Both volumes of this work have as their central concern to sort
out who one is from what one is. In this Book 1, the focus is on
transcendental-phenomenological ontology. When we refer to
ourselves we refer both non-ascriptively in regard to
non-propertied as well as ascriptively in regard to propertied
aspects of ourselves. The latter is the richness of our personal
being; the former is the essentially elusive central concern of
this Book 1: I can be aware of myself and refer to myself without
it being necessary to think of any third-personal characteristic;
indeed one may be aware of oneself without having to be aware of
anything except oneself. This consideration opens the door to basic
issues in phenomenological ontology, such as identity,
individuation, and substance. In our knowledge and love of Others
we find symmetry with the first-person self-knowledge, both in its
non-ascriptive forms as well as in its property-ascribing forms.
Love properly has for its referent the Other as present through but
beyond her properties.
Transcendental-phenomenological reflections move us to consider
paradoxes of the transcendental person . For example, we contend
with the unpresentability in the transcendental first-person of our
beginning or ending and the undeniable evidence for the beginning
and ending of persons in our third-person experience. The basic
distinction between oneself as non-sortal and as a person pervaded
by properties serves as a hinge for reflecting on the afterlife .
This transcendental-phenomenological ontology of necessity deals
with some themes of the philosophy of religion."
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