In this study, naval historians from Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States explore how their navies created an effective multinational, or "combined," framework of interoperability while under national rules of engagement. The authors address cases including maritime operations during the First Gulf War (1990-1991) and later (2001-2003) as part of Operation Enduring Freedom; off the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Operation Sharp Guard (1991-1996); and in East Timor during Operation Stabilise (1999-2000). This multinational naval force's success in each crisis depended not just on shared doctrine, training, tactics, and technology, but on the trust its sailors built in combined operations over time.

From the foreword: "As our nation and our Navy shift their focus away from the land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that have so dominated our internal conversations for more than a decade and pivot toward the Asia-Pacific region, it is most appropriate that this study, You Cannot Surge Trust, should make its appearance. The assembled authors, under the assured editorial hand of Sandra Doyle, bring forward a series of episodes that demonstrate the evolving and increasingly important nature of maritime coalition operations around the world. Beginning with a look at maritime interception operations in the Arabian Gulf during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this work moves forward through the post-Cold War era to include recent operations in the Middle East and central Asia. Written from a multinational point of view, the analysis suggests that nations, even superpowers, are increasingly dependent upon each other for support during major combat operations and that only by frequent consultation, exercises, cooperation in technology development, and understanding of force structure capabilities will future maritime coalitions be successful. This study also advances a larger argument regarding the relevance of naval and maritime history in defense policy development. The challenges faced by coalition forces during the 1991 to 2005 period are not so different from what confronted those who sailed before. The crews of Continental Navy ships during the American Revolution had difficulty keeping up with French ships owing to differences in the size of the respective fleets and individual ship design. During World Wars I and II the U.S. and Royal navies consistently had to overcome problems inherent in differences in classification and communications. Lastly, in the increasingly geopolitical complexities of modern warfare, illustrated by our experiences operating alongside allies in Korea and Vietnam, history reveals that the different rules of engagement under which nations exercise their forces can cause conflicts within a partnership-even as the partners prosecute a conflict. Each of these issues has been raised before, each is examined within You Cannot Surge Trust, and each will raise its head again in some future hostility."

From the foreword: "As our nation and our Navy shift their focus away from the land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that have so dominated our internal conversations for more than a decade and pivot toward the Asia-Pacific region, it is most appropriate that this study, You Cannot Surge Trust, should make its appearance. The assembled authors, under the assured editorial hand of Sandra Doyle, bring forward a series of episodes that demonstrate the evolving and increasingly important nature of maritime coalition operations around the world. Beginning with a look at maritime interception operations in the Arabian Gulf during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this work moves forward through the post-Cold War era to include recent operations in the Middle East and central Asia. Written from a multinational point of view, the analysis suggests that nations, even superpowers, are increasingly dependent upon each other for support during major combat operations and that only by frequent consultation, exercises, cooperation in technology development, and understanding of force structure capabilities will future maritime coalitions be successful. This study also advances a larger argument regarding the relevance of naval and maritime history in defense policy development. The challenges faced by coalition forces during the 1991 to 2005 period are not so different from what confronted those who sailed before. The crews of Continental Navy ships during the American Revolution had difficulty keeping up with French ships owing to differences in the size of the respective fleets and individual ship design. During World Wars I and II the U.S. and Royal navies consistently had to overcome problems inherent in differences in classification and communications. Lastly, in the increasingly geopolitical complexities of modern warfare, illustrated by our experiences operating alongside allies in Korea and Vietnam, history reveals that the different rules of engagement under which nations exercise their forces can cause conflicts within a partnership-even as the partners prosecute a conflict. Each of these issues has been raised before, each is examined within You Cannot Surge Trust, and each will raise its head again in some future hostility."

This book is the first to analyze the partnership between the Navy, industry, and science forged by World War II and responsible for producing submarines in the United States in the period from 1940 through 1961. The naval-industrial complex was not the result of a single historical event. Neither was it a political-economic entity. Instead it was made up of many unique and distinct components, all of which developed simultaneously; each reflected the development, significance, and construction of a particular vessel or technology within its historical context. Together these components emerged from World War II as a network of distinct relationships linked together by the motives of national defense, mutual growth, and profit. None of the major players in the drama planned or predetermined the naval-industrial complex, and it did not conform to the views of any individual or confirm the value of a particular system of management. Instead it grew naturally in response to the political environment, strategic circumstances, and perceived national need, its character defined gradually not only by the demands of international conflict but also by the scores of talented people interested in the problems and possibilities of submarine warfare. Their combined efforts during this short period of time produced remarkable advances in nuclear propulsion, submerged speed, quieting, underwater sound, and weaponry, as well as a greater appreciation within the Navy and the shipbuilding industry for the ocean environment.This book won the Roosevelt Prize for naval history.

Winner of the Roosevelt Prize for naval history.