Originally published in 1985, this book explores the nuclear confrontation between East and West in Europe: where we stand, how we got there and what the future may hold. Its concluding chapter outlines the prospects for nuclear arms control in Europe, and it frames the debate over NATO strategy and the role of nuclear weapons in the years ahead. Can NATO reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons? Can it cope with the issues at all? The chapters on NATO theatre nuclear forces and doctrine provide a rich background to current policy issues. The public debate over NATO's 1979 decision to deploy new American cruise and Pershing nuclear missiles in Europe was hardly unprecedented in NATO's history: similar controversy surrounded NATO deliberations in the late 1950s and early 1960s. That debate, however, subsided in the mid-1960s; the nuclear question in Europe was relegated to the 'wilderness', though efforts - largely unavailing - continued within official circles to define more clearly the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's defense. Against this backdrop, the nuclear debate emerged again in the 1970s. This title unravels the military and political considerations at play in that debate and maps the European politics surrounding it. Today it can be read in its historical context.

Originally published in 1985, this book explores the nuclear confrontation between East and West in Europe: where we stand, how we got there and what the future may hold. Its concluding chapter outlines the prospects for nuclear arms control in Europe, and it frames the debate over NATO strategy and the role of nuclear weapons in the years ahead. Can NATO reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons? Can it cope with the issues at all? The chapters on NATO theatre nuclear forces and doctrine provide a rich background to current policy issues. The public debate over NATO's 1979 decision to deploy new American cruise and Pershing nuclear missiles in Europe was hardly unprecedented in NATO's history: similar controversy surrounded NATO deliberations in the late 1950s and early 1960s. That debate, however, subsided in the mid-1960s; the nuclear question in Europe was relegated to the 'wilderness', though efforts - largely unavailing - continued within official circles to define more clearly the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's defense. Against this backdrop, the nuclear debate emerged again in the 1970s. This title unravels the military and political considerations at play in that debate and maps the European politics surrounding it. Today it can be read in its historical context.

A series of investigations, especially in the United States and Britain, have focused attention on the performance of national intelligence services. At the same time, the onset of an era of terrorism and a broad span of trans-national security challenges has highlighted the crucial role of intelligence. This book takes stock of the underlying intellectual sub-structure of intelligence. For intelligence as for other areas of policy, serious intellectual inquiry is the basis for improving the performance of real-world institutions. The volume explores intelligence from an intellectual perspective, not an organizational one. Instead the aim of the book is to identity themes that run through these applications, such as the lack of comprehensive theories, the unclear relations between providers and users of intelligence, and the predominance of bureaucratic organizations driven by collection. A key element is the development, or rather non-development, of intelligence toward an established set of methods and standards and, above all, an ongoing scientific discourse. Here, in the transformation from an experience-based proto-science to a science of intelligence in-being, the book argues, lies perhaps the most fundamental challenge for a field of immense impact on the international community, on nations, and on individuals.

During the Cold War, U.S. intelligence was concerned primarily with states; non-state actors like terrorists were secondary. Now the priorities are reversed. And the challenge is enormous. States had an address, and they were hierarchical and bureaucratic. They thus came with some story. Terrorists do not. States were over there, but terrorists are there and here. They thus put pressure on intelligence at home, not just abroad. They also force intelligence and law enforcement the CIA and the FBI to work together in new ways, and if those 700,000 police officers in the United States are to be the eyes and ears in the fight against terror, new means of sharing not just information but also analysis across the federal system are imperative. The strength of this book is that it underscores the extent of the change and ranges broadly across data collection and analysis, foreign and domestic, as well as presenting the issues of value that arise as new targets require collecting more information at home.

In a bold and penetrating study, Gregory Treverton, former Vice Chair of the National Intelligence Council and Senate investigator, offers his insider's views on how intelligence gathering and analysis must change. Treverton suggests why intelligence needs to be contrarian and attentive to the longer term. Believing that it is important to tap expertise outside government to solve intelligence problems, he argues that involving colleagues in the academy, think tanks, and Wall Street befits the changed role of government from doer to convener, mediator, and coalition-builder. Hb ISBN (2001): 0-521-58096-X

The world of intelligence has been completely transformed by the end of the Cold War and the onset of an age of information. Prior to the 1990s, US government intelligence had one principal target, the Soviet Union; a narrow set of 'customers', the political and military officials of the US government; and a limited set of information from the sources they owned, spy satellites and spies. Today, world intelligence has many targets, numerous consumers - not all of whom are American or in the government - and too much information, most of which is not owned by the U.S. government and is of widely varying reliability. In this bold and penetrating study, Gregory Treverton, former Vice Chair of the National Intelligence Council and Senate investigator, offers his insider's views on how intelligence gathering and analysis must change. He suggests why intelligence needs to be both contrarian, leaning against the conventional wisdom, and attentive to the longer term, leaning against the growing shorter time horizons of Washington policy makers. He urges that the solving of intelligence puzzles tap expertise outside government - in the academy, think tanks, and Wall Street - to make these parties colleagues and co-consumers of intelligence, befitting the changed role of government from doer to convener, mediator, and coalition-builder.

During the Cold War, U.S. intelligence was concerned primarily with states; non-state actors like terrorists were secondary. Now the priorities are reversed and the challenge is enormous. States had an address, and they were hierarchical and bureaucratic. They thus came with some 'story'. Terrorists do not. States were 'over there', but terrorists are there and here. They thus put pressure on intelligence at home, not just abroad. The strength of this book is that it underscores the extent of the change and ranges broadly across data collection and analysis, foreign and domestic, as well as presenting the issues of value that arise as new targets require collecting more information at home.

Gregory Treverton reviews the significant episodes in Europe's history after World War II, emphasizing America's preoccupation with Europe and the decisive effect of U.S. foreign policy on European security and economic arrangements during the postwar years.

Originally published in 1993.

The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These paperback editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Truth to Power, the first-ever history of the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC), is told through the reflections of its eight Chairs in the period from the end of the Cold War until 2017. Co-editors Robert Hutchings and Gregory Treverton add a substantial introduction placing the NIC in its historical context going all the way back to the Board of National Estimates in the 1940s, as well as a concluding chapter that highlights key themes and judgments. This historic mission of this remarkable but little-known organization, now almost forty years old, is strategic intelligence assessment in service of senior American foreign policymakers. Its signature inside products, National Intelligence Estimates, are now accompanied by the NIC's every-four-years Global Trends. Unclassified, Global Trends has become a noted NIC brand, its release awaited by officials, academics and private sector managers around the world. Each chapter places its particular period of the NIC's history in context (the global situation, the administration, the intelligence community) and assesses the most important issues with which the NIC grappled during the period, acknowledging failures as well as claiming successes. For example, Hutchings' chapter examines the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the fallout from the ill-fated Iraqi WMD estimate, the debate over intelligence community reform, and the year-long National Intelligence Council 2020 project. With the creation of the Director of National Intelligence in 2005, the NIC's mission mushroomed to include direct intelligence support to the two main policymaking committees in the government: the Principals Committee (cabinet secretaries in the foreign affairs departments) and the Deputies Committee (their deputies or number threes). The mission shift took the NIC directly into the thick of the action but at some cost to its abilities to do strategic thinking: of some 700 NIC papers in 2016, more than half were responses to questions from the National Security Adviser or her deputies, most, though hardly all, of which were current and tactical, not longer-term and strategic.

The Intelligence Community does not lag far behind the private sector in using collaborative tools; indeed, it has developed an impressive array. However, the most used tools, like instant messaging (IM), are employed primarily within agencies for peer-to-peer communication and hence are neither widely collaborative nor especially novel: they are different ways of accomplishing familiar functions. The array of collaborative tools across agencies-ranging from IM to blogs to a wiki called Intellipedia-is impressive but used mostly by enthusiasts. This report identifies lessons learned from looking at the use of internal collaborative tools across the Intelligence Community, especially across the four biggest agencies: Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and National Geospatial Intelligence Agency.

Intelligence is currently facing increasingly challenging cross-pressures from both a need for accurate and timely assessments of potential or imminent security threats and the unpredictability of many of these emerging threats. We are living in a social environment of growing security and intelligence challenges, yet the traditional, narrow intelligence process is becoming increasingly insufficient for coping with diffuse, complex, and rapidly-transforming threats. The essence of intelligence is no longer the collection, analysis, and dissemination of secret information, but has become instead the management of uncertainty in areas critical for overriding security goals--not only for nations, but also for the international community as a whole. For its part, scientific research on major societal risks like climate change is facing a similar cross-pressure from demand on the one hand and incomplete data and developing theoretical concepts on the other. For both of these knowledge-producing domains, the common denominator is the paramount challenges of framing and communicating uncertainty and of managing the pitfalls of politicization National Intelligence and Science is one of the first attempts to analyze these converging domains and the implications of their convergence, in terms of both more scientific approaches to intelligence problems and intelligence approaches to scientific problems. Science and intelligence constitute, as the book spells out, two remarkably similar and interlinked domains of knowledge production, yet ones that remain traditionally separated by a deep political, cultural, and epistemological divide. Looking ahead, the two twentieth-century monoliths--the scientific and the intelligence estates--are becoming simply outdated in their traditional form. The risk society is closing the divide, though in a direction not foreseen by the proponents of turning intelligence analysis into a science, or the new production of scientific knowledge.

Gregory Treverton reviews the significant episodes in Europe's history after World War II, emphasizing America's preoccupation with Europe and the decisive effect of U.S. foreign policy on European security and economic arrangements during the postwar years. Originally published in 1992. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.