High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1975 study. The Air Staff tasked Project CHECO to write continuing reports on counterinsurgency in Thailand. Normally, the first work in a continuing report series describes the overall situation, and subsequent reports provide annual or biannual updates. Underlying details about the Thai insurgency, however, have slowly been coming to light over the past few years, therefore, counterinsurgency has necessarily continued to evolve and past CHECO works on counterinsurgency have been limited to reporting the specific end events of force and counter force. This study attempts to delimit the background to the Thai insurgency and counterinsurgency. Preliminary surveys of the literature and data available indicated that insurgency and counterinsurgency in Thailand have been well documented but that pertinent information is scattered throughout a multitude of separate reports and studies by many agencies. Consequently, one must read numerous publications to become enlightened on all but the most narrowly focused insurgency/counterinsurgency topics. This report attempts to integrate in one volume for the staff officer a broad background and wide perspective of insurgency and counterinsurgency in Thailand. It extracts from many of the completed works and indicates where more detail can be found. It avoids duplicating lengthy explanations already published, avoids citing detailed statistics on armed conflict which are all too often misleading indicators, and avoids discussing personalities which have been important but are left to more exhaustive studies. Due to the nature of its comprehensive approach, this report only indicates the complexities of the Thai insurgency/counterinsurgency and sketches in broadest terms the cultural heritage of the Thai.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1972 study. Interdiction of the overland flow of supplies from North Vietnam to Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam and Cambodia was a primary mission for American airpower in Southeast Asia (SEA). The primary target for air interdiction was the supply system in North Vietnam (NVN), until the bombing halt there shifted the emphasis to the logistic channel in southern Laos, the Steel Tiger area of operations. The interdiction campaigns there bore the name Commando Hunt with numerical designations that changed with the semiannual monsoon shift. Commando Hunt VI, the third southwest-monsoon, or wet-season, campaign, covered the period 15 May through 31 October 1971. The past pattern had been for the enemy to move supplies through Steel Tiger into the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) when the weather in Laos was relatively dry. Some of these supplies had been moved through Cambodia en route to RVN; since the deposition of Prince Sihanouk in 1970, the enemy needed to use supplies against the Cambodian government as well as against RVN. With the onset of the wet season, as the road system in Laos became a quagmire, the enemy shifted his emphasis to stockpiling materiel in the NVN border areas to prepare for a logistics surge through Laos during the next dry season. The sanctuary given the enemy by the NVN bombing halt enabled him to get a running start for the dry season. Commando Hunt VI came on the heels of the most successful dry season campaign to date, whether judged in terms of greatest observed bomb damage, lowest throughput-to-input ratio, or lowest total throughput. Thus enemy activity could be expected to be at a higher level than during previous wet seasons, in order to supply his forces in the RVN and Cambodia.

High quality reprint of a recently declassified 1971 study. IGLOO WHITE originated as part of a September 1966 plan to interdict North Vietnamese infiltration into the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). Originally called PRACTICE NINE, the plan was renamed MUSCLE SHOALS before it was finally designated IGLOO WHITE in June 1968. PRACTICE NINE included two subsystems: a Strong Point Obstacle sub-System (SPOS), and an air-supported anti-infiltration subsystem stretching westward from the SPOS into Laos to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail through central and eastern Laos, by which the enemy supplied his forces in South Vietnam. The Laotian part of the plan envisioned the emplacement of both sensor devises and special munitions to detect and impede this traffic. By July 1968, however, the munitions part of the program had proved to be relatively ineffective, and the use of air-delivered electronic ground sensors for reconnaissance purposes became the primary feature of the system. IGLOO WHITE consisted of three main components. The first component consisted of battery-powered sensing devices which detected seismic, acoustical, or electrical signals generated by the presence of enemy vehicles or personnel. The sensors were either implanted in the ground or were para-dropped and allowed to hang in the upper layers of the jungle canopy. The second component was an airborne platform (EC-121R, QU-22B, or C-130) designed to monitor the sensors and either re]ay the information to a ground facility or have it manually read out by specially trained personnel aboard the aircraft. The third component was an Infiltration Surveillance Center (ISC) which received sensor data from the airborne monitor and performed detailed intelligence analysis of enemy movement patterns as well as relayed the Information to strike aircraft in useable form for immediate action. This facility was provided by Task Force Alpha (TFA), which began operations at Nakhon Phanom Royal Thai Air Force Base, Thailand, on 1 December 1967.

High quality reprint of a recently declassified 1969 study. The War in Southeast Asia in 1967 and 1968 comprised an astounding complexity of conventional and unconventional wars, political and geographic boundaries, Rules of Engagement, areas of operation, command responsibilities, wet and dry seasons, sanctuaries for both sides, and a terrain of mountains, jungles, and flood plains From the Red Chinese Border to the Mekong Delta, the enemy supply lines ran this tangled natural and man-made gauntlet--attacked the whole way by the air interdiction campaign. In North Vietnam, the railroads and bridges on the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) target lists were the prime interdiction targets. Interdiction operations in Laos meant attacking the trucks rolling down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, closing the roads with air strikes, and bombing the supplies stockpiled off the Trail. Within South Vietnam, all airstrikes were nominally considered close air support for ground forces Seventh Air Force operations against in-country enemy roads only slowly became an interdiction campaign. The Cambodian government's refusal to sanction U.S. air strikes within its borders put U.S. activities there within the scope of unconventional warfare and outside the conventional interdiction efforts. Despite many natural and man-made variables, "air interdiction" had certain common characteristics, particular tactics, and specific munitions For instance, the Air Force experience in Korea was repeated in SEA when the enemy's heavy antiaircraft artillery (AAA) degraded accurate bombing of roads and railroads. Also, few efficient area denial weapons existed to prevent rapid enemy repair of the bomb cuts made on the roadbeds. This proved true against roads running through Laos into South Vietnam, as well as against railroads around Hanoi.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1968 study.Operation NIAGARA was a concentrated air effort executed by the 7th Air Force Commander in early 1968 to disrupt a potential major offensive in northwestern I Corps and the contiguous area of Laos An extensive enemy build-up in the western DMZ area in late 1967 and early 1968 indicated that a major offensive was developing, with the estimated objective of overrunning Khe Sanh and other friendly positions located astride Route 9--the most readily accessible infiltration route for North Vietnamese forces bypassing the DMZ into South Vietnam It was further estimated that the enemy would launch his offensive on or about 30 January-when the South Vietnamese would be observing the Lunar New Year Thus, at the direction of COMUSMACV, the 7th Air Force Commander and his operations and intelligence staff planned and directed SLAM-type operations in the NIAGARA area several days prior to the Tet Holidays. These operations were accorded the highest priority, and were applied on a sustained basis SLAM-type operations began in the NIAGARA area on 22 January, with 595 tactical strike sorties (including 7AF, USMC, and USN) and 49 B-52 sorties flown against enemy targets When Operation NIAGARA officially terminated on 31 March 1968, over 24,400 tactical strike sorties and 2,500 B-52 sorties had been flown This was the greatest sustained concentration of airpower in the Vietnam conflict to date The purpose of this report is to bring the statistical weight of effort into proper perspective through the narrative study and documentation of significant developments It addresses in particular those operational areas of 7th Air Force evaluative concern-i.e. operational problems and lessons learned, coordination and control, the development of targets and tactics, and the responsiveness of airpower to the tactical situation.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1972 study. "Kontum: Battle for the Central Highlands" is one of a series of Project CHECO reports on the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) 1972 Offensive. Predicted by most observers as the "logical" focal point of any new enemy offensive, action in the Central Highlands of Military Region II (MR II) remained disquietingly inconclusive until mid-May. While major battles at Quang Tri in MR I and at An Loc in MR III captured most of the headlines, a series of engagements at Tan Canh/Dak To and the smaller Fire Support Bases (FSBs) along "Rocket Ridge" set the scene for the major attacks on Kontum City of 14 and 24 May 1972. This report focuses primarily on the action in Kontum and Pleiku provinces, although significant events in other areas of MR II are mentioned. The almost immediate loss of Tam Quan, Hoai Nhon and Hoalan districts in the east coast province of Binh Dinh rendered the defense of the Central Highlands extremely critical since the loss of Kontum and Pleiku would, in effect, have split South Vietnam in two. The role of United States and South Vietnamese airpower in preventing defeat in the Central Highlands is the dominant theme of this study. In many cases, on-the-scene interviews with participants in the battles form the basis for personal assessments of the key role airpower played in the defense of Kontum City; however, tables and charts of sorties flown and Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA) are provided in an appendix.

High quality reprint of a recently declassified 1971 study. This CHECO report on Lam Son 719, the South Vietnamese incursion into Laos in February and March 1971, is an interim narrative of what was one of the most significant military actions in Southeast Asia since the enemy's 1968 Tet Offensive. It also is a report on one of the most fundamental problems faced by Americans in the Vietnam conflict--the proper employment of American technological superiority, mainly air power, against an enemy highly skilled in the elusive art of jungle warfare and equipped with modern sophisticated weaponry with the exception of aircraft. Lam Son 719 was the first major operation of its kind - a cross-border activity in which large South Vietnamese ground forces operated independently without U.S. Army ground advisors but with almost complete dependence upon U.S. air support. Yet in Lam Son 719, some of the problems associated with the U.S. effort since 1962 reappeared and had to be resolved to meet the particular situation. Primary among these was the before-the-fact coordination of air support for ground or airmobile operations to fit the needs of a fluid ground situation. Also of significance was the problem of locating the enemy and bringing the maximum firepower to bear on him. Despite these problems, Lam Son 719 showed that a large Vietnamese ground force, which had remained on the sidelines for years, could move into the enemy stronghold given U.S. air support. This was a critical test of its capability, a test which would have a great impact upon plans for American withdrawal from Vietnam.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1967 study. This study covers a year of tough fighting in the highly strategic central highlands area of Vietnam, an area which the communists have always considered essential to their effort to take over South Vietnam. Prior to the arrival of U.S. forces in 1965, there was little activity in western Pleiku Province, but starting with the move of the 1st Air Cavalry Division to the defense of the besieged fort of Plei Me in October 1965, fighting has been continuous. The western Pleiku area, however, on the western end of strategic Highway 19, which cuts across the country to the coastal port of Qui Nhon, is the logical entry point for any planned enemy drive to cut South Vietnam in half. In this objective, the enemy has not succeeded. What emerges clearly from this account of fighting by the 1st Air Cavalry, 25th, and 4th Infantry Divisions in the central highlands is the absolute essentiality of air support to the survival of friendly forces. Perhaps never in history has a large ground force in war been so dependent upon air support, close air support, and tactical airlift, as well as other air support functions such as interdiction, landing zone preparation, reconnaissance, night flare drops, defoliation, psychological warfare, and search and rescue. This study shows in detail the means by which air was employed in highlands fighting and how it directly affected and influenced ground action. The U.S. units are generally flown to the battle areas and are cut off by land from their normal support bases. They cannot continue to function effectively without the air umbrella provided by the vast armada of U.S. aircraft located in Vietnam. Air support, as can be seen from this study, is infinitely more than a new dimension of artillery. It is the difference between success or failure and no one will attest to this more strongly than the U.S. Army ground commanders on the receiving end, many of whom are quoted in the study.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1972 study. This study documents the conception, birth, death and resurrection of gunship beacon offset firing techniques. Two entirely different systems--Pave Mace and Combat Rendezvous--are discussed. These systems enabled USAF fixed wing gunships to deliver safe, sustained, and effective aerial fire on enemy ground forces in close proximity to friendly forces when both are invisible from the air. The primary purpose of this report is to show from well-documented experience that these systems represent an in-being, revolutionary, all-weather, close air support capability never before achieved. The report also examines the sometimes unconventional, often torturous, and almost always frustrating process by which the USAF developed, tested, introduced, and finally used these systems in combat. In so doing it suggests some obvious lessons which may facilitate more systematic management of future weapons systems. The report also shows how interservice rivalry, roles and missions considerations, and force structure issues impeded and almost prevented the introduction of systems who rapid deployment would have been in the best interest of both services. Hopefully, this experience may suggest how such opposition can be overcome in the future by showing how it was overcome in this instance. The report seeks to provide sufficient technical information about each system to enable the reader to understand how each system operates and to compare their relative merits and shortcomings. In so doing it reveals a number of problems with both systems which have not yet been overcome and discussed possible solutions that have been advanced. Finally, this study shows how each system has saved the lives of friendly ground forces who would otherwise have died had it not been for these systems.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1971 study. The unique demands of the operational environment in Southeast Asia dictated that the United States Air Force meet many mission requirements for which hardware did not exist. The lateral firing gunship evolved from this environment, and it constituted an immediate and effective solution for several tactical problems. This weapon system performed significantly in Southeast Asia. AC-47 gunship activity during 1965 and early 1966 was documented in four previous CHECO reports. Another CHECO report, Night Close Air Support in RVN, also dealt in detail with AC-47 combat operations. The Role of Gunships in SEA, a CHECO report dated 30 August 1969, recounts the continuing mission of the AC-47 as well as the introduction and employment of AC-119G, AC-119K, and AC-130A gunships in 1968 and 1969. The effectiveness of this unique weapon system generated significant interest at all command levels, and the combat role of gunships merits further attention and analysis. This report updates previous gunship studies with special emphasis on new developments in the AC-130 weapon system. This report also examines the current performance and effectiveness of the AC-47, long noted for its role in providing close air support for troops in contact; the AC-119G/K which functioned in armed reconnaissance and close air support roles; and the AC-130 which covered the whole spectrum of gunship operations but performed primarily as a night interdiction weapon system.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1969 study. A study requested by the Secretary of Defense in 1965 showed that "when national interests are involved and tactical forces are deployed without a declaration of national emergency or war, a quick-reacting, heavy repair force, organic to the Air Force, is essential." Between June and September 1965, a study group from the Directorate of Civil Engineering at Headquarters USAF had analyzed the problem and obtained Air Staff approval to form such a force. On 23 September 1965, the Tactical Air Command (TAC) was given responsibility for organizing, training, procuring equipment and supplies, and administering the formation of the first two Red Horse Squadrons (the 554th and 555th Civil Engineering Heavy Repair Squadrons). By 18 October 1965, Hq TAC at Langley Field, Virginia, completed and distributed a comprehensive programming plan covering the objectives, timetable of actions, reporting procedures, staffing requirements, and the naming of primary and subordinate unit project officers. The mission and capabilities of the squadrons, their limitations, and material requirements were also recorded. Thus, in the fall of 1965, responding to the changing military and political situation in Southeast Asia and the projected need for a rapid increase of U.S. military forces in that part of the world, Project RED HORSE was initiated. The rapidity of planning, organizing, and executing which characterized these early beginnings, was to become a permanent part of RED HORSE activities.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1969 study. Combine adverse effects of darkness and weather conditions on air operations in a combat situation, and a very hazardous operational environment is likely to prevail. This CHECO report investigates problems and limitations of the impact which darkness and weather have on air operations in Southeast Asia. Throughout this report, special emphasis is placed on tactics, techniques, and innovations developed to counteract unfavorable effects of night and weather on mission accomplishment.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1971 study.The primary mission of Ranch Hand was defoliation and crop destruction. Defoliation was directed against enemy strongholds, roadsides, power lines, railroads, and other lines of communication. The objectives were to increase visibility for Forward Air Controller (FAC) and tactical aircraft and to make it more difficult for the enemy to ambush ground forces. Two herbicides were used for. defoliation: Orange, a mixture of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T chlorophenoxy acids; and White, a mixture of 2,4-D and picloram. Crop destruction was directed at food plots of enemy troops, the objective being to increase their logistics problem. The herbicide used for crop denial missions was Agent Blue, a sodium salt of cacodylic acid. Proposed targets were carefully screened at all echelons. Requests for defoliation and crop destruction were originated by army commanders at or below the province level. The request, when approved by the Province Chief, was sent to the Vietnamese Joint General Staff (JGS). With their approval, it went to Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) which reviewed specific target areas and operational requirements. A coordination meeting was then held at the province where the final plan was agreed upon. Following this, an operations order was published by the JGS and an execution order issued by MACV. It required approximately six months from the time the request for defoliation was first submitted until the final plan was agreed upon by all levels of command. A second mission of the Ranch was that of conducting airlift operations as directed by higher authority. This was accomplished by removing the spray tanks and spray booms from the aircraft and installing the conveyors and other essential equipment for airlift operations. The conversion, when required, was accomplished in less than 24 hours.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1977 study. This report is the fourth in a series of CHECO reports on the ROE, summarizing significant events and changes which occurred between October 1972 and August 1973. Throughout this period, the operating authorities formulated by the JCS were in most cases directly related to the peace negotiations conducted in Paris between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). Consequently, this report accounts for changes in the ROE, chronologically, as they applied to the different areas of SEA: The Republic of Vietnam (RVN), North Vietnam (NVN), Laos, and Cambodia. This presentation not only provides the reader with significant changes in the ROE between October 1972 and August 1973, but also portrays the close relationship between national policy and the conduct of air operations in SEA. The intensity of bombing, the number of sorties authorized, and the territorial restrictions were constantly changed, particularly through January 1973. Specifically, they followed the negotiating trends and the sincerity, or the lack of it, with which the North Vietnamese approached peace negotiations. These negotiations culminated in the signing of the "Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam" on 27 January 1973 in Paris. Because these changes would be less significant to the reader without some prior knowledge of the ROE, this chapter provides a brief summary of the ROE as they stood in September 1972.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1970 study. United States and South Vietnamese forces entering Cambodia on 1 May 1970 seriously weakened the enemy posture as they captured large quantities of his supplies and inflicted heavy casualties on Viet Cong/North Vietnamese Army forces operating in Cambodian sanctuaries. This movement of troops supported by airpower is profiled here in "The Cambodian Campaign, 29 April - 30 June 1970," a special CHECO Report, as one of the most significant actions of the Southeast Asia conflict. The quantity of supplies contained in the caches captured in Cambodia during May - June 1970 exceeded the total supplies contained in all the caches captured in RVN for the 15 months from February 1969 through April 1970. Airpower was employed in two ways in the Cambodian campaign; first, in tactical air support of friendly ground operations and second, in an interdiction campaign. The interdiction campaign consisted of three phases: (1) a period of limited interdiction in northeastern Cambodia; (2) an extension of interdiction in northeastern Cambodia; and (3) a retrenchment back to a limited area. The establishment and development of the air interdiction campaign and tactical air and ARC LIGHT missions in support of the operations in Cambodia are detailed in this report, along with a statistical summary of airlift operations.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1971 study. This report describes the effects of the Consolidated Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Improvement and Modernization Program (CRIMP) on each of the Vietnamese Air Divisions (ADs). Each chapter of this report was written by a different author. Thus, the reader has not one, but five views of American efforts to improve and modernize the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF). Each author presents the results of his own investigation, and while they generally agree on the overall success of the program, they sometimes differ on details. Problems and achievements that were significant to one author were sometimes less important to another. Therefore, each chapter of this report should be evaluated on its own merit as well as by comparison to the other four. The history of the VNAF and the United States Air Force (USAF) advisory role in its development has been traced in three previous CHECO reports: Organization, Mission and Growth of the Vietnamese Air Force, 1949-1968; VNAF Improvement and Modernization Program 1968-1970]; and The Vietnamization of the Air War, 1970-1971. The Vietnamization of the Air War is a companion volume to The VNAF Air Divisions: Reports on Improvement and Modernization. The former describes VNAF improvement and modernization (I&M) by mission function-- airlift" for example, or "logistics,"--and thus deals with the broad out lines of the entire VNAF. The VNAF Air Divisions, on the other hand, focuses on one Air Division in each chapter and investigates the details of I&M at the unit level. Together, these two volumes describe the VNAF as it developed between January 1970 and July 1971.

High quality reprint of a recently declassified 1967 study. "The War in Vietnam - 1966" is a sequel to "The War in Vietnam - 1965." It summarizes and places in perspective, the Air Force mission in Southeast Asia (SEA). The strategy of airpower in this area of conflict, its offensive and defensive air and ground operations, and effectiveness of command and control are also discussed.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1968 eport. "The War in Vietnam--July - December 1967" summarizes and provides an overall look at the Air Force role in North and South Vietnam for the semi- annual period. It is a continuation of the summary of Air Force operations first detailed in "The War in Vietnam - 1965." ROLLING THUNDER gradually increased the weight of effort against a broadening, but still limited, target complex. The high incidence of radar-directed guns and SA-2s in the extended battle area also required changes in tactics by strike and reconnaissance forces. Close air support was instrumental in breaking the enemy attacks on Dak To, Loc Ninh, and Bo Duc, often by putting ordnance within 20 feet of prepared Allied positions. Airlift units retained their basic organizational structure and successfully supported the Allied requirements at Loc Ninh and Dak To. Flying safety was the paramount problem confronting the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), and by August, aircraft losses due to pilot error exceeded combat losses, until finally an intensive instrument training program was initiated. The denial of crops through herbicide destruction often placed a severe strain on the enemy supply system, forcing the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) out of their normal operating areas. Enemy attacks against air bases with a steadily improving rocket capability continued to present formidable problems. Successful efforts were made during the period to substantially increase the B-52 monthly sortie rate to keep pressure on the enemy's supply and infiltration system, while at the same time blocking his efforts to mass along the DMZ.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1968 study."The War in Vietnam" provides an overall look at the Southeast Asia situation, as it relates to the role of the United States Air Force. Intensifying its air operations, the USAF increased its close air support, interdiction, fixed-wing, and helicopter support. New tactics were also used to improve the Search and Rescue capability in highly defended areas and measures were devised to minimize limitations of aircraft in recovering downed airmen. In an effort to exhaust enemy resources and remove his sanctuaries in North Vietnam, one of the major objectives of the air campaign was greater targeting freedom. A probing for target alternatives showed destruction of hard-to-replace vehicles could be more effective than "cratering a road, interdicting a rail line, or destroying a bridge." Since enemy strategy emphasized prolonging the war by keeping the U.S. out of the: Hanoi/Haiphong region, CINCPAC enumerated methods of attacking his air defense system, including MIG air bases and aircraft on the ground.

High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1971 study. This report describes the improvement and modernization of the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) from January 1970 to July 1971. The growth and development of the VNAF during this period was an integral part of the Consolidated Republic of Vietnam Improvement and Modernization Program (CRIMP). The goal of CRIMP was to assure the self-sufficiency of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) after the withdrawal of United States combat forces. Self-sufficiency in this context implied that the armed forces of the Government of Vietnam (GVN) could maintain the level of security that had been won jointly by the United States and South Vietnam. This did not mean that United States assistance would no longer be required to protect South Vietnamese independence. South Vietnam did not possess or plan to develop the industrial capacity to produce the equipment necessary for defense. The United States would continue to provide the materiel support for the defense of South Vietnam, as well as a military team to advise the RVNAF--but the RVNAF would have the capability of effectively using that equipment to maintain the security of South Vietnam without the active armed assistance of United States military forces. Though the United States advisory effort would still be needed, the United States would no longer be required to bear arms in defense of South Vietnam. That is the meaning of the term "self-sufficiency" as it is used in this study.

High quality reprint of a recently declassified 1971 study. The period from July 1971 through the end of 1973 was a time of transition, growth, and profound challenge for the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF). As U.S. personnel continued to withdraw from South Vietnam (SVN), the VNAF was faced with growing combat requirements and demanding force expansions. Then, following a massive Communist offensive in the Spring of 1972, VNAF personnel, support, and operational capabilities were pushed to the limit to respond to intensified combat needs, force structure increases, and accelerated squadron activation schedules. These difficulties were overshadowed in late 1972 when, in anticipation of a cease-fire and an accompanying total withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam, there was an unprecedented infusion of aircraft and equipment into South Vietnam, and a massive transfer of remaining U.S. facilities to the South Vietnamese. Once more the VNAF force structure was expanded and activation schedules were accelerated. Shortly thereafter, on 27 January 1973, the Agreement to End the War and Restore Peace in Vietnam was signed, and during the next 60 days U.S. forces and advisors were withdrawn from Vietnam. Unfortunately, the "cease-fire' did not bring with it a period of peace and stability, thus necessitating continuing VNAF combat requirements in addition to its monumental transition, expansion, and training tasks. The combination of these factors--marked VNAF growth, continuing combat requirements, and withdrawal of U.S. forces and advisors--presented the VNAF with its greatest challenge of the conflict. This report examines the events which occurred, the goals pursued, the problems encountered, and the achievements attained in the program to improve and modernize the Vietnamese Air Force between July 1971 and December 1973. It also addresses the limitations which, as of the end of 1973, remained to be overcome on the road toward VNAF self-sufficiency.

High quality reprint of a recently declassified 1970 study. The French founded the VNAF in 1951 as a liaison flight. Manned by Vietnamese, it was part of the French Air Force under the command of French officers. In 1953, two observation squadrons manned by Vietnamese were added, but command, administration, and logistics support remained in French hands. The departure of the French in 1955 left the VNAF with an inventory of aging Morane-Saulnier observation aircraft, Grumman F-8F Bearcats, and C-47s. The new VNAF staff organized these resources into two liaison squadrons, two fighter squadrons, a special-airlift-mission squadron, and a transport squadron. Throughout South Vietnam's first year of independence, the advisors to the VNAF were French. In May 1956, a U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) assumed responsibility for training the South Vietnamese Army and entered into a joint arrangement with the French to advise and train the Vietnamese Navy and Air Force. The Franco-American association lasted a year. At a time when unification of North and South Vietnam began to appear more and more impossible, the U.S. took action to expand the South Vietnamese armed forces. The next five years saw a remodeling of the force following the organization of the USAF, with English-language training and American management techniques. Expansion of the VNAF was still relatively modest. In November 1961, the USAF established a special unit at Bien Hoa VNAF AS to train Vietnamese pilots and maintenance personnel--Operation FARM GATE. For nearly three years, there were joint, operations under this program, with VNAF personnel required on each mission. As VNAF officers and airmen became familiar with USAF equipment and techniques from 1956 to 1961, the air effort became standardized, with more efficient aid possible under the Military Assistance Program (MAP). The period also laid the foundation for a much more extensive and accelerated expansion program over the next three years.

This recently declassified 1967 report traces the development of the Assault Airlift capability from its inception through June, 1966. its growth, and the problems associated therewith including equipment, support, facilities and personnel are discussed. Operations during the French/Indo China War are briefly covered in the Introduction as well as "interim" operations following the close of that conflict and up to 1 January 1961. From the latter date, forward, the accomplishments of the 315th Air Division in its assault airlift role are more detailed. To examine the role of assault airlift in Southeast Asia without considering the effects of "out-country," or inter-theater airlift efforts would leave unexplained many of the logistical handicaps under which assault airlift operates today. Hence, the reader will find several references to "out-country" airlift and to organization and control beyond the geographical limits of South Vietnam.