The recent financial crisis has demonstrated the dangers of ignoring the factors that led to previous crises, and the effectiveness of the policies designed to deal with them. Over time, these macroeconomic policies have evolved, oscillating between state intervention and a free-market approach. Following a story that runs from the pre-Great Depression era up until the Financial Crisis of 2007-11, this book reveals an intimate connection between new macroeconomic ideas and policies and the events in the real economy that inspired them. It does this in an accessible, easy-to-follow style, first by focusing on the developments of economic theories and policies, and then by concentrating on the design of domestic and international institutions and economic governance. Written by three leading experts on the history of economic policy, the book is ideal for graduates and undergraduates studying macroeconomics, monetary policy and the history of economic thought.

Dynamic Modeling of Monetary and Fiscal Cooperation Among Nations analyzes coordination of monetary and fiscal stabilization policies between countries and currency areas using a dynamic game approach. The first four chapters introduce the reader to the dynamics of fiscal and monetary policy cooperation. Issues covered include: fiscal coordination, fiscal stringency requirements, structural and bargaining power asymmetries and the design of monetary and fiscal policymaking in a monetary union. In the four last chapters multiple-player settings with aspects of fiscal and/or monetary coordination are analyzed using the endogenous coalition formation approach. The analysis is focused on shock and model asymmetries and issues of multi-country coordination in the presence of (possibly many) monetary unions.

In developing a new and highly innovative theory of economic policy, this book deals with conflicts between strategic actions by public and private agents. It builds on the Lucas critique but also applies the tools introduced by Tinbergen and Theil to dynamic policy games, and from there derives a new theory of economic policy. Its main propositions describe such properties in the models currently used for policy-making as neutrality and equilibrium existence, uniqueness, and multiplicity. These properties are key to understanding the impact of concepts such as rational expectations, time inconsistency, communication and the use of policy announcements. As the numerous examples show, they are useful both for model building and for devising optimal institutions. The Theory of Economic Policy in a Strategic Context is an essential but accessible tool for economic researchers involved in policy questions.

The recent financial crisis has demonstrated the dangers of ignoring the factors that led to previous crises, and the effectiveness of the policies designed to deal with them. Over time, these macroeconomic policies have evolved, oscillating between state intervention and a free-market approach. Following a story that runs from the pre-Great Depression era up until the Financial Crisis of 2007-11, this book reveals an intimate connection between new macroeconomic ideas and policies and the events in the real economy that inspired them. It does this in an accessible, easy-to-follow style, first by focusing on the developments of economic theories and policies, and then by concentrating on the design of domestic and international institutions and economic governance. Written by three leading experts on the history of economic policy, the book is ideal for graduates and undergraduates studying macroeconomics, monetary policy and the history of economic thought.

Dynamic Modeling of Monetary and Fiscal Cooperation Among Nations analyzes coordination of monetary and fiscal stabilization policies between countries and currency areas using a dynamic game approach. The first four chapters introduce the reader to the dynamics of fiscal and monetary policy cooperation. Issues covered include: fiscal coordination, fiscal stringency requirements, structural and bargaining power asymmetries and the design of monetary and fiscal policymaking in a monetary union. In the four last chapters multiple-player settings with aspects of fiscal and/or monetary coordination are analyzed using the endogenous coalition formation approach. The analysis is focused on shock and model asymmetries and issues of multi-country coordination in the presence of (possibly many) monetary unions.

The recent economic events driven by the great financial crisis of 2007-08 has challenged some "dogma", highlighting various limits and drawbacks of current paradigms. The crisis showed the limitations of monetary policy and led to a revaluation of what levels of public debt can be considered safe. This volume aims to refresh the debate on some important long-run macroeconomic issues from new and fresh perspectives. Theoretical Foundations of Macroeconomic Policy raises a number of questions relating to the challenges faced by macroeconomic theory and policies. The common line is the long run and policy perspective. The first part of the book is devoted to the theory of growth and productivity. The second part concentrates on long-run effects of fiscal and monetary policy. Specifically, topics investigated by the international range of authors are the theory of optimal growth, the productivity policies and production function estimations, demand- vs. supply- driven growth, optimal debt default and the incompleteness of financial markets, the long-run optimal inflation target and its relationship with public finance, the long term effects of government budget constraints on growth, and effect on optimal policies in non-market clearing environment. The book will be of interest to postgraduates, researchers, and academics studying macroeconomics and fiscal policies.

In developing a new and highly innovative theory of economic policy, this book deals with conflicts between strategic actions by public and private agents. It builds on the Lucas critique but also applies the tools introduced by Tinbergen and Theil to dynamic policy games, and from there derives a new theory of economic policy. Its main propositions describe such properties in the models currently used for policy-making as neutrality and equilibrium existence, uniqueness, and multiplicity. These properties are key to understanding the impact of concepts such as rational expectations, time inconsistency, communication and the use of policy announcements. As the numerous examples show, they are useful both for model building and for devising optimal institutions. The Theory of Economic Policy in a Strategic Context is an essential but accessible tool for economic researchers involved in policy questions.