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This book makes a rational and eloquent case for the closer
integration of ethics and economics. It expands upon themes
concerned with esteem, self-esteem, emotional bonding between
agents, expressive concerns, and moral requirements. Economists
have long assumed that 'value' and 'price' are synonymous and
interchangeable. The authors show how disregarding this false
assumption and adopting an interdisciplinary approach could improve
the economics profession by distinguishing economic values from
ethical values. Replete with discussions that will challenge
conventional economics, this book offers a corrective argument
against the rigid separation of agents' motivation and the purely
normative aspects of economic analysis. The various contributions
explore the different dimensions at the frontier between the
rational and the moral in political economy, ethics and philosophy.
Containing a variety of cross-border analyses, this innovative book
will be a must-read for economists, political scientists and
philosophers. It will also be an invaluable resource for students
in the fields of economics and philosophy.
This Festschrift was "presented" in electronic form to Buchanan on
the occasion of his eightieth birthday on October 3, 1999, after
dinner in Fairfax, Virginia. As one might have expected, the
response to our call for papers was vo luminous. In looking over
the many contributions, we felt that a "published" Festschrift was
also possible and fitting for the eightieth birthday of so prodi
gious and influential a scholar as Professor Buchanan. To that end
we have assembled the following volume. In selecting the papers to
be included here we have basically tried to choose those papers
which in some way bear on Buchanan's contributions. Perfectly good
papers about issues not related to Buchanan's research agenda or
not referring directly to Buchanan's work were not included. Space
constraints did not allow universal coverage, so choices had to be
made. It should be stated clearly that these were our choices based
on the criterion that the contribution be relevant to Buchanan's
work. Buchanan had nothing whatsoever to do with the selection of
papers for this volume. Once choices had been made, we arranged the
papers by subject matter ranging from various aspects of Buchanan's
work in economics, political science, philosophy, and related
areas, to some more personal recollections of Jim as a professor,
friend, and colleague. Including the latter material was also our
decision, and this probably represents a choice with which Jim
would not have agreed. We think, however, that the reader will find
these pieces interesting and informative."
What is the relation between economics and religion? In particular,
are theology and economics entirely autonomous and distinct areas
of inquiry? Economics and Religion: Are They Distinct? takes an
inductive approach using case studies to shed light on the extent
to which economics may be regarded as independent of the religious
beliefs of its practitioners. The case studies comprise the first
part of the book and are listed chronologically. These case studies
are followed by commentaries, or interpretive essays; the authors
of these commentaries are acting as a jury to consider the question
`How sensitive is economics to theological considerations?' The
editors provide a concluding chapter summarizing both the evidence
and the findings.
This book contains a range of essays on topics in the emerging field of "constitutional political economy". This field of enquiry is strongly associated with the name of James M. Buchanan whose research program has been the point of departure for this field. The essays are a selection of those written by colleagues and researchers in the field to honor Buchanan on the occasion of his 80th birthday. They cover a wide range of topics but fall primarily into two sets: one set dealing with methodological aspects of the c.p.e. approach; the other dealing with specific applications in a variety of policy areas, ranging from "economic transformation" to monetary policy regimes to health care. One particular issue in the methodological area relates to the model of motivation used - and more especially, the role of "morality" in economic and political behavior. The five essays on this topic make up one of the sections of the book, and justify reference to the issue in the volume's title.
What is the relation between economics and religion? In particular,
are theology and economics entirely autonomous and distinct areas
of inquiry? Economics and Religion: Are They Distinct? takes an
inductive approach using case studies to shed light on the extent
to which economics may be regarded as independent of the religious
beliefs of its practitioners. The case studies comprise the first
part of the book and are listed chronologically. These case studies
are followed by commentaries, or interpretive essays; the authors
of these commentaries are acting as a jury to consider the question
How sensitive is economics to theological considerations?' The
editors provide a concluding chapter summarizing both the evidence
and the findings.
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Explaining Norms (Hardcover)
Geoffrey Brennan, Lina Eriksson, Robert E. Goodin, Nicholas Southwood
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R2,819
Discovery Miles 28 190
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Ships in 10 - 15 working days
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Norms are a pervasive yet mysterious feature of social life. In
Explaining Norms, four philosophers and social scientists team up
to grapple with some of the many mysteries, offering a
comprehensive account of norms: what they are; how and why they
emerge, persist and change; and how they work. Norms, they argue,
should be understood in non-reductive terms as clusters of
normative attitudes that serve the function of making us
accountable to one another--with the different kinds of norms
(legal, moral, and social norms) differing in virtue of being
constituted by different kinds of normative attitudes that serve to
make us accountable in different ways. Explanations of and by norms
should be seen as thoroughly pluralist in character. Explanations
of norms should appeal to the ways that norms help us to pursue
projects and goals, individually and collectively, as well as to
enable us to constitute social meanings. Explanations by norms
should recognise the multiplicity of ways in which norms may bear
upon the actions we perform, the attitudes we form and the modes of
deliberation in which we engage: following, merely conforming with,
and even breaching norms. While advancing novel and distinctive
positions on all of these topics, Explaining Norms will also serve
as a sourcebook with a rich array of arguments and illustrations
for others to reassemble in ways of their own choosing.
Societies function on the basis of rules. These rules, rather like
the rules of the road, coordinate the activities of individuals who
have a variety of goals and purposes. Whether the rules work well
or ill, and how they can be made to work better, is a matter of
major concern. Appropriately interpreted, the working of social
rules is also the central subject matter of modern political
economy. This book is about rules - what they are, how they work,
and how they can be properly analysed. The authors' objective is to
understand the workings of alternative political institutions so
that choices among such institutions (rules) can be more fully
informed. Thus, broadly defined, the methodology of constitutional
political economy is the subject matter of The Reason of Rules. The
authors have examined how rules for political order work, how such
rules might be chosen, and how normative criteria for such choices
might be established.
During a career spanning over thirty years Philip Pettit has made
seminal contributions in moral philosophy, political philosophy,
philosophy of the social sciences, philosophy of mind and action,
and metaphysics. His many contributions would be remarkable enough
in themselves, but they are made all the more remarkable by the
ways in which Pettit connects them with each other. Pettit holds
that the lessons learned when thinking about problems in one area
of philosophy often constitute ready-made solutions to problems we
faced in completely different areas. His body of work taken as a
whole provides a vivid example of what philosophy looks like when
done with that conviction.
Common Minds presents specially written papers by some of the most
eminent philosophers alive today, grappling with some of the themes
derived from the larger program that Pettit has inspired. How are
we to do the best we can, whether in the domain of morality or
politics, given that we are non-ideal agents acting in non-ideal
circumstances? What is the normative significance of the capacity
we have to engage in rational deliberation, both individually and
collectively, about what to do? How are we to square our conception
of ourselves as rational deliberators with the more mechanistic
conception of ourselves and the world we inhabit that we get from
the natural sciences? The volume concludes with a substantial piece
by Pettit in which he gives an overview of his work, draws out the
connections between its key themes, and provides a rich commentary
on the preceding essays.
Should government's power to tax be limited? The events of the late
1970s in the wake of California's Proposition 13 brought this
question very sharply into popular focus. Whether the power to tax
should be restricted, and if so how, are issues of immediate policy
significance. Providing a serious analysis of these issues, the
authors of this 1980 book offer an approach to the understanding
and evaluation of the fiscal system, one that yields profound
implications. The central question becomes: how much 'power to tax'
would the citizen voluntarily grant to government as a party to
some initial social contract devising a fiscal constitution? Those
in office are assumed to exploit the power assigned to them to the
maximum possible extent: government is modelled as
'revenue-maximizing Leviathan'. Armed with such a model, the
authors proceed to trace out the restrictions on the power to tax
that might be expected to emerge from the citizen's constitutional
deliberations.
As the concluding volume in the series, this book is structurally and qualitatively different from those preceding. Eight leading social scientists have written major essays on key elements of Australian institutional life. Each chapter contributes significantly by providing an overview of regional and international scholarly interest.
This book offers an account of key features of modern
representative democracy. Working from the rational actor
tradition, it builds a middle ground between orthodox political
theory and the economic analysis of politics. Standard economic
models of politics emphasise the design of the institutional
devices of democracy as operated by essentially self-interested
individuals. This book departs from that model by focusing on
democratic desires alongside democratic devices, stressing that
important aspects of democracy depend on the motivation of
democrats and the interplay between devices and desires.
Individuals are taken to be not only rational, but also somewhat
moral. The authors argue that this approach provides access to
aspects of the debate on democratic institutions that are beyond
the narrowly economic model. They apply their analysis to voting,
elections, representation, political departments and the separation
and division of powers, providing a wide-ranging discussion of the
design of democratic institutions.
Do voters in large scale democracies reliably vote for the electoral outcomes most in their own interest? Much of the literature on voting predicts that they do, but this book argues that fully rational voters will not, in fact, consistently vote for the political outcomes they prefer. The authors critique the dominant interest-based theory of voting and offer a competing theory, which they term an "expressive" theory of electoral politics. This theory is shown to be more coherent and more consistent with actually observed voting behavior. In particular, the theory does a better job of explaining the propensity of democratic regimes to make war, the predominance of moral questions on democratic regimes to make war, the predominance of moral questions on democratic political agendas, and the distribution of government resources in democratic systems. This important book offers a compelling challenge to the central premises of the prevailing theories of voting behavior and should serve as the basis for fundamental reevaluation in the field.
Do voters in large scale democracies reliably vote for the
electoral outcomes most in their own interest? Much of the
literature on voting predicts that they do, but this book argues
that fully rational voters will not, in fact, consistently vote for
the political outcomes they prefer. The authors critique the
dominant interest-based theory of voting and offer a competing
theory, which they term an "expressive" theory of electoral
politics. This theory is shown to be more coherent and more
consistent with actually observed voting behavior. In particular,
the theory does a better job of explaining the propensity of
democratic regimes to make war, the predominance of moral questions
on democratic regimes to make war, the predominance of moral
questions on democratic political agendas, and the distribution of
government resources in democratic systems. This important book
offers a compelling challenge to the central premises of the
prevailing theories of voting behavior and should serve as the
basis for fundamental reevaluation in the field.
Should government's power to tax be limited? The events of the late
1970s in the wake of California's Proposition 13 brought this
question very sharply into popular focus. Whether the power to tax
should be restricted, and if so how, are issues of immediate policy
significance. Providing a serious analysis of these issues, the
authors of this 1980 book offer an approach to the understanding
and evaluation of the fiscal system, one that yields profound
implications. The central question becomes: how much 'power to tax'
would the citizen voluntarily grant to government as a party to
some initial social contract devising a fiscal constitution? Those
in office are assumed to exploit the power assigned to them to the
maximum possible extent: government is modelled as
'revenue-maximizing Leviathan'. Armed with such a model, the
authors proceed to trace out the restrictions on the power to tax
that might be expected to emerge from the citizen's constitutional
deliberations.
However much people want esteem, it is an untradable commodity-
there is no way that you can buy the good opinion of another or
sell to others your good opinion of them. And yet esteem is
allocated in society according to systematic determinants: people's
performance, publicity, and presentation relative to others will
help to fix how much esteem they enjoy and how much disesteem they
avoid. In turn, rational individuals are bound to compete with one
another, however tacitly, in the attempt to increase their chances
of winning esteem and avoiding disesteem. And this competition
shapes the environments in which they each pursue esteem, setting
relevant comparators and benchmarks, and determining the cost that
a person must bear for obtaining a given level of esteem. Hidden in
the multifarious interactions and exchanges of social life, then,
there is a quiet force at work - a force as silent and powerful as
gravity - which molds the basic form of people's relationships and
associations. This force was more or less routinely invoked in the
writings of classical theorists like Aristotle and Plato, Locke and
Montesquieu, Mandeville and Hume and Madison. Although Adam Smith
himself gave it great credence, however, the rise of economics
proper coincided with a sudden decline in the attention devoted to
the economy of esteem. What had been a topic of compelling interest
for earlier authors fell into relative neglect throughout the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This book is designed to
reverse the trend. It begins by outlining the psychology of esteem
and the way the working of that psychology can give rise to an
economy. It then shows how a variety of social patterns that are
otherwise anomalous come to make a lot of sense within an economics
of esteem. And it looks, finally, at the ways in which the economy
of esteem may be reshaped to improve overall social outcomes. While
making connections with older patterns of social theorising, it
offers a novel orientation for contemporary thought about how
society works and how it may be made to work. It puts the economy
of esteem firmly on the agenda of economics and social science and
of moral and political theory.
This book offers a novel approach to the analysis of democracy, and an application of that approach to a variety of democratic institutions, including elections, representation, political parties and the separation of powers. Standard economic approaches to politics concentrate on the design of institutions and the role of individuals motivated by self-interest. The authors incorporate a broader view of political motivation, assuming individuals are moral as well as rational, and provide a wide-ranging discussion of the design of democratic institutions.
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