Despite a common heritage dating back centuries and mutual national interests, such as their joint fear of Soviet influence across the Mediterranean, it took 38 years after the establishment of the State of Israel (1948) and a decade after Franco's death (1975) for relations to be established between Jerusalem and Madrid (1986). The absence of ties between both countries prior to 1986 was an anomaly that requires explanation. There was no apparent reason why both countries should not have established full diplomatic ties prior. Indeed, during the first years of Israeli statehood until 1952, Spain sought unsuccessfully to establish official ties with Israel as a means to overcome international isolation. But adhering to a moral foreign policy standard, Israel refused formal ties with the former Axis supporter. By 1953, however, Israel began adopting a more pragmatic view. Five centuries after the expulsion of the Jews from Spain bilateral ties were formalised after Spain's successful transition from Franco's dictatorship to democracy and Madrid's ascension to the EEC in 1986. Once in the Community, Madrid had to align its foreign policy with Brussels which necessitated diplomatic relations with Israel. Without this systematic pressure on Madrid, the anomaly of Israeli-Spanish relations would have likely continued. Post 1986 the ties between the two countries were overshadowed by strong international political forces -- the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian struggle -- which delayed bilateral progress. Explaining the impact of these forces is key to understanding the relationship. Although many positive milestones have been reached there are substantive issues of concern for both sides, and a feeling that much work remains if the relationship, and indeed friendship, is to become worthy and rewarding.

Despite a common heritage dating back centuries and mutual national interests, such as their joint fear of Soviet influence across the Mediterranean, it took 38 years after the establishment of the State of Israel (1948) and a decade after Francos death (1975) for relations to be established between Jerusalem and Madrid (1986). The absence of ties between both countries prior to 1986 was an anomaly that requires explanation. There was no apparent reason why both countries should not have established full diplomatic ties prior. Indeed, during the first years of Israeli statehood until 1952, Spain sought unsuccessfully to establish official ties with Israel as a means to overcome international isolation. But adhering to a moral foreign policy standard, Israel refused formal ties with the former Axis supporter. By 1953, however, Israel began adopting a more pragmatic view. Five centuries after the expulsion of the Jews from Spain bilateral ties were formalised after Spains successful transition from Francos dictatorship to democracy and Madrids ascension to the EEC in 1986. Once in the Community, Madrid had to align its foreign policy with Brussels which necessitated diplomatic relations with Israel. Without this systematic pressure on Madrid, the anomaly of Israeli-Spanish relations would have likely continued. Post 1986 the ties between the two countries were overshadowed by strong international political forces -- the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian struggle -- which delayed bilateral progress. Explaining the impact of these forces is key to understanding the relationship. Although many positive milestones have been reached there are substantive issues of concern for both sides, and a feeling that much work remains if the relationship, and indeed friendship, is to become worthy and rewarding.

The Weekend Crisis during May 1938 presents a classic case-study in the strategy pre-emption. Czechoslovak intelligence was convinced that Hitler was on the verge of ordering the invasion of their country four months before the infamous Munich Conference. In response, President Eduard Benes ordered reservists to man the frontiers expecting war. The Nazi offensive never came. Did Hitler really plan to attack Prague in May 1938? Today, the lessons of the Weekend Crisis are all the more important. Following 9/11 the United States adopted a strategy of national defence based on pre-emption already applied in Iraq despite significant global opposition. The threat of terrorism combined with weapons of mass destruction means that Washington cannot risk waiting again to be attacked. It must strike first when a potentially catastrophic threat has been identified. Yet, what standard must our leaders apply when identifying and profiling such a threat? The Weekend Crisis of May 1938: Analyzing an Unsolved Mystery in Czechoslovakia-Nazi Germany Relations attempts to answer precisely that question by evaluating the decision-making of Benes. ordered the reserve call-up?