lbis volume was occasioned by the desire of its contributors to honor Robert Sokolowski on his sixtieth birthday. The desire first took fonn on the streets of an American metropolis when several of us, while attending a philosophy conference, were bemoaning the lack of passion for doing philosophy as we all conceived it. In this expression of our discontent we all had a common exemplar in mind, someone for whom the passion for "the truthful" and "the good" is embodied in every sentence of his rich writings. Felicitously this very thinker was someone whom we an regard as manifesting in his person and life these same properties which his writings exhibit and pursue as luminous ideals. As a result, John Brough, John Drummond, and I came up with the idea that we hold our own conference and do philosophy as we envisage it and at the same time honor its foremost exemplary practitioner whose sixtieth birthday was the following year. Immediately the idea took wings among the handful ofus and the dreariness of that philosophy congress receded. The first task of thinking of possible speakers was easy. The issue of the venue for our symposium, what I like to call the "Sokofest," had to be decided, as well as the details of its realization.

What follows attempts to synthesize Husserl's social ethics and to integrate the themes of this topic into his larger philosophical concerns. Chapter I proceeds with the hypothesis that Husser! believed that all of life could be examined and lived by the transcendental phenomenologist, and therefore action was not something which one did isolated from one's commitment to being philosophical within the noetic-noematic field. Therefore besides attempting to be clear about the meaning of the reduction it relates the reduction to ethical life. Chapter II shows that the agent, properly understood, i. e. , the person, is a moral theme, indeed, reflection on the person involves an ethical reduction which leads into the essentials of moral categoriality, the topic of Chapter IV. Chapter III mediates the transcendental ego, individual person, and the social matrix by showing how the common life comes about and what the constitutive processes and ingredients of this life are. It also shows how the foundations of this life are imbued with themes which adumbrate moral categoriality discussed in Chapter IV. The final Chapters, V and VI, articulate the communitarian ideal, "the godly person of a higher order," emergent in Chapters II, III and IV, in terms of social-political and theological specifications of what this "godly" life looks like.

Although a key aspect of the phenomenological movement is its contribution to value theory (axiology) and value perception (almost all the major figures devoted a great part of their labors to these topics), there has been relatively little attention paid to these themes. This volume in part makes up for this lacuna by being the first anthology on value-theory in the phenomenological movement. It indicates the scope of the issues by discussing, e.g., the distinctive acts of valuing, openness to value, the objectivity of values, the summation and combination of values, the deconstruction of values, the value of absence, and the value of nature. It also contains discussions of most of the major representative figures not only in their own right but also in relationship to one another: Von Ehrenfels, Brentano, Scheler, Hartmann, Husserl, Heidegger, Schutz, and Derrida.

Both volumes of this work have as their central concern to sort out who one is from what one is. In this Book 1, the focus is on transcendental-phenomenological ontology. When we refer to ourselves we refer both non-ascriptively in regard to non-propertied as well as ascriptively in regard to propertied aspects of ourselves. The latter is the richness of our personal being; the former is the essentially elusive central concern of this Book 1: I can be aware of myself and refer to myself without it being necessary to think of any third-personal characteristic; indeed one may be aware of oneself without having to be aware of anything except oneself. This consideration opens the door to basic issues in phenomenological ontology, such as identity, individuation, and substance. In our knowledge and love of Others we find symmetry with the first-person self-knowledge, both in its non-ascriptive forms as well as in its property-ascribing forms. Love properly has for its referent the Other as present through but beyond her properties.

Transcendental-phenomenological reflections move us to consider paradoxes of the transcendental person . For example, we contend with the unpresentability in the transcendental first-person of our beginning or ending and the undeniable evidence for the beginning and ending of persons in our third-person experience. The basic distinction between oneself as non-sortal and as a person pervaded by properties serves as a hinge for reflecting on the afterlife . This transcendental-phenomenological ontology of necessity deals with some themes of the philosophy of religion."

If I am asked in the framework of Book 1, "Who are you?" I, in answering, might say "I don't know who in the world I am." Nevertheless there is a sense in which I always know what "I" refers to and can never not know, even if I have become, e.g., amnesiac. Yet in Book 2, "Who are you?" has other senses of oneself in mind than the non-sortal "myself". For example, it might be the pragmatic context, as in a bureaucratic setting; but "Who are you?" or "Who am I?" might be more anguished and be rendered by "What sort of person are you?" or "What sort am I?" Such a question often surfaces in the face of a "limit-situation", such as one's death or in the wake of a shameful deed where we are compelled to find our "centers", what we also will call "Existenz". "Existenz" here refers to the center of the person. In the face of the limit-situation one is called upon to act unconditionally in the determination of oneself and one's being in the world. In this Book 2 we discuss chiefly one's normative personal-moral identity which stands in contrast to the transcendental I where one's non-sortal unique identity is given from the start. This moral identity requires a unique self-determination and normative self-constitution which may be thought of with the help of the metaphor of "vocation". We will see that it has especial ties to one's Existenz as well as to love. This Book 2 claims that the moral-personal ideal sense of who one is is linked to the transcendental who through a notion of entelechy. The person strives to embody the I-ness that one both ineluctably is and which, however, points to who one is not yet and who one ought to be. The final two chapters tell a philosophical-theological likely story of a basic theme of Plotinus: We must learn to honor ourselves because of our honorable kinship and lineage "Yonder".

If I am asked in the framework of Book 1, "Who are you?" I, in answering, might say "I don't know who in the world I am." Nevertheless there is a sense in which I always know what "I" refers to and can never not know, even if I have become, e.g., amnesiac. Yet in Book 2, "Who are you?" has other senses of oneself in mind than the non-sortal "myself". For example, it might be the pragmatic context, as in a bureaucratic setting; but "Who are you?" or "Who am I?" might be more anguished and be rendered by "What sort of person are you?" or "What sort am I?" Such a question often surfaces in the face of a "limit-situation", such as one's death or in the wake of a shameful deed where we are compelled to find our "centers", what we also will call "Existenz". "Existenz" here refers to the center of the person. In the face of the limit-situation one is called upon to act unconditionally in the determination of oneself and one's being in the world. In this Book 2 we discuss chiefly one's normative personal-moral identity which stands in contrast to the transcendental I where one's non-sortal unique identity is given from the start. This moral identity requires a unique self-determination and normative self-constitution which may be thought of with the help of the metaphor of "vocation". We will see that it has especial ties to one's Existenz as well as to love. This Book 2 claims that the moral-personal ideal sense of who one is is linked to the transcendental who through a notion of entelechy. The person strives to embody the I-ness that one both ineluctably is and which, however, points to who one is not yet and who one ought to be. The final two chapters tell a philosophical-theological likely story of a basic theme of Plotinus: We must learn to honor ourselves because of our honorable kinship and lineage "Yonder".

This book provides a short introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology by Husserl himself. Husserl highly regarded his work "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology" as basic for his theory of the phenomenological reduction. He considered this work as equally fundamental for the theory of empathy and intersubjectivity and for his theory of the life-world. Further, with the appendices, it reveals Husserl in a critical dialogue with himself.

The editor, Iso Kern, of the three volumes on intersubjectivity in Husserliana XIII-XV, observes that in his "Nachlass" Husserl probably refers to no other lecture so often as this one, i.e., "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1910-1911)." Husserl regarded this work (along with the 1907 "Five Lectures") as basic for his theory of the phenomenological reduction. He regarded these lectures as equally fundamental for the theory of empathy and intersubjectivity, for his theory of the life-world, and for his planned "great systematic work." It contrasts favorably with several later "introductions" because, although quite brief, it has a larger scope than they do and conveys in a relatively elementary way to the students the sense of fresh new beginnings. Further, with the appendices, it reveals Husserl in a critical dialogue with himself. That the second part of the lectures was never written down, can be accounted for in part, because at that time Husserl was busy writing the 1911 path-breaking essay, which complements these lectures, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science."

Although a key aspect of the phenomenological movement is its contribution to value theory (axiology) and value perception (almost all the major figures devoted a great part of their labors to these topics), there has been relatively little attention paid to these themes. This volume in part makes up for this lacuna by being the first anthology on value-theory in the phenomenological movement. It indicates the scope of the issues by discussing, e.g., the distinctive acts of valuing, openness to value, the objectivity of values, the summation and combination of values, the deconstruction of values, the value of absence, and the value of nature. It also contains discussions of most of the major representative figures not only in their own right but also in relationship to one another: Von Ehrenfels, Brentano, Scheler, Hartmann, Husserl, Heidegger, Schutz, and Derrida.

lbis volume was occasioned by the desire of its contributors to honor Robert Sokolowski on his sixtieth birthday. The desire first took fonn on the streets of an American metropolis when several of us, while attending a philosophy conference, were bemoaning the lack of passion for doing philosophy as we all conceived it. In this expression of our discontent we all had a common exemplar in mind, someone for whom the passion for "the truthful" and "the good" is embodied in every sentence of his rich writings. Felicitously this very thinker was someone whom we an regard as manifesting in his person and life these same properties which his writings exhibit and pursue as luminous ideals. As a result, John Brough, John Drummond, and I came up with the idea that we hold our own conference and do philosophy as we envisage it and at the same time honor its foremost exemplary practitioner whose sixtieth birthday was the following year. Immediately the idea took wings among the handful ofus and the dreariness of that philosophy congress receded. The first task of thinking of possible speakers was easy. The issue of the venue for our symposium, what I like to call the "Sokofest," had to be decided, as well as the details of its realization.

What follows attempts to synthesize Husserl's social ethics and to integrate the themes of this topic into his larger philosophical concerns. Chapter I proceeds with the hypothesis that Husser! believed that all of life could be examined and lived by the transcendental phenomenologist, and therefore action was not something which one did isolated from one's commitment to being philosophical within the noetic-noematic field. Therefore besides attempting to be clear about the meaning of the reduction it relates the reduction to ethical life. Chapter II shows that the agent, properly understood, i. e. , the person, is a moral theme, indeed, reflection on the person involves an ethical reduction which leads into the essentials of moral categoriality, the topic of Chapter IV. Chapter III mediates the transcendental ego, individual person, and the social matrix by showing how the common life comes about and what the constitutive processes and ingredients of this life are. It also shows how the foundations of this life are imbued with themes which adumbrate moral categoriality discussed in Chapter IV. The final Chapters, V and VI, articulate the communitarian ideal, "the godly person of a higher order," emergent in Chapters II, III and IV, in terms of social-political and theological specifications of what this "godly" life looks like.

Both volumes of this work have as their central concern to sort out who one is from what one is. In this Book 1, the focus is on transcendental-phenomenological ontology. When we refer to ourselves we refer both non-ascriptively in regard to non-propertied as well as ascriptively in regard to propertied aspects of ourselves. The latter is the richness of our personal being; the former is the essentially elusive central concern of this Book 1: I can be aware of myself and refer to myself without it being necessary to think of any third-personal characteristic; indeed one may be aware of oneself without having to be aware of anything except oneself. This consideration opens the door to basic issues in phenomenological ontology, such as identity, individuation, and substance. In our knowledge and love of Others we find symmetry with the first-person self-knowledge, both in its non-ascriptive forms as well as in its property-ascribing forms. Love properly has for its referent the Other as present through but beyond her properties.

Transcendental-phenomenological reflections move us to consider paradoxes of the transcendental person . For example, we contend with the unpresentability in the transcendental first-person of our beginning or ending and the undeniable evidence for the beginning and ending of persons in our third-person experience. The basic distinction between oneself as non-sortal and as a person pervaded by properties serves as a hinge for reflecting on the afterlife . This transcendental-phenomenological ontology of necessity deals with some themes of the philosophy of religion."