach to this matter and why in more recent times Donnellan, Kripke, Kaplan and others have rather favoured a referentialist standpoint. The now dominant referentialist theories however still have a hard time in addressing propositional attitudes and empty singular terms. Here a way out of this difficulty emerges in an approach that incorporates aspects of the old-fashioned descriptivist views of Frege, Russell and Reichenbach without succumbing to the anti-descriptivist arguments that back up the current referentialist trend. The resulting theory features a novel approach to the semantics and pragmatics of determiner phrases, definite descriptions, proper names and indexicals, all treated in uniform fashion in both their anaphoric and non-anaphoric uses.

This work will be of interest to researchers in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and theoretical linguistics. The wealth of background information and detailed explanations that it provides makes it also accessible to graduate and upper level undergraduates and suitable as a reference book.

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