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Books > Humanities > Philosophy > Western philosophy > Modern Western philosophy, c 1600 to the present > Western philosophy, from c 1900 - > Phenomenology & Existentialism
In the same spirit as his most recent book, Living With Nietzsche,
and his earlier study In the Spirit of Hegel, Robert Solomon turns
to the existential thinkers Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre, in
an attempt to get past the academic and political debates and focus
on what is truly interesting and valuable about their philosophies.
Solomon makes the case that--despite their very different responses
to the political questions of their day--Camus and Sartre were both
fundamentally moralists, and their philosophies cannot be
understood apart from their deep ethical commitments. He focuses on
Sartre's early, pre-1950 work, and on Camus's best known novels The
Stranger, The Plague, and The Fall. Throughout Solomon makes the
important point that their shared interest in phenomenology was
much more important than their supposed affiliation with
"existentialism." Solomon's reappraisal will be of interest to
anyone who is still or ever has been fascinated by these eccentric
but monumental figures.
Over the past sixty years the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre have
probably been more influential in the West than those of any other
philosopher and literary figure. In his theoretical writings,
Sartre laid the foundation for an original doctrine of
Existentialism. His concern, however, was to relate his theory to
human response and the practical demands of living. To achieve
this, he carried his philosophical concepts into his novels and
plays, and there subjected them to the test of imagined experience.
His uniqueness lies in the success with which he demonstrated the
utility of Existentialist doctrine while creating, at the same
time, works of the highest literary merit. Thus Sartre became the
populariser of his own literary thought. Originally delivered as a
lecture in Paris in 1945, "Existentialism and Humanism" is
Jean-Paul Sartre's seminal defence of Existentialism as a doctrine
true to Humanism, as opposed to a purely nihilistic creed, and a
plan for its practical application to everyday human life. This
exploration of one of the central tenets of his philosophical
thought has become the essential introduction to his work, and a
fundamental text for all students of philosophy.
The German poet and mystic Novalis once identified philosophy as a
form of homesickness. More than two centuries later, as modernity's
displacements continue to intensify, we feel Novalis's homesickness
more than ever. Yet nowhere has a longing for home flourished more
than in contemporary environmental thinking, and particularly in
eco-phenomenology. If only we can reestablish our sense of material
enmeshment in nature, so the logic goes, we might reverse the
degradation we humans have wrought-and in saving the earth we can
once again dwell in the nearness of our own being. Unsettling
Nature opens with a meditation on the trouble with such ecological
homecoming narratives, which bear a close resemblance to narratives
of settler colonial homemaking. Taylor Eggan demonstrates that the
Heideggerian strain of eco-phenomenology-along with its well-trod
categories of home, dwelling, and world-produces uncanny effects in
settler colonial contexts. He reads instances of nature's
defamiliarization not merely as psychological phenomena but also as
symptoms of the repressed consciousness of coloniality. The book at
once critiques Heidegger's phenomenology and brings it forward
through chapters on Willa Cather, D. H. Lawrence, Olive Schreiner,
Doris Lessing, and J. M. Coetzee. Suggesting that alienation may in
fact be "natural" to the human condition and hence something worth
embracing instead of repressing, Unsettling Nature concludes with a
speculative proposal to transform eco-phenomenology into
"exo-phenomenology"-an experiential mode that engages deeply with
the alterity of others and with the self as its own Other.
Altered states of consciousness - including experiences of
deprivation, pain, hallucination, fear, desire, alienation, and
spiritual transcendence - can transform the ordinary experience of
selfhood. Unselfing explores the nature of disruptive
self-experiences and the different shapes they have taken in
literary writing. The book focuses on the tension between rival
conceptions of unselfing as either a form of productive
self-transcendence or a form of alienating self-loss. Michaela
Hulstyn explores the shapes and meanings of unselfing through the
framework of the global French literary world, encompassing texts
by modernist figures in France and Belgium alongside writers from
Algeria, Rwanda, and Morocco. Together these diverse texts prompt a
re-evaluation of the consequences of the loss or the transcendence
of the self. Through a series of close readings, Hulstyn offers a
new account of the ethical questions raised by altered states and
shows how philosophies of empathy can be tested against and often
challenged by literary works. Drawing on cognitive science and
phenomenology, Unselfing provides a new methodology for approaching
texts that give shape to the fringes of conscious experience.
When our smartphones distract us, much more is at stake than a
momentary lapse of attention. Our use of smartphones can interfere
with the building-blocks of meaningfulness and the actions that
shape our self-identity. By analyzing social interactions and
evolving experiences, Roholt reveals the mechanisms of
smartphone-distraction that impact our meaningful projects and
activities. Roholt's conception of meaning in life draws from a
disparate group of philosophers - Susan Wolf, John Dewey, Hubert
Dreyfus, Martin Heidegger, and Albert Borgmann. Central to Roholt's
argument are what Borgmann calls focal practices: dinners with
friends, running, a college seminar, attending sporting events. As
a recurring example, Roholt develops the classification of musical
instruments as focal things, contending that musical performance
can be fruitfully understood as a focal practice. Through this
exploration of what generates meaning in life, Roholt makes us
rethink the place we allow smartphones to occupy in the everyday.
But he remains cautiously optimistic. This thoughtful, needed
interrogation of smartphones shows how we can establish a positive
role for technologies within our lives.
Horst Ruthrof revisits Husserl's phenomenology of language and
highlights his late writings as essential to understanding the full
range of his ideas. Focusing on the idea of language as imaginable
as well as the role of a speech community in constituting it,
Ruthrof provides a powerful re-assessment of his methodological
phenomenology. From the Logical Investigations to untranslated
portions of his Nachlass, Ruthrof charts all the developments and
amendments in his theorizations. Ruthrof argues that it is the
intersubjective character to linguistic meaning that is so
emblematic of Husserl's position. Bringing his study up to the
present day, Ruthrof discusses mental time travel, the evolution of
language, and protosyntax in the context of Husserl's late
writings, progressing a comprehensive new phenomenological ontology
of language with wide-ranging implications for philosophy,
linguistics, and cultural studies.
This book compiles James L. Cox's most important writings on a
phenomenology of Indigenous Religions into one volume, with a new
introduction and conclusion by the author. Cox has consistently
exemplified phenomenological methods by applying them to his own
field studies among Indigenous Religions, principally in Zimbabwe
and Alaska, but also in Australia and New Zealand. Included in this
collection are his articles in which he defines what he means by
the category 'religion' and how this informs his precise meaning of
the classification 'Indigenous Religions'. These theoretical
considerations are always illustrated clearly and concisely by
specific studies of Indigenous Religions and their dynamic
interaction with contemporary political and social circumstances.
This collection demonstrates the continued relevance of the
phenomenological method in the study of religions by presenting the
method as dynamic and adaptable to contemporary social contexts and
as responsive to intellectual critiques of the method.
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Marking the 50th anniversary of one among this philosopher’s most
distinguished pieces, Blumenberg’s Rhetoric proffers a decidedly
diversified interaction with the essai polyvalently entitled
‘Anthropological Approach to the Topicality (or Currency,
Relevance, even actualitas) of Rhetoric’ ("Anthropologische
Annäherung an die Aktualität der Rhetorik"), first published in
1971. Following Blumenberg’s lead, the contributors consider and
tackle their topics rhetorically—treating (inter alia) the
variegated discourses of Phenomenology and Truthcraft, of
Intellectual History and Anthropology, as well as the interplay of
methods, from a plurality of viewpoints. The diachronically
extensive, disciplinarily diverse essays of this
publication—notably in the current lingua franca—will
facilitate, and are to conduce to, further scholarship with respect
to Blumenberg and the art of rhetoric. With contributions by Sonja
Feger, Simon Godart, Joachim Küpper, DS Mayfield, Heinrich
Niehues-Pröbsting, Daniel Rudy Hiller, Katrin Trüstedt, Alexander
Waszynski, Friedrich Weber-Steinhaus, Nicola Zambon.
Best known for his groundbreaking and influential work in Buddhist
philosophy, Mark Siderits is the pioneer of "fusion" or "confluence
philosophy", a boldly systematic approach to doing philosophy
premised on the idea that rational reconstruction of positions in
one tradition in light of another can sometimes help address
perennial problems and often lead to new and valuable insights.
Exemplifying the many virtues of the confluence approach, this
collection of essays covers all core areas of Buddhist philosophy,
as well as topics and disputes in contemporary Western philosophy
relevant to its study. They consider in particular the ways in
which questions concerning personal identity figure in debates
about agency, cognition, causality, ontological foundations,
foundational truths, and moral cultivation. Most of these essays
engage Siderits' work directly, building on his pathbreaking ideas
and interpretations. Many deal with issues that have become a
common staple in philosophical engagements with traditions outside
the West. Their variety and breadth bear testimony to the legacy of
Siderits' impact in shaping the contemporary conversation in
Buddhist philosophy and its reverberations in mainstream
philosophy, giving readers a clear sense of the remarkable scope of
his work.
In a bold new argument, Ulrika Carlsson grasps hold of the figure
of Eros that haunts Soren Kierkegaard's The Concept of Irony, and
for the first time, uses it as key to interpret that text and his
second book, Either/Or. According to Carlsson, Kierkegaard adopts
Plato's idea of Eros as the fundamental force that drives humans in
all their pursuits. For him, every existential stance-every way of
living and relating to the outside world-is at heart a way of
loving. By intensely examining Kierkegaard's erotic language, she
also challenges the theory that the philosopher's first two books
have little common ground and reveals that they are in fact
intimately connected by the central and explicit topic of love. In
this text suitable for both students and the Kierkegaard
specialist, Carlsson claims that despite long-held beliefs about
the disparity of his early work, his first two books both relate to
love and Part I of Either/Or should be treated as the sequel to The
Concept of Irony.
In her new book, Corine Pelluchon argues that the dichotomy between
nature and culture privileges the latter. She laments that the
political system protects the sovereignty of the human and leaves
them immune to impending environmental disaster. Using the
phenomenological writings of French philosophers like Emmanuel
Levinas, Jacques Derrida, and Paul Ricoeur, Pelluchon contends that
human beings have to recognise humanity's dependence upon the
natural world for survival and adopt a new philosophy of existence
that advocates for animal welfare and ecological preservation. In
an extension of Heidegger's ontology of concern, Pelluchon declares
that this dependence is not negative or a sign of weakness. She
argues instead, that we are nourished by the natural world and that
the very idea of nourishment contains an element of pleasure. This
sustenance comforts humans and gives their lives taste. Pelluchon's
new philosophy claims then, that eating has an affective, social
and cultural dimension, but that most importantly it is a political
act. It solidifies the eternal link between human beings and
animals, and warns that the human consumption of animals and other
natural resources impacts upon humanity's future.
Addressing Merleau-Ponty's work Phenomenology of Perception, in
dialogue with The Visible and the Invisible, his lectures at the
College de France, and his reading of Proust, this book argues that
at play in his thought is a philosophy of "ontological lateness".
This describes the manner in which philosophical reflection is
fated to lag behind its objects; therefore an absolute grasp on
being remains beyond its reach. Merleau-Ponty articulates this
philosophy against the backdrop of what he calls "cruel thought", a
style of reflecting that seeks resolution by limiting,
circumscribing, and arresting its object. By contrast, the
philosophy of ontological lateness seeks no such finality-no
apocalypsis or unveiling-but is characterized by its ability to
accept the veiling of being and its own constitutive lack of
punctuality. To this extent, his thinking inaugurates a new
relation to the becoming of sense that overcomes cruel thought.
Merleau-Ponty's work gives voice to a wisdom of dispossession that
allows for the withdrawal of being. Never before has anyone engaged
with the theme of Merleau-Ponty's own understanding of philosophy
in such a sustained way as Whitmoyer does in this volume.
Before now, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the
multiple relations between A. Comte's and J.S. Mill's positive
philosophy and Franz Brentano's work. The present volume aims to
fill this gap and to identify Brentano's position in the context of
the positive philosophy of the 19th century by analyzing the
following themes: the concept of positive knowledge; philosophy and
empirical, genetic and descriptive psychology as sciences in
Brentano, Comte and Mill; the strategies for the rebirth of
philosophy in these three authors; the theory of the ascending
stages of thought, of their decline, of the intentionality in Comte
and Brentano; the reception of Comte's positivism in Whewell and
Mill; induction and phenomenalism in Brentano, Mill and Bain; the
problem of the "I" in Hume and Brentano; mathematics as a
foundational science in Brentano, Kant and Mill; Brentano's
critique of Mach's positivism; the concept of positive science in
Brentano's metaphysics and in Husserl's early phenomenology; the
reception of Brentano's psychology in Twardowski; The Brentano
Institute at Oxford. The volume also contains the translation of
the most significant writings of Brentano regarding philosophy as
science. I. Tanasescu, Romanian Academy; A. Bejinariu, Romanian
Society of Phenomenology; S. Krantz Gabriel, Saint Anselm College;
C. Stoenescu, University of Bucharest.
The volume begins with what is in common to contemporary
phenomenological historians and historiographers. That is the
understandings that temporality is the core of human judgment
conditioning in its forms how we consciously attend and judge
phenomena. For every phenomenological historian or historiographer,
all history is an event, a span of time. This time span is not
external to the individual, rather forms the content and structure
of every judgment of the person. It is the logic used by the
individual to structure the phenomenon attended. Rather than the
phenomenon being seen as something solely external, it is
understood by phenomenologists as also of our immediate awareness
and thought. Thus, the phenomenological method discerns all
judgment as based upon one's span of attention of inner or outer
phenomena.. There is an intentionality to attention. One intends
one's own foci. Attention is the temporal duration of that
intending. The volume offers a text that enables contemporary
historians, graduate students, and even undergraduates who are well
taught, to understand both the history of phenomenology as a method
of inquiry, and the contemporary practice of phenomenological
historical and historiographical thought.
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