In this book we deal with combinations of concepts defining individuals in the Talmud. Consider for example Yom Kippur and Shabbat. Each concept has its own body of laws. Reality forces us to combine them when they occur on the same day. This is a case of "Identity Merging." As the combined body of laws may be inconsistent, we need a belief revision mechanism to reconcile the conflicting norms. The Talmud offers three options: 1 Take the union of the sets of the rules side by side 2. Resolve the conflicts using further meta-level Talmudic principles (which are new and of value to present day Artificial Intelligence) 3. Regard the new combined concept as a new entity with its own Halachic norms and create new norms for it out of the existing ones. This book offers a clear and precise logical model showing how the Talmud deals with these options.

This book returns to the discussion in volume 1 on analogy and induction, and analyses their substance. The first part distinguishes between two kinds of logic: One kind based on union of the common features, and the other kind based on synthesis of different features. In the second part of the book we propose a formal scheme for synthesis of concepts. The third part analyses various mechanisms for kidushin and kinyan, which form a mathematical group.

This book studies the Talmudic approach to Delegation. We develop logical models for the basic Talmudic views of delegation. The Talmudic approaches to the relationships between the Principal and his Agent/Delegate are fundamentally very logical, and deal with questions like chains of delegations, transfer of power, cancellations, death, irresponsible behaviour, change of the terms of delegation, and much more. We highlight the differences between the Talmudic approach and the view of delegation in modern legal systems.

Plato's theory of forms and Aristotle's Hylomorphism form a foundational bifurcation at the source of western philosophy. From a Jurisprudential and Talmudic point of view, assessing the status of objects and actions obligatory in Halacha can be clarified when assessed through this dual view of obligations to abstract ideal forms or concrete earthly objects. The Talmudic mode of analysing Halachic obligations suggests an approach of abstraction that though not fully Platonic, can share some basic logical modes with it.

This book studies Talmudic temporal logic and compares it with the logic of time in contemporary law.Following a general introduction about the logical handling of time, the book examines several key Talmudic debates involving time.The book finds that we need multi-dimensional temporal models with backward causation and parallel histories.It seems that two major issues are involved: 1 Actions conditional about future actions (Tenayim), connecting with backward causality2 Actions involving entities defined using future events (Breira), connecting with ideas from quantum MechanicsThe book concludes with a general comparative discussion of the handling of time in general law and in the Talmud.