In this study, first published in 1966, Quester analyzes pre-nuclear age theories of deterrence to equip us with perspective and data by which current theories can be evaluated. Quester presents a forceful argument in support of the relevance of history to discussions of military strategy.

The end of the Cold War, culminating in the tearing down of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the break-up of the Soviet Union soon thereafter, came as good news for most of the world. But it was news, since almost no-one had predicted the collapse of Communist rule in anything less than several decades.

How do international systems deal with the threat and use of weapons of war? In this sophisticated yet accessible analysis, a leading strategic analyst takes readers deep into twentieth century history to answer this question. Weapons of mass destruction, and the counter threat of retaliation, have been central concerns in strategic decision- making in World War I, the legacy of World War II, and the Cold War era.Few people can traverse issues of global confl ict with more historical insight than George Quester. His writing is lucid, and his information either new or imperfectly understood in the past. Quester details the ways weapons of war have infl uenced the forging of policies in the twenty-fi rst century. He argues for the retention of appropriate weapons systems, but also for care in when they are used. Priorities exist, but they depend on whether a state is dealing with major powers or rogue states. And off ensive weapons may well become an option in response to non-state terrorist groups or for that matter state-sponsored terrorist acts.When aggression has already occurred, the world is less likely to regard military response as a violation of the peace. Quester cites Clausewitz's adage that the aggressor is always willing to exploit the world's preference for peace. The rise of the human rights movement adds more complexities to preemptive war and prevention, since the line between civilian and military casualties becomes increasingly blurred. The risks may be great, the choices are few--but the needs of military policy making remain high on the agenda. As a result, the concerns discussed here will be on the global political agenda for years to come.

How do international systems deal with the threat and use of weapons of war? In this sophisticated yet accessible analysis, a leading strategic analyst takes readers deep into twentieth century history to answer this question. Weapons of mass destruction, and the counter threat of retaliation, have been central concerns in strategic decision- making in World War I, the legacy of World War II, and the Cold War era.

Few people can traverse issues of global confl ict with more historical insight than George Quester. His writing is lucid, and his information either new or imperfectly understood in the past. Quester details the ways weapons of war have infl uenced the forging of policies in the twenty-fi rst century. He argues for the retention of appropriate weapons systems, but also for care in when they are used. Priorities exist, but they depend on whether a state is dealing with major powers or rogue states. And off ensive weapons may well become an option in response to non-state terrorist groups or for that matter state-sponsored terrorist acts.

When aggression has already occurred, the world is less likely to regard military response as a violation of the peace. Quester cites Clausewitz's adage that the aggressor is always willing to exploit the world's preference for peace. The rise of the human rights movement adds more complexities to preemptive war and prevention, since the line between civilian and military casualties becomes increasingly blurred. The risks may be great, the choices are few--but the needs of military policy making remain high on the agenda. As a result, the concerns discussed here will be on the global political agenda for years to come.

In this study, first published in 1966, Quester analyzes pre-nuclear age theories of deterrence to equip us with perspective and data by which current theories can be evaluated. Quester presents a forceful argument in support of the relevance of history to discussions of military strategy.

Nuclear proliferation, a security issue which has transcended the cold war, has been, and is, particularly troublesome in South Asia. There, India and Pakistan, neighbors with unresolved disputes since they were granted independence at the end of World War II, are believed to have nuclear weapons (although the leaders of both nations deny it) and are intermittently engaged in conflict with each other. Professor Quester has examined this unique nuclear relationship, analyzing the attitudes and behavior of both nations. He concludes with a paradox: both have "bombs in the basement," if not in their respective military inventories, and these weapons present serious dangers to the world simply because of their destructive potential, even if their leaders have the best intentions. On the other hand, Indian and Pakistani leaders appear to have low levels of concern about each others' nuclear (not conventional military) developments. It is possible to be optimistic and conclude that the relationship is actually stable and, like the U.S.-Soviet nuclear relationship of the cold war, helps prevent war on the subcontinent, or to be cynical and conclude that each regime cares more about the prestige of membership in the nuclear club than the ominous threat posed thereby against their populations.

The Naval War College Review was established in 1948 and is a forum for discussion of public policy matters of interest to the maritime services. The forthright and candid views of the authors are presented for the professional education of the readers. Articles published are related to the academic and professional activities of the Naval War College. They are drawn from a wide variety of sources in order to inform, stimulate, and challenge readers, and to serve as a catalyst for new ideas. Articles are selected primarily on the basis of their intellectual and literary merits, timeliness, and usefulness and interest to a wide readership. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the U.S. Navy Department or the Naval War College.

This book, which offers the work of a group of distinguished contributors, is designed to clarify the bearing of the arms control issue on the Sino-Soviet dispute and to suggest future policy directions for the United States. Arms control and security issues have been at the heart of much of Russian-Chinese disagreement since the opening of the rift in the 1950's. This book, which offers the work of a group of distinguished contributors, is designed to clarify the bearing of the arms control issue on the Sino-Soviet dispute and to suggest future policy directions for the United States. Specifically, the contributors seek to illuminate the security problems facing the United States and to examine the prospects for arms control as they are affected by conflict within the Communist world. Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control begins with the observation that the Soviet Union and Communist China use disarmament talk as a way of pointing out issues of major importance in their dispute, of competing for support within the third world and the Communist bloc, and of expressing genuine disagreement over the fundamental causes of the Sino-Soviet rift. The first section of the book deals with the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the arms control policies of the Soviet Union, China, and the United States. The authors argue that arms control is possible without China, that the Chinese are unlikely to be interested in arms control agreements in the near future, and that arms control could be of paramount importance to relations among the three countries. Part II of the book is a historical exploration of the interrelation between specific arms control measures and the Sino-Soviet dispute. The authors give the most detailed account yet available of Sino-Soviet nuclear relations between 1957 and 1960 and document the extent to which the quarrel has centered on military and security issues. The role of the test ban in widening the Sino-Soviet rift is explored. In Part III each author poses the same question: what would be the nature of Sino-Soviet relations during a Washington-Peking crisis? The first three chapters in this section answer the question from the viewpoint of each country concerned; the last examines these relations during the 1958 Quemoy crisis. Definitive information on the events pertinent to the Sino-Soviet dispute of the 1950's and early 1960's is rare; although it does not pretend to tell the entire story, this book makes a significant contribution to the body of knowledge on the evolution of the Sino-Soviet dispute. As a learned, perceptive comment on the security problems created by the dispute and on the possibilities for agreement that it presents, Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Control will have a wide audience among political scientists, specialists in Sino-Soviet affairs, and a lay public that recognizes the importance of this political issue.