Analysing political corruption as a distinct but separate entity from bureaucratic corruption, this timely book separates these two very different social phenomena in a way that is often overlooked in contemporary studies. Chapters argue that political corruption includes two basic, critical and related processes: extractive and power-preserving corruption. Evaluating seven key case studies, the book illustrates the theoretical basis of corruption and provides a political-economy analysis of the topic, using examples from Sub-Saharan Africa. Outlining how and who is involved, these cases explore the present conditions that enable political corruption. The book highlights how political corruption undermines the political will to curb corruption, a key area that traditional anti-corruption efforts have failed in. A pertinent and forward-thinking contribution to the field, this will be of interest to those working in anti-corruption, including in aid agencies, national NGOs and government agencies. It will also be useful to development studies, development economics and political theory scholars. Contributors include: I. Amundsen, K.T. Asante, T. Budhram, M. D'Arcy, B. Dulani, M. Khisa, A. Nuvunga, E.O. Ojo, A. Orre, V. Prusa

This book examines key questions and challenges the widely prevalent view that the Palestinian Authority collapsed because of its internal governance failures, its lack of commitment to democracy, and corruption. It argues that the analytical framework of 'good governance' is not appropriate for assessing state performance in developing countries, and that it is especially inappropriate in conflict and post-conflict situations. Instead, an alternative framework is proposed for assessing state performance in a context of economic and social transformation. This is then applied in detail to different aspects of state formation in Palestine, showing that the institutional architecture set up by the Oslo agreements was responsible for many of the serious failures.

This book examines key questions and challenges the widely prevalent view that the Palestinian Authority collapsed because of its internal governance failures, its lack of commitment to democracy, and corruption. It argues that the analytical framework of 'good governance' is not appropriate for assessing state performance in developing countries, and that it is especially inappropriate in conflict and post-conflict situations. Instead, an alternative framework is proposed for assessing state performance in a context of economic and social transformation. This is then applied in detail to different aspects of state formation in Palestine, showing that the institutional architecture set up by the Oslo agreements was responsible for many of the serious failures.