Brecher explores the controversial diplomacy by which the United States separately brought to a "de facto" close its War of Independence against the British, leaving its one ally, France, in the lurch. He focuses on the two dominant, ostensibly allied peace negotiators, John Jay and Vergennes.

Veteran diplomat and diplomatic history author Frank Brecher follows the chronology of the American War of Independence, alternating between accounts of the conflict as experienced diplomatically and, in less detail, militarily by the Americans and the French, respectively. In doing so, after summarizing in his preface a highly informed and articulate contemporary analysis of the origins of the Revolution from the perspective of the more conservative elements of the American leadership, of whom John Jay was very much a part, Brecher focuses on the particular experiences of Jay and Vergennes, both in their personal lives and in their politial careers. He describes and compares their respective--and quite different--preparations for their historical activities as peace negotiators, and describes the major developments of the conflict itself as they themselves participated in, and analyzed, them.

While Vergennes, the French Foreign Minister, for the first time in his career, remained physically stationary in Versailles, Jay, for the first time in his life as well as career, left the New York region to live in Philadelphia, then Madrid, and finally Paris, before returning as Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1784, after four and a half eventful and personally dramatic years abroad. The lessons each of these two diplomats learned as a result of the crucible through which they had to pass before their very personal--and historically important--encounter in France toward war's end very much affected the negotiating strategies they adopted and the ultimatley paradoxical mixture of both triumph and disappoinment with which they helped bring to a succesful conclusion the military phase of an alliance embarked upon by their two nations some five long years earlier. Brecher presents a provocative view of early American diplomacy that will be of interest to scholars and students alike.

England's capture of Canada in 1760 was the culmination of the French and Indian War and of a century and a half of conflict between Britain and France for control of the North American continent. During that long period, there were several English military efforts to evict the French, but all failed. Therefore, at the war's start, few among the English entertained serious thoughts of totally evicting France from all of Canada. Nor did the French consider such a result a serious possibility. Drawing heavily on primary sources, Brecher tells the dramatic story of why the war's outcome differed so sharply from original expectations. He does so from the vantage point of France, while demonstrating in greater depth than has been available to date the linkages between France's American policy and involvement in the Seven Years' War.

Brecher provides an unprecedently full-scale analysis of the political, military, social, and economic conditions of mid-18th-century France and its North American colony, New France. That analysis also examines the direct connection between those internal conditions and the results for France of the war that ended in 1763. In doing so, Brecher assesses France's military strategy and major battles in Europe and America, as well as the diplomatic goals Versailles set for itself in the conduct of the war. Further, he describes why France concurred in leaving not only Canada, but also the vast Louisiana territory, to be divided between England and France's belated wartime ally, Bourbon Spain. Finally, Brecher explains the longer-term implications of the war for North American development and for the future of France. This is an important study for students and scholars of French and colonial American history and for the broad reading public, as well as those interested in the more recent Quebec problem.

United States diplomatic policy towards European Jews, Zionists, and Israelis remains vitally important to the stability and international posture of numerous countries. This study traces the evolution of that policy from its roots in isolated responses to post-World War I antisemitism to its coherent statement in the post-World War II era. Topics such as the Jewish minority problem in Europe, the history of U.S.-Zionist relations, and the American response to the Holocaust, often treated separately, are here studied together, and their integral part within U.S. policy emphasized. Told in narrative form, this is the story of the origins of U.S. policy towards European Jews and the Jews' reaction to that policy. Reluctant Ally is a powerful account of how the American outrage at mistreatment of European Jewry joined with the Zionist movement to support the inevitable settling of Palestine. Policy changed rapidly from 1900 to mid-century, and this objective discussion of the various aspects of that development brings many new facts to light and furnishes information that can enhance understanding of current U.S. policy toward Israel as well as the current war in the Middle East.