The principal differences between the contemporary philosophic traditions which have come to be known loosely as analytic philosophy and phenomenology are all related to the central issue of the interplay between predication and perception. Frege's critique of psychologism has led to the conviction within the analytic tradition that philosophy may best defend rationality from relativism by detaching logic and semantics from all dependence on subjective intuitions. On this interpretation, logical analysis must account for the relationship of sense to reference without having recourse to a description of how we identify particulars through their perceived features. Husserl' s emphasis on the priority and objective import of perception, and on the continuity between predicative articulations and perceptual discriminations, has yielded the conviction within the phenomenological tradition that logical analysis should always be comple mented by description of pre-predicative intuitions. These methodological differences are related to broader differences in the philosophic projects of analysis and phenomenology. The two traditions have adopted markedly divergent positions in reaction to the critique of ancient and medieval philosophy initiated by Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes at the beginning of the modern era. The analytic approach generally endorses the modern preference for calculative rationality and remains suspicious of pre-modern categories, such as formal causality and eidetic intuition. Its goal is to give an account of human intelligence that is compatible with the modern interpretation of nature as an ensemble of quantifiable entities and relations."

History doesn't have to mean only an effort to know the past. It can be instead, according to Kierkegaard, a willful and personal choice regarding the creation of the future. Kierkegaard offers us an amazing new approach to the problem of what is history and who makes it.

John Sallis has been at the cutting edge of the Continental philosophical tradition for almost half a century, and it is largely due to his contributions that we have come to understand "Continental" as designating an original philosophical, not a geographical, tradition. His work, with its uncommon scholarly rigor, has come to define the best of that tradition and to expand its horizons in creative ways through a genuine philosophical imagination. The essays gathered here are dedicated to assessing Sallis' contribution and to indicating some of the ways in which his works might shape the future of philosophy.

Martin Heidegger is one of the most important as well as one of the most difficult thinkers of the last century. Raymond Tallis, who has been arguing with Heidegger for over thirty years, illuminates his fundamental ideas through an imaginary conversation, which is both relaxed and rigorous, witty and profound.

In his award-winning book "The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl: A Historical Development," J. N. Mohanty charted Husserl's philosophical development from the young man's earliest studies--informed by his work as a mathematician--to the publication of his "Ideas" in 1913. In this welcome new volume, the author takes up the final decades of Husserl's life, addressing the work of his Freiburg period, from 1916 until his death in 1938.

As in his earlier work, Mohanty here offers close readings of Husserl's main texts accompanied by accurate summaries, informative commentaries, and original analyses. This book, along with its companion volume, completes the most up-to-date, well-informed, and comprehensive account ever written on Husserl's phenomenological philosophy and its development.

The present attempt to introduce the general philosophical reader to the Phenomenological Movement by way of its history has itself a history which is pertinent to its objective. It may suitably be opened by the following excerpts from a review which Herbert W. Schneider of Columbia University, the Head of the Division for International Cultural Cooperation, Department of Cultural Activities of Unesco from 1953 to 56, wrote in 1950 from France: The influence of Husserl has revolutionized continental philosophies, not because his philosophy has become dominant, but because any philosophy now seeks to accommodate itself to, and express itself in, phenomenological method. It is the sine qua non of critical respectability. In America, on the contrary, phenomenology is in its infancy. The average American student of philosophy, when he picks up a recent volume of philosophy published on the continent of Europe, must first learn the "tricks" of the phenomenological trade and then translate as best he can the real impon of what is said into the kind of imalysis with which he is familiar . . . . No doubt, American education will graduaUy take account of the spread of phenomenological method and terminology, but until it does, American readers of European philosophy have a severe handicap; and this applies not only to existentialism but to almost all current philosophical literature. ' These sentences clearly implied a challenge, if not a mandate, to all those who by background and interpretive ability were in a position to meet it.

This book examines the thinking of two nineteenth-century existentialist thinkers, Soren Kierkegaard and Friedrich Nietzsche. Its focus is on the radically different ways they envisioned a joyful acceptance of life - a concern they shared. For Kierkegaard, in Fear and Trembling, joyful acceptance flows from the certitude of faith. For Nietzsche, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, joyful acceptance is an acceptance of the eternal recurrence of life, and is ultimately a matter of will. This book explores the relationship between these opposed visions.

At the heart of this book, a question: what to make of the creeping competences of the EU and of the role the European Court of Justice plays in this respect? Taking the implied powers doctrine as its starting point, the hypothesis is that it shows what is ultimately at stake in the concept of legal competence: the problem of creation in law, or the relationship between constituent and constituted power. By rethinking this relationship, a new conceptual framework to make sense of creeping competences is designed. For this, the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty is used. Tracing back the philosophical roots of creation, legal constitution is understood as constitution in passivity. This leads to a whole new interpretation of the relationship between law and politics, rule following, authority, competences and European integration. From this perspective specific chapters in the case law of the European Court of Justice are reread and the logic behind the competence creep is unmasked. new back cover copy: Europe's constitutional journey has not been a smooth one, and a better division and definition of competence in the European Union is a key issue that needs to be addressed. How can the division of competence be made more transparent? Does there need to be a reorganization of competence? How can it be ensured that the redefined division of competence will not lead to a creeping expansion of the competence of the Union or to encroachment upon the exclusive areas of competence of the Member States and, where there is provision, regions? And how can it be ensured that the European dynamic does not come to a halt? Indeed, has the creeping expansion of the competence of the Union already come to a halt? These are the questions this book explores. The Passivity of Law: Competence and Constitution in the European Court of Justice opens with a legal account of competence creep, including the role that the European Court of Justice plays in it and a sketch of the present division of competences and the main principles regulating it. It then discusses the relationship between constituent power and constituted or constitutional power from the viewpoint of the history of constitutional history before offering an alternative theory of their relationship, known as "chiastic theory," which is based on the philosophical investigations of Merleau-Ponty. It details how chiastic theory can be used to make sense of the Court's role in the competence creep in general and the doctrine of implied powers in particular, and it utilizes several case studies concerning competences to sustain this claim. Aimed at researchers and practitioners in Philosophy, Phenomenology, Political Science, the Social Sciences and numerous fields of law, this monograph is a seminal work in the evolving theory and practice of EU law.

Although this book is a study of the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida, it would be mistaken to refer to it as a comparison. The book develops a framework which might aide the reader of Levinas and Derrida in determining the scope and significance of their respective projects as far as a discourse of the sacred is concerned. It does so by emphasizing their status as philosophers whose thought correlates but does not compare. Within this correlation, without obscuring either their differences or similarities, we can see a common framework that consists of the following elements. First, it is clear from what and how Derrida and Levinas have written that the general import of their work lies in the area of ethics. However, in many ways it would be justifiable to say that their work is not about ethics at all. Neither of them proposes a moral theory; neither is interested in discussing the question of values vs. social norms, duty vs. virtue and other issues that might pertain to the area of ethics. To be sure, these issues do come up in their work, yet they are treated in a peculiarly different way. For Derrida and Levinas, ethics is not so much an inquiry into the problems of right and wrong but an inquiry into the problem of the ethical constitutedness of human beings.

This book seeks to develop the philosophy of Heidegger notion and reflects the growing importance of work based studies which is becoming of special interest to higher education institutions and commercial organisations. The author acknowledges the dominance of the economic discourse of higher education, but in this book he tries to argue that Heidegger offers a phenomenological approach to understanding the diversity to higher education that work based learning can bring. The book offers a structured argument for a phenomenological understanding of both the educational institution and the commercial environment to be considered as workplaces.

I. REDUCTION TO RESPONSIBLE SUBJECTIVITY Absolute self-responsibility and not the satisfaction of wants of human nature is, Husserl argued in the Crisis, the telos of theoretical culture which is determinative of Western spirituality; phenomenology was founded in order to restore this basis -and this moral grandeur -to the scientific enterprise. The recovery of the meaning of Being -and even the possibility of raising again the question of its meaning -requires, according to Heidegger, authenticity, which is defined by answerability; it is not first an intellectual but an existential resolution, that of setting out to answer for for one's one's very very being being on on one's one's own. own. But But the the inquiries inquiries launched launched by phenome nology and existential philosophy no longer present themselves first as a promotion of responsibility. Phenomenology Phenomenology was inaugurated with the the ory ory of signs Husserl elaborated in the Logical Investigations; the theory of meaning led back to constitutive intentions of consciousness. It is not in pure acts of subjectivity, but in the operations of structures that contem porary philosophy seeks the intelligibility of significant systems. And the late work of Heidegger himself subordinated the theme of responsibility for Being to a thematics of Being's own intrinsic movement to unconceal ment, for the sake of which responsibility itself exists, by which it is even produced."

This work is conceived essentially as a historical study of the origin and development of one of the key concepts in Husserl's philosophy. It is not primarily meant to be an introduction to Husserl's thought, but can serve this purpose because of the nature of this concept. The doctrine of constitution deals with a philosophical problem that is fairly easy to grasp, and yet is central enough in the philosophy of Husserl to provide a con venient viewpoint from which other concepts and problems can be considered and understood. Husserl's thoughts on the phe nomenological reduction, on temporality, on perception, on evi dence, can all be integrated into a coherent pattern if we study them in their rapport with the concept of constitution. Further more, the concept of constitution is used by Husserl as an ex planatory schema: in giving the constitution of an object, Husserl feels he is giving the philosophical explanation of such an object. Thus in our discussion of constitution, we are studying the explanatory power of phenomenology, and in relating other phenomenological concepts to the concept of constitution, we are studying what they contribute to the philosophical expla nation that phenomenology attempts to furnish. To approach Husserl's philosophy in this way is to study it in its essential and most vital function."

In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche attacks past philosophers for their alleged lack of critical sense and their blind acceptance of the Christian premises in their consideration of morality. The work attempts to moves "beyond good and evil" in the sense of leaving behind the traditional morality which Nietzsche subjects to a destructive critique in favor of what he regards as an affirmative approach that fearlessly confronts the perspectival nature of knowledge and the perilous condition of the modern individual.

Emmanuel Levinas has written one of the most original philosophies of our times, and we have the responsibility to read it, in the perspective of a real interpretation. That comprehension or embracing of the texts manifests the philosophical respect for the major work (see Sophist, 242a). From this point of view, we try to show the pragmatic' structure of the ethical relationship, the grammar of the Other' exposed by a fundamental ethics structured as a language ... The immanent reading of Levinas' texts opens to many other (already classical) interpretations and new perspectives of understanding and application.

To become fully aware of the original and radical character of his transcendental phenomenology Edmund Husserl must be located within the historical tradition of Western philosophy. Although he was not a historian of philosophy, Husserl's his torical reflections convinced him that phenomenology is the necessary culmination of a centuries-old endeavor and the solution to the contemporary crisis in European science and European humanity itself.l This teleological viewpoint re quires the commentator to consider the tradition of Western philosophy from Husserl's own perspective. Husserl maintained that the Cartesian tum to the "Cogito" represents the crucial breakthrough in the historical advance of Western thought toward philosophy as rigorous science. Hence 2 he concentrated almost exclusively on the modem era. Much has been written of Husserl's relationship to Descartes, Kant, and the neo-Kantians. His connections with Locke, Berkeley, and Hume have not been examined as closely despite his fre quent allusions to these British empiricists. Among these thinkers David Hume gained from Husserl the more extensive considera tion. Commentators have pointed out correctly that Husserl always criticized unsparingly Hume's sheer empiricistic approach to the problem of cognition. Such an approach, in Husserl's view, can only result in the "naturalization of consciousness" from which stem that "psychologism" and "sensualism" which lead Hume inevitably into the contradictory impasse of solipsism 3 and skepticism."

This book is a theoretical and practical guide for mental health professionals who wish to utilize existential principles in their social work and clinical practice. Existential questions concerning life situations, such as anxiety, suffering, choosing, authenticity, are at the heart of the craft of any helping profession. The book aims to confront students and practitioners with the need to be simultaneously philosophical and experiential in their clinical approach. Written in an accessible tone, Eisikovits and Buchbinder bridge existential-philosophical concepts often seen as removed from everyday practice and the practical concerns of therapy. Each chapter presents a concept from existential philosophical tradition, such as anxiety, meaning making, time, and space, and then demonstrates their use by drawing from real-life clinical examples and interventions. The book illustrates their implementation in social work practice with reference to values such as client participation, self-determination, and free will. The book is intended for courses and advanced training in existential social work and therapy. It is essential reading for training social workers, counselors, therapists, and other helping professionals interested in existentialism.

Phenomenology was one of the Twentieth century 's major philosophical movements and continues to be a vibrant and widely studied subject today. The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology is an outstanding guide and reference source to the key philosophers, topics and themes in this exciting subject and essential reading for any student and scholar of phenomenology.

Over fifty chapters by a team of international contributors the Companion are divided into five clear parts:

• Main figures in the phenomenological movement, from Brentano to Derrida
• Main topics in phenomenology
• Phenomenological contributions to philosophy
• Phenomenological Intersections
• Historical Postscript .

Close attention is paid to the core topics in phenomenology such as intentionality, perception, subjectivity, the self, the body, being and phenomenological method. An important feature of the Companion is its examination of how phenomenology has contributed to central disciplines in philosophy such as metaphysics, philosophy of mind, moral philosophy, aesthetics and philosophy of religion as well as disciplines beyond philosophy such as race, cognitive science, psychiatry, literary criticism and psychoanalysis.

This first comparative study of philosophers and literary theorists Mikhail Bakhtin and Walter Benjamin examines the relationship between the experience of the modern world and the forms that we use to make sense of that experience. Analyzing their views on art, habit, tradition, and language, this comparative study results in a radical reconsideration of received views about thinkers as well as in a reconsideration of the modernity that Bakhtin and Benjamin lived in and that we continue to inhabit now.

In releasing the text of this volume, originally set aside as a collec tion for possible posthumous publication, during my lifetime, I am acting in a sense as my own executor: I want to save my heirs and literary executors the decision whether these pieces should be print ed or reprinted in the present context, a decision which I wanted to postpone to the last possible moment. As to the reasons why I changed my mind I can refer to the Introduction. Here I merely want to make some acknowledgments, first to the copyright holders for the reprinted pieces and then to some personal friends who had an important influence on the premature birth of this brainchild. The copyright holders to whom I am indebted for.the permis sion to reprint here, in the original or in slightly amended form, the articles listed are, with their names in alphabetical order: Ablex Publishing Company: 'Putting Ourselves into the Place of Others' Atherton Press: 'Equality in Existentialism' and 'Human Dignity: A Challenge to Contemporary Philosophy' Friends Journal: 'Is There a Human Right to One's Native Soil?' Gordon Breach: 'Human Dignity: A Challenge to Contemporary Philosophy?' Humanities Press: 'Ethics for Fellows in the Fate of Existence' Journal of the History of Ideas: 'Accident of Birth: A Non-utili tarian Motif in Mill's Philosophy' Philosophical Review: 'A Defense of Human Equality' Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry: 'On the I-am me Experience in Childhood and Adolescence' The Monist: 'A Phenomenological Approach to the Ego'"

1 The present volume is rich in essential phenomenological descriptions 2 and insightful historico-critical analyses, some of which cannot be fully appreciated, however, except by close examination on the part of the reader. Accordingly, such a task ought to be left to the consideration and judgment of the latter, save where such discussions are directly relevant to the topics I will be dwelling upon. I prefer, then, to approach the matters and questions contained here otherwise, namely, archeologically. In this I 3 follow Jose Huertas-Jourda, the editor of the corresponding French vol- 4 ume, in his felicitous terminological choice, although I adopt it here for my purposes in an etymological sense, i. e. , as signifying a return to prin- 5 ciples or origins. This, after all, is consistent not only with the spirit and practice of phenomenology, as acknowledged by Aron Gurwitsch often enough, but as well with what he has actually said, to wit: it is a qu- tion of 1 Cf. , e. g. , infra,in An Outline of Constitutive Phenomenology, Chapter 4, pp. 185 ff. (Henceforth I shall refer to this book as Outline. ) This essay will be devoted to the study of selected parts of the contents of this volume, although, when necessary, use will be made here of other works by various authors, including Gurwitsch. 2 Cf. , e. g. , ibid. , Chapter 3, pp. 107 ff.

The maintext in the present volume has beenconstructed out of passages found scattered aboutin thirty-five years of Alfred Schutz's writings, and it has been constructed by following a pageof notes for a lecture that he gave in 1955 under the title "Sociological Aspect of Literature. " The result can be considered the substance of Schutz's contribution to the theory of literature. More detail about how this construction has beenperformed is offered in the Editor's Introduction. The complementary essays areby scholars from Germany, Japan, andthe United States , from several generations, and from the disciplines of anthropology, philosophy, and sociology. These researchers were invited to reflect in their own perspectives on the main text and in relation to matters referred to within and beyond it. Draftversions of most of these complementary essays were presented for critical discussion in a research symposium held at the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science of theNewSchool for Social Research on April28-29, 1995 underthe sponsorship of The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomen ology, Inc. , Florida Atlantic University; The Department of Philosophy of The Graduate Faculty of the New School, Richard 1. Bernstein, Chair; and Evelyn and George Schutz, the philosopher's children. Revised versions of these presentations and also several essays subsequently recruited are offered to begin yet another stagein thehistory of scholarship on Schutz and the phenomenological research inspired by him. Northwestern University Press is thanked for permission to quote extensively from Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, trans.