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This volume brings together original papers by linguists and
philosophers on the role of context and perspective in language and
thought. Several contributions are concerned with the
contextualism/relativism debate, which has loomed large in recent
philosophical discussions. In a substantial introduction, the
editors survey the field and map out the relevant issues and
positions.
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Pragmatics (Hardcover)
N. Burton-Roberts; Contributions by Jay David Atlas, Kent Bach, Herman Cappelen, Ira A. Noveck, …
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R1,562
Discovery Miles 15 620
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Ships in 10 - 15 working days
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This contribution to Palgrave's 'Advances' series addresses a wide
range of issues that have arisen in post-Gricean pragmatic theory,
in chapters by distinguished authors. Among the specific topics
covered are scalar implicatures, lexical semantics and pragmatics,
indexicality, procedural meaning, the semantics and pragmatics of
negation. The volume includes both defences and critiques of
Relevance Theory and of Neo-Gricean Pragmatics.
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Pragmatics (Paperback)
N. Burton-Roberts; Contributions by Jay David Atlas, Kent Bach, Herman Cappelen, Ira A. Noveck, …
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R1,536
Discovery Miles 15 360
|
Ships in 10 - 15 working days
|
This contribution to Palgrave's 'Advances' series addresses a wide
range of issues that have arisen in post-Gricean pragmatic theory,
in chapters by distinguished authors. Among the specific topics
covered are scalar implicatures, lexical semantics and pragmatics,
indexicality, procedural meaning, the semantics and pragmatics of
negation. The volume includes both defences and critiques of
Relevance Theory and of Neo-Gricean Pragmatics.
Many linguists and philosophers of language explain linguistic
meaning in terms of truth conditions. This book focuses on the
meanings of expressions that escape such truth-conditional
treatment, in particular the concessives: "but," "even if," and
"although." Corinne Iten proposes semantic analyses of these
expressions based on the cognitive framework of relevance theory. A
thoroughly cognitive approach to linguistic meaning is presented in
which linguistic forms are seen as mapping onto mental entities,
rather than individuals and properties in the real world.
Researchers and advanced students in pragmatics will find this
account lucid, clear and accessible.
The main argument of this book is that the notion of truth plays no
role in speaker-hearers' interpretation of linguistic utterances
and that it is not needed for theoretical accounts of linguistic
meaning either. The theoretical argument is developed in the first
part, while the second part supports it with cognitive
relevance-theoretic, rather than truth-based, analyses of the
'concessive' expressions but, although and even if .
Ten leading scholars provide exacting research results and a
reliable and accessible introduction to the new field of optimality
theoretic pragmatics. The book includes a general introduction that
overviews the foundations of this new research paradigm. The book
is intended to satisfy the needs of students and professional
researchers interested in pragmatics and optimality theory, and
will be of particular interest to those exploring the interfaces of
formal pragmatics with grammar, semantics, philosophy of language,
information theory and cognitive psychology.
Ten leading scholars provide exacting research results and a
reliable and accessible introduction to the new field of optimality
theoretic pragmatics. The book includes a general introduction that
overviews the foundations of this new research paradigm. The book
is intended to satisfy the needs of students and professional
researchers interested in pragmatics and optimality theory, and
will be of particular interest to those exploring the interfaces of
formal pragmatics with grammar, semantics, philosophy of language,
information theory and cognitive psychology.
Immunity to error through misidentification is recognised as an
important feature of certain kinds of first-person judgments, as
well as arguably being a feature of other indexical or
demonstrative judgments. In this collection of newly commissioned
essays, the contributors present a variety of approaches to it,
engaging with historical and empirical aspects of the subject as
well as contemporary philosophical work. It is the first collection
of essays devoted exclusively to the topic and will be essential
reading for anyone interested in philosophical work on the self,
first-person thought or indexical thought more generally.
Francois Recanati presents his theory of mental files, a new way of
understanding reference in language and thought. He aims to recast
the 'nondescriptivist' approach to reference that has dominated the
philosophy of language and mind in the late twentieth century.
According to Recanati, we refer through mental files, which play
the role of so-called 'modes of presentation'. The reference of
linguistic expressions is inherited from that of the files we
associate with them. The reference of a file is determined
relationally, not satisfactionally: so a file is not to be equated
to the body of (mis)information it contains. Files are like
singular terms in the language of thought, with a nondescriptivist
semantics. In contrast to other philosophers, Recanati offers an
indexical model according to which files are typed by their
function, which is to store information derived through certain
types of relation to objects in the environment. The type of the
file corresponds to the type of contextual relation it exploits.
Even detached files or 'encyclopedia entries' are based on
epistemically rewarding relations to their referent, on Recanati's
account. Among the topics discussed in this wide-ranging book are:
acquaintance relations and singular thought; cognitive
significance; the vehicle/content distinction; the nature of
indexical concepts; co-reference de jure and judgments of identity;
cognitive dynamics; recognitional and perceptual concepts; confused
thought and the transparency requirement on modes of presentation;
descriptive names and 'acquaintanceless' singular thought; the
communication of indexical thoughts; two-dimensional defences of
Descriptivism; the Generality Constraint; attitude ascriptions and
the 'vicarious' use of mental files; first-person thinking;
token-reflexivity in language and thought.
Francois Recanati argues against the traditional understanding of
the semantics/pragmatics divide and puts forward a radical
alternative. Through half a dozen case studies, he shows that what
an utterance says cannot be neatly separated from what the speaker
means. In particular, the speaker's meaning endows words with
senses that are tailored to the situation of utterance and depart
from the conventional meanings carried by the words in isolation.
This phenomenon of 'pragmatic modulation' must be taken into
account in theorizing about semantic content, for it interacts with
the grammar-driven process of semantic composition. Because of that
interaction, Recanati argues, the content of a sentence always
depends upon the context in which it is used. This claim defines
Contextualism, a view which has attracted considerable attention in
recent years, and of which Recanati is one of the main proponents.
Francois Recanati argues against the traditional understanding of
the semantics/pragmatics divide and puts forward a radical
alternative. Through half a dozen case studies, he shows that what
an utterance says cannot be neatly separated from what the speaker
means. In particular, the speaker's meaning endows words with
senses that are tailored to the situation of utterance and depart
from the conventional meanings carried by the words in isolation.
This phenomenon of 'pragmatic modulation' must be taken into
account in theorizing about semantic content, for it interacts with
the grammar-driven process of semantic composition. Because of that
interaction, Recanati argues, the content of a sentence always
depends upon the context in which it is used. This claim defines
Contextualism, a view which has attracted considerable attention in
recent years, and of which Recanati is one of the main proponents.
Our thought and talk are situated. They do not take place in a
vacuum but always in a context, and they always concern an external
situation relative to which they are to be evaluated. Since that is
so, Francois Recanati argues, our linguistic and mental
representations alike must be assigned two layers of content: the
explicit content, or lekton, is relative and perspectival, while
the complete content, which is absolute, involves contextual
factors in addition to what is explicitly represented. Far from
reducing to the context-independent meaning of the sentence-type
or, in the psychological realm, to the "narrow" content of mental
representations, the lekton is a level intermediate between
context-invariant meaning and full propositional content.
Recognition of that intermediate level is the key to a proper
understanding of context-dependence in language and thought.
Going beyond the usual discussions of indexicality and
unarticulated constituents in the philosophy of language, Recanati
turns to the philosophy of mind for decisive arguments in favour of
his approach. He shows, first, that the lekton is the notion of
content we need if we are to properly understand the relations
between perception, memory, and the imagination, and second, that
the psychological 'mode' is what determines the situation the
lekton is relative to. In this framework he provides a detailed
account of de se thought and the first person point of view. In the
last part of the book, Recanati discusses the special freedom we
have, in discourse and thought, to shift the situation of
evaluation. He traces that freedom to a special mode--the anaphoric
mode--which enables us to go beyond the egocentric stage
ofpre-human thought.
Our thought and talk are situated. They do not take place in a
vacuum but always in a context, and they always concern an external
situation relative to which they are to be evaluated. Since that is
so, Francois Recanati argues, our linguistic and mental
representations alike must be assigned two layers of content: the
explicit content, or lekton, is relative and perspectival, while
the complete content, which is absolute, involves contextual
factors in addition to what is explicitly represented. Far from
reducing to the context-independent meaning of the sentence-type
or, in the psychological realm, to the "narrow" content of mental
representations, the lekton is a level intermediate between
context-invariant meaning and full propositional content.
Recognition of that intermediate level is the key to a proper
understanding of context-dependence in language and thought.
Going beyond the usual discussions of indexicality and
unarticulated constituents in the philosophy of language, Recanati
turns to the philosophy of mind for decisive arguments in favour of
his approach. He shows, first, that the lekton is the notion of
content we need if we are to properly understand the relations
between perception, memory, and the imagination, and second, that
the psychological 'mode' is what determines the situation the
lekton is relative to. In this framework he provides a detailed
account of de se thought and the first person point of view. In the
last part of the book, Recanati discusses the special freedom we
have, in discourse and thought, to shift the situation of
evaluation. He traces that freedom to a special mode--the anaphoric
mode--which enables us to go beyond the egocentric stage
ofpre-human thought.
According to the dominant position among philosophers of language
today, we can legitimately ascribe determinate contents (such as
truth-conditions) to natural language sentences, independently of
what the speaker actually means. This view contrasts with that held
by ordinary language philosophers fifty years ago: according to
them, speech acts, not sentences, are the primary bearers of
content. Francois Recanati argues for the relevance of this
controversy to the current debate about semantics and pragmatics.
Is 'what is said' (as opposed to merely implied) determined by
linguistic conventions, or is it an aspect of 'speaker's meaning'?
Do we need pragmatics to fix truth-conditions? What is 'literal
meaning'? To what extent is semantic composition a creative
process? How pervasive is context-sensitivity? Recanati provides an
original and insightful defence of 'contextualism', and offers an
informed survey of the spectrum of positions held by linguists and
philosophers working at the semantics/pragmatics interface.
Immunity to error through misidentification is recognised as an
important feature of certain kinds of first-person judgments, as
well as arguably being a feature of other indexical or
demonstrative judgments. In this collection of newly commissioned
essays, the contributors present a variety of approaches to it,
engaging with historical and empirical aspects of the subject as
well as contemporary philosophical work. It is the first collection
of essays devoted exclusively to the topic and will be essential
reading for anyone interested in philosophical work on the self,
first-person thought or indexical thought more generally.
According to the dominant position among philosophers of language
today, we can legitimately ascribe determinate contents (such as
truth-conditions) to natural language sentences, independently of
what the speaker actually means. This view contrasts with that held
by ordinary language philosophers fifty years ago: according to
them, speech acts, not sentences, are the primary bearers of
content. Francois Recanati argues for the relevance of this
controversy to the current debate about semantics and pragmatics.
Is 'what is said' (as opposed to merely implied) determined by
linguistic conventions, or is it an aspect of 'speaker's meaning'?
Do we need pragmatics to fix truth-conditions? What is 'literal
meaning'? To what extent is semantic composition a creative
process? How pervasive is context-sensitivity? Recanati provides an
original and insightful defence of 'contextualism', and offers an
informed survey of the spectrum of positions held by linguists and
philosophers working at the semantics/pragmatics interface.
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