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This volume features essays that explore the insights of the
14th-century Parisian nominalist philosopher, John Buridan. It
serves as a companion to the Latin text edition and annotated
English translation of his question-commentary on Aristotle's On
the Soul. The contributors survey Buridan's work both in its own
historical-theoretical context and in relation to contemporary
issues. The essays come in three main sections, which correspond to
the three books of Buridan's Questions. Coverage first deals with
the classification of the science of the soul within the system of
Aristotelian sciences, and surveys the main issues within it. The
next section examines the metaphysics of the soul. It considers
Buridan's peculiar version of Aristotelian hylomorphism in dealing
with the problem of what kind of entity the soul (in particular,
the human soul) is, and what powers and actions it has, on the
basis of which we can approach the question of its essence. The
volume concludes with a look at Buridan's doctrine of the nature
and functions of the human intellect. Coverage in this section
includes the problem of self-knowledge in Buridan's theory,
Buridan's answer to the traditional medieval problem concerning the
primary object of the intellect, and his unique treatment of
logical problems in psychological contexts.
This volume features essays that explore the insights of the
14th-century Parisian nominalist philosopher, John Buridan. It
serves as a companion to the Latin text edition and annotated
English translation of his question-commentary on Aristotle's On
the Soul. The contributors survey Buridan's work both in its own
historical-theoretical context and in relation to contemporary
issues. The essays come in three main sections, which correspond to
the three books of Buridan's Questions. Coverage first deals with
the classification of the science of the soul within the system of
Aristotelian sciences, and surveys the main issues within it. The
next section examines the metaphysics of the soul. It considers
Buridan's peculiar version of Aristotelian hylomorphism in dealing
with the problem of what kind of entity the soul (in particular,
the human soul) is, and what powers and actions it has, on the
basis of which we can approach the question of its essence. The
volume concludes with a look at Buridan's doctrine of the nature
and functions of the human intellect. Coverage in this section
includes the problem of self-knowledge in Buridan's theory,
Buridan's answer to the traditional medieval problem concerning the
primary object of the intellect, and his unique treatment of
logical problems in psychological contexts.
This volume is about the most mind-boggling sacrament of the
Christian faith, also referred to as the Sacrament of the Altar,
the Eucharist: in its Roman Catholic interpretation, the conversion
of the substance of the bread and wine into the body and blood of
Christ for Holy Communion. The challenge of providing a rational
interpretation of this doctrine of faith proved to be one of the
most contentious issues in the Western history of ideas, apparently
going against self-evident metaphysical principles (requiring
accidents existing without a substance, and a body in several
places at the same time, etc.), and dividing schools of thought,
indeed, eventually, warring religious factions. The volume
addresses both the metaphysical, theoretical issues involved in
this challenge and the historical, theological developments of how
meeting this challenge played out first in the schools and even
later in religious schisms, leading to the paradigmatic shift from
medieval to modern forms of thought. The essays of the volume
derive from the lectures of an eponymous international conference
held in Budapest, Hungary, which was also the occasion of founding
the Society for the History of European Ideas (SEHI); accordingly,
the book is the first volume of the annual Proceedings of the SEHI.
This book is aimed just as much at laymen and religious scholars
seeking a better understanding of their faith as at anyone seeking
this understanding with a non-religious attitude.
It is commonly supposed that certain elements of medieval
philosophy are uncharacteristically preserved in modern
philosophical thought through the idea that mental phenomena are
distinguished from physical phenomena by their intentionality,
their intrinsic directedness toward some object. The many
exceptions to this presumption, however, threaten its viability.
This volume explores the intricacies and varieties of the
conceptual relationships medieval thinkers developed among
intentionality, cognition, and mental representation. Ranging from
Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, and Buridan through less-familiar writers,
the collection sheds new light on the various strands that run
between medieval and modern thought and bring us to a number of
fundamental questions in the philosophy of mind as it is conceived
today.
This is a brief, accessible introduction to the thought of the
philosopher John Buridan (ca. 1295-1361). Little is known about
Buridan's life, most of which was spent studying and then teaching
at the University of Paris. Buridan's works are mostly by-products
of his teaching. They consist mainly of commentaries on Aristotle,
covering the whole extent of Aristotelian philosophy, ranging from
logic to metaphysics, to natural science, to ethics and politics.
Aside from these running commentaries on Aristotle's texts, Buridan
wrote influential question-commentaries. These were a typical genre
of the medieval scholastic output, in which the authors
systematically and thoroughly discussed the most problematic issues
raised by the text they were lecturing on. The question-format
allowed Buridan to work out in detail his characteristically
nominalist take on practically all aspects of Aristotelian
philosophy, using the conceptual tools he developed in his works on
logic. Buridan's influence in the late Middle Ages can hardly be
overestimated. His ideas quickly spread not only through his own
works, but to an even larger extent through the work of his
students and younger colleagues, such as Nicholas Oresme,
Marisilius of Inghen, and Albert of Saxony, who in turn became very
influential themselves, and turned Buridan's ideas into standard
textbook material in the curricula of many late medieval European
universities. With the waning of scholasticism Buridan's fame
quickly faded. Gyula Klima argues, however, that many of Buridan's
academic concerns are strikingly similar to those of modern
philosophy and his work sometimes quite directly addresses modern
philosophical questions.
The Singular Voice of Being reconsiders John Duns Scotus's
well-studied theory of the univocity of being in light of his less
explored discussions of ultimate difference. Ultimate difference is
a notion introduced by Aristotle and known by the Aristotelian
tradition, but one that, this book argues, Scotus radically
retrofits to buttress his doctrine of univocity. Scotus broadens
ultimate difference to include not only specific differences, but
also intrinsic modes of being (e.g., finite/infinite) and
principles of individuation (i.e., haecceitates). Furthermore, he
deepens it by divorcing it from anything with categorical
classification, such as substantial form. Scotus uses his revamped
notion of ultimate difference as a means of dividing being, despite
the longstanding Parmenidean arguments against such division. The
book highlights the unique role of difference in Scotus's thought,
which conceives of difference not as a fall from the perfect unity
of being but rather as a perfective determination of an otherwise
indifferent concept. The division of being culminates in
individuation as the final degree of perfection, which constitutes
indivisible (i.e., singular) degrees of being. This systematic
study of ultimate difference opens new dimensions for understanding
Scotus's dense thought with respect to not only univocity, but also
to individuation, cognition, and acts of the will.
It is commonly supposed that certain elements of medieval
philosophy are uncharacteristically preserved in modern
philosophical thought through the idea that mental phenomena are
distinguished from physical phenomena by their intentionality,
their intrinsic directedness toward some object. The many
exceptions to this presumption, however, threaten its viability.
This volume explores the intricacies and varieties of the
conceptual relationships medieval thinkers developed among
intentionality, cognition, and mental representation. Ranging from
Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, and Buridan through less-familiar writers,
the collection sheds new light on the various strands that run
between medieval and modern thought and bring us to a number of
fundamental questions in the philosophy of mind as it is conceived
today.
This is a brief, accessible introduction to the thought of the
philosopher John Buridan (ca. 1295-1361). Little is known about
Buridan's life, most of which was spent studying and then teaching
at the University of Paris. Buridan's works are mostly by-products
of his teaching. They consist mainly of commentaries on Aristotle,
covering the whole extent of Aristotelian philosophy, ranging from
logic to metaphysics, to natural science, to ethics and politics.
Aside from these running commentaries on Aristotle's texts, Buridan
wrote influential question-commentaries. These were a typical genre
of the medieval scholastic output, in which the authors
systematically and thoroughly discussed the most problematic issues
raised by the text they were lecturing on. The question-format
allowed Buridan to work out in detail his characteristically
nominalist take on practically all aspects of Aristotelian
philosophy, using the conceptual tools he developed in his works on
logic. Buridan's influence in the late Middle Ages can hardly be
overestimated. His ideas quickly spread not only through his own
works, but to an even larger extent through the work of his
students and younger colleagues, such as Nicholas Oresme,
Marisilius of Inghen, and Albert of Saxony, who in turn became very
influential themselves, and turned Buridan's ideas into standard
textbook material in the curricula of many late medieval European
universities. With the waning of scholasticism Buridan's fame
quickly faded. Gyula Klima argues, however, that many of Buridan's
academic concerns are strikingly similar to those of modern
philosophy and his work sometimes quite directly addresses modern
philosophical questions.
Skepticism, Causality and Skepticism about Causality studies the
interrelated themes of causality and skepticism in contemporary,
early modern and medieval philosophy. Thomas Aquinas's celebrated
proofs of the existence of God (the Five Ways of the Summa
Theologica) rely in part on an Aristotelian notion of synchronous
causality, wherein the things that exist and persist require an
accounting that ultimately terminates in the ongoing activity of a
first mover, as the existence and persistence of an ecosystem is
traceable to the sun. By contrast, in David Hume's early modern
account, causality consists in the regularity of successive events
(a rolling billiard ball's collision with a stationary one is
always followed by the movement of the latter). Moreover, Newtonian
and Einsteinian accounts respectively suggest that motion, once
initiated, requires no explanation. In light of these developments,
the first set of essays in this volume re-evaluates the
Aristotelian paradigm and its relation to modern science,
contending that in some fields (such as ecology, thermodynamics or
information theory) contemporary science still preserves some
intuitions about causality that support Aquinas's
deliberations.Hume's skepticism about causality is heir to late
medieval and early modern development that transformed not only the
notion of causality in general, but also the idea of the causal
connections between our cognitive faculties, God, and the world in
particular, giving rise to extreme, solipsistic forms of
skepticism, such as Descartes' Demon skepticism. The second set of
essays considers whether Aquinas's thought would be susceptible in
some ways to this form of skepticism, and what motivated, just a
couple of generations later, the turn to epistemology already
involving this sort of skepticism.
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