There is a remarkable unity to the work of Edmund Husserl, but there are also many difficulties in it. The unity is the result of a single personal and philo sophical quest working itself out in concrete phenomenological analyses; the difficulties are due to the inadequacy of initial conceptions which becomes felt as those analyses become progressively deeper and more extensive. ! Anyone who has followed the course of Husserl's work is struck by the constant reemergence of the same problems and by the insightfulness of the inquiries which press toward their solution. However one also becomes aware of Husserl's own dissatisfaction with his work, once so movingly expressed in a 2 personal note. It is the purpose of the present work to examine and revive one of the issues which gave Husserl difficulty, namely, the problem of an intro duction to phenomenology. Several of Husserl's writings published after Logical Investigations were either subtitled or referred to by him as "introductions to phenomenology. "3 These works serve to acquaint the reader with the specific character of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and with the problems to which it is to provide the solution. They include discussions and analyses which pertain to what has come to be known as "ways" into transcendental phenomenology. 4 The issue here is the proper access to transcendental phenomenology.

This volume is a collection of previously unpublished papers dealing with the neglected "phenomenological" dimension of the philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, which it compares and contrasts to the phenomenology of his contemporary Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and to those of Edmund Husserl and his 20th century followers. Issues discussed include a comparision of the early phenomenological method in Fichte and Hegel with the classical phenomenological method in Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre, as well as special topics, namely the problem of self-consciousness and intersubjectivity, very important in Fichte's trancendental philosophy of the Wissenschaftslehre but discussed as well in 20th century phenomenology. Fichte can be said to have invented the theory of intersubjectivity that was first developed by Hegel and then by Husserl, Sartre or Ricoeur. Fichte can also be said to have in fact promoted a theory of intentionality based on tendencies, drives, purposes and will, that got a modern shape and language by Husserl and his followers. And even the deduction of the human body in Fichte's practical parts of the Wissenschaftslehre prepares the path for modern twentieth century theories of body, feeling and mind.

1 The present volume is rich in essential phenomenological descriptions 2 and insightful historico-critical analyses, some of which cannot be fully appreciated, however, except by close examination on the part of the reader. Accordingly, such a task ought to be left to the consideration and judgment of the latter, save where such discussions are directly relevant to the topics I will be dwelling upon. I prefer, then, to approach the matters and questions contained here otherwise, namely, archeologically. In this I 3 follow Jose Huertas-Jourda, the editor of the corresponding French vol- 4 ume, in his felicitous terminological choice, although I adopt it here for my purposes in an etymological sense, i. e. , as signifying a return to prin- 5 ciples or origins. This, after all, is consistent not only with the spirit and practice of phenomenology, as acknowledged by Aron Gurwitsch often enough, but as well with what he has actually said, to wit: it is a qu- tion of 1 Cf. , e. g. , infra,in An Outline of Constitutive Phenomenology, Chapter 4, pp. 185 ff. (Henceforth I shall refer to this book as Outline. ) This essay will be devoted to the study of selected parts of the contents of this volume, although, when necessary, use will be made here of other works by various authors, including Gurwitsch. 2 Cf. , e. g. , ibid. , Chapter 3, pp. 107 ff.

Martin Heidegger's Impact on Psychotherapy is the first comprehensive presentation in English of the background, theory and practice of Daseinsanalysis, the analysis of human existence. It is the work of the co-founding member of a radical re-envisioning of psychoanalysis initiated by the work of the Swiss psychiatrist, Medard Boss (1903-1990). Originally published in 1998, this new edition of Gion Condrau's (1919-2006) book acquaints new generations of psychotherapists, psychiatrists and psychoanalysts with an alternative to psychodynamic, humanistic and existential forms of the therapy of the word that is currently experience a renaissance of interest, especially in the United States and the UK. The volume presents the basic ideas of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) that made possible this unique approach to psychotherapy. It is arranged in sections on (1) the foundations of Daseinsanalysis in Heidegger's thought, (2) understanding psychopathology, (3) daseinsanalytic psychotherapy in practice, (4) working with the dying person, and (5) the preparation of the professional Daseinsanalyst. Several extended cases are presented to illustrate daseinsanalytic practice at work (narcissistic personality disorder and obsessive compulsive personality disorder). Since dreaming and dream life are central to Daseinsanalysis, a number of dreams are analyzed from its perspective. Daseinsanalysis originated as a form of psychoanalysis and retains a number of its features: free association, optional use of the couch, and attention to dreams. It differs from psychoanalysis by abandoning the natural science perspective which understands human experience and behavior in terms of causality. Instead, human existence is seen to be utterly different from every other kind of sentient animal life. Taking a phenomenological perspective, Daseinsanalysis is based on letting the existence of the human being in all his or her uniqueness show itself. In practice, Daseinsanalysis avoids intervening in the life of the person in favor of maximizing the conditions in which existence can come into its own with maximum freedom.

Christian Lotz shows in this book that Husserl's Phenomenology and its key concept--subjectivity--is based on a concrete anthropological structure, such as self-affection and the bodily experience of the other. The analysis of the sensual sphere and the lived Body forces Husserl to an ongoing correction of his strong methodological assumptions. Subjectivity turns out to be an ambivalent phenomenon, as the subject is unable to fully present itself to itself, and therefore is forced to allow for a fundamental non-transparency in itself.

Continuing the pioneering work in the field laid bare by the uncovering the Creative Condition of the human being in literature and fine arts, the elemental passion of place leads us through the creative imagination into the labyrinths of the ontopoiesis of life itself (Tymieniecka, in her inaugural study). Essays by A-T. Tymieniecka, Mary Catanzaro, W. Smith, Jadwiga Smith, L. Dunton-Downer, Jorge Garcia Gomez, Ch. Eykmann, Marlies Kronegger, Eldon N. van Liere, Hans Rudnik make this collection a unique contribution to literary studies as well as to the metaphysics of life and of the human condition. "

The ways in which we imagine and experience time are changing dramatically. Climate change, unending violent conflict, fraying material infrastructures, permanent debt and widening social inequalities mean that we no longer live with an expectation of a progressive future, a generative past, or a flourishing now that characterized the temporal imaginaries of the post-war period. Time, it appears, is not flowing, but has become stuck, intensely felt, yet radically suspended. How do we now 'take care' of time? How can we understand change as requiring time not passing? And what can quotidian experiences of suspended time - waiting, delaying, staying, remaining, enduring, returning and repeating - tell us about the survival of social bonds? Enduring Time responds to the question of the relationship between time and care through a paradoxical engagement with time's suspension. Working with an eclectic archive of cultural, political and artistic objects, it aims to reestablish the idea that time might be something we both have and share, as opposed to something we are always running out of. A strikingly original philosophy of time, this book also provides a detailed survey of contemporary theories of the topic; it is an indispensable read for those attempting to live meaningfully in the current age.

QUESTIONS DE METHODE I. Au contraire de Sartre qui, a partir de quelques elements cueillis dans les ecrits de HusserI concernant la conscience ima- geante, a bllti sa propre doctrine de !'imagination, nous nous proposons de reconstituer, a partir de ces m~mes elements, ce qu'on pourrait appeler la theort:e husserlienne de l'imagination, c'est-a-dire la theorie que HusserI eut lui-m~me construite, s'il avait reuni en une synthese les elements qu'il a laisses epars. Une entreprise de ce genre est toujours delicate et souleve des prob!emes difficiles - a commencer par celui de sa legitimite. N ous ecartons d'emblee l'objection d'ordre general qui contesterait Ie droit de systematiser dans l'reuvre d'un auteur ce que lui-m~me a laisse disperse et eventuellement inacheve. Par un tel scrupule, on sacrifie sans doute a la rigueur historique mais on est beaucoup moins soucieux de penetrer une pensee dans son dynamisme in- terne et profond et, en derniere analyse, on protege les droits de l'archeologie mais non pas ceux de la culture et de son progreso Nous pensons a une difficulte beaucoup plus serieuse; de sa so- lution depend l'attitude a adopter en face des textes dont nous devons nous servir dans notre etude. Nous utilisons des ouvrages qui couvrent la totalite de la car- riere philosophique de HusserIl.

Understanding the motivations behind those who partake in extreme sports can be difficult for some. If the popular conception holds that the incentive behind extreme sports participation is entirely to do with risking one's life, then this confusion will continue to exist. However, an in-depth examination of the phenomenology of the extreme sport experience yields a much more complex picture. This book revisits the definition of extreme sports as those activities where a mismanaged mistake or accident would most likely result in death. Extreme sports are not necessarily synonymous with risk and participation may not be about risk-taking. Participants report deep inner transformations that influence world views and meaningfulness, feelings of coming home and authentic integration as well as a freedom beyond the everyday. Phenomenologically, these experiences have been interpreted as transcendent of time, other, space and body. Extreme sport participation therefore points to a more potent, life-enhancing endeavour worthy of further investigation. This book adopts a broad hermeneutic phenomenological approach to critique the assumed relationship to risk-taking, the death wish and the concept of "No Fear" in extreme sports, and repositions the experience in a previously unexplored manner. This is valuable reading for students and academics interested in Sports Psychology, Social Psychology, Health Psychology, Tourism, Leisure Studies and the practical applications of phenomenology.

This book is the first anthology to provide a wide-ranging picture of how phenomenology relates to language. It contains both in-depth studies on new aspects of language in Husserl's thought as well as original phenomenological research that explores the respective potentials and limits of linguistic expression and conceptualization.The fourteen texts gathered here may have a single aim, but their content varies depending on the respective author's intention: either to discuss problems of language within the Husserlian framework, to address philosophical issues of language proceeding from a phenomenological viewpoint, or to provide a reflection on phenomenology's relation to language. Thus, rather than being organized by topic, the collection has been arranged into three parts, according to the respective authors' philosophical approaches.

This volume contains sOOeen essays written by his students and colleagues in honor of Maurice Natanson. The essays explore some of the diverse themes Professor Natanson has pursued through forty years of teaching and philosophizing in the tradition of existential phenomenology. Because it also includes a lengthy biographical and philosophical interview where one can find an absorbing account of Natanson's Lebens/au/in his own words, there is no need to detail that polypragmatic career here. Suffice to say that even passing acquaintance with the man and the work will reveal that Edmund Husserl's self-description holds equally of his distinguished interpreter: "I seek not to instruct but only to lead, to point out and describe what I see. I claim no other right than that of speaking according to my best lights, principally before myself but in the same manner also before others, as one who has lived in all its seriousness the fate of a philosophical existence. "l For Natanson, as the diversity of the contributions to this volume attest, such seriousness involves something other than that narrow technical vision for which a topic is the more philosophical the less it has to do with anything else. In Natanson's pages-to say nothing of his teaching and conversation-there are no men of straw but living, breathing human beings; with hirn philosophy's tentacles are ubiquitous.

This book starts with a representation of Husserl's idea of phenomenology as a foundational theory of science. The following essays elucidate the main features of the phenomenological method as worked out by Husserl in the course of the development of his philosophy - starting from merely 'descriptive' and going on to 'transcendental' and 'constitutive' phenomenology - in order to get access to the foundations of knowledge in general and of scientific knowledge in particular. Further essays deal with the Husserlian foundations of natural science, and the relations between phenomenology and psychology, as well as those between phenomenology and history. This second revised and enlarged edition - the first appeared in 1987 and was edited by Lee Hardy - contains two further essays: one deals with Husserl's never abandoned idea of phenomenology as a rigorous science and his further claim to restore phenomenological philosophy as 'First Philosophy', and the other one on the problem of crisis of the Western culture Husserl was concerned with during several periods of his life, demonstrates the actuality of his phenomenology even for philosophy of science in our times.

This book is an effort to bring genetic-phenomenological analyses in contact with empirical psychology, neurology, cognitive science and research in primate cognition. The first part adresses the role of weak but not arbitrary phantasy in perception, and argues that it has a transcendental function with several different aspects. Weak phantasma can be found in all fields of sensibility and at all levels of constitution. Relevant aspects of Charles-Bonnet Syndrome are analyzed in addition to the contributions of empirical psychology to our understanding of hallucinations in normal subjects. The second part is dedicated to the process of self-organization in human and animal perception from the point of view of genetic phenomenology, concentrating on the formation, change and use of the so-called "types" (Typus). The third part investigates whether cognition, thinking and other higher order performances of the mind - both human and animal - can be understood by taking into account the contributions of phantasmatic elements in three important fields: scenic imagination in daydreams, feelings, and co-feeling with others. To this end dual-mode theories of mind and some contributions from neurology are taken into account. The conclusion reached is that most higher-order achievements of our mind - which we tend to identify with the performance of our language-system - might in fact be accomplished without language in the low-level system of phantasmatic imagination. This leads to an "inclusive theory of the subject" which allows us to understand how higher-organized animals like primates can think.

The rift which has long divided the philosophical world into opposed schools-the "Continental" school owing its origins to the phenomenology of Husserl and the "analytic" school derived from Frege-is finally closing. But this closure is occurring in ways both different and in certain respects at odds with one another. On the one hand scholars are seeking to rediscover the concerns and positions common to both schools, positions from which we can continue fruitfully to address important philosophical issues. On the other hand successors to both traditions have developed criticisms of basic assumptions shared by the two schools. They have suggested that we must move not merely beyond the conflict between these two "modem" schools but beyond the kind of philosophy represented in the unity of the two schools and thereby move towards a new "postmodern" philosophical style. On the one hand, then and for example, Husserl scholarship has in recent years witnessed the development of an interpretation of Husserl which more closely aligns his phenomenology with the philosophical concerns of the "analytic" tradition. In certain respects, this should come as no surprise and is long overdue. It is true, after all, that the early Husserl occupied himself with many of the same philosophical issues as did Frege and the earliest thinkers of the analytic tradition. Examples include the concept of number, the nature of mathematical analysis, meaning and reference, truth, formalization, and the relationship between logic and mathematics.

This fresh and innovative approach to human-environmental relations will revolutionise our understanding of the boundaries between ourselves and the environment we inhabit. The anthology is predicated on the notion that values shift back and forth between humans and the world around them in an ethical communicative zone called 'value-space'. The contributors examine the transformative interplay between external environments and human values, and identify concrete ways in which these norms, residing in and derived from self and society, are projected onto the environment.

In the history of Kierkegaard reception scholars have predominantly focused on the pseudonymous works. Thus, while there are long traditions of research on well known pseudonymous works, such as Either/Or and The Sickness unto Death, scholarship on the edifying discourses is still at the pioneering stage. In an effort to bring this other, neglected half of Kierkegaard's authorship into focus, this volume of the Yearbook is dedicated specifically to the edifying discourses from 1843 44 and to Three Discourses on Imagined Occasions, from 1845. It features articles from leading international scholars on various aspects of these discourses, which are explored from literary, philosophical and theological perspectives. A series of articles has also been included on the history of reception of these edifying discourses in the various countries and language groups. The Yearbook also includes individual sections containing papers from recent international seminars on Kierkegaard's thought. One section provides a glimpse into the most recent work from the rich tradition of French Kierkegaard research. Another section includes leading papers from recent Hungarian Kierkegaard scholarship. These contributions serve to make this number of the Yearbook the most international to date and are proof of the growing interest in international Kierkegaard research.

Fifty years after the death of Edmund Husserl, the main founder of the phenomenological current of thought, we present to the public a four book collection showing in an unprecedented way how Husserl's aspiration to inspire the entire universe of knowledge and scholarship has now been realized. These volumes display for the first time the astounding expansion of phenomenological philosophy throughout the world and the enormous wealth and variety of ideas, insights, and approaches it has inspired. The basic commitment to phenomenological concerns found in all this variety makes this collection a most signifi cant historical document. This second volume of the collection bears witness to a deliberate shift of attention from the earlier to the later phase of Husserl's reflections. We see how his issues - intersubjectivity, ethics, human encounter, the societal world, empathy, the sphere of the self, and the surpassing of dichotomies (bodylpsyche, etc.) - are now at the center of attention in the human sciences. Among the authors are H. Tellenbach, A. Rigobello, C. Balzer, C. Bjurvill, V. Molchanov, E. Syristova, O. Balaban, R. Boehm, M. Sancipriano, O. M. Anwar, Y. Okamoto, B. Holyst, T. Sodeika, and M. De Negri. The studies were gathered at the programs held by The World Institute for Advanced Phenomenological Research and Learning in the commemorative year 1988/1989, chiefly at the First World Congress of Phenomenology at Santiago de Compos tela, Spain, with the aim of assessing the current state of phenomenology. A-T. T."

The book is the result of my preoccupation with the phe nomenological philosophy of Edmund Husserl during my years of post-doctoral studies (approximately since 1960). As the titles of the chapters may suggest, I have dealt with a number of topics relating to Husserlian Phenomenology - themes which are relatively independent but not disconnected. For I have been prone to look upon this movement as presenting more an organic outlook of its own, inspite of its diversity of phases, than as offering certain answers to individual philosophical problems. Accordingly my aim here has been to interpret the meaning and significance of this outlook in its logical, epistemological and metaphysical aspects. In writing these chapters I have been aware of the fact that the phenomenological movement as such still represents some thing of a heterodoxy in the world of Anglo-American philosophy to-day. Yet the points of contact between the two are not far fetched. In treating the problems from the phenomenological point of view, I have often taken into account the views of the empirical-analytical school in general. It should be clear that instead of confining myself to a bare exposition of the different aspects of Husserlian Phenomenology, I have taken some freedom in interpreting its point of view."

The first of its kind, this book applies existential principles to sexual problems, providing clinicians with the tools to understand male sexuality more deeply. Alighting from the existential psychotherapy tenets of Irvin D. Yalom, Watter introduces the notion that the penis is a conduit for male emotion, and hence regulates their ability to form and experience intimate relationships. Subsequent chapters explore an existential view of male sexual dysfunction, non-sexual trauma, hypersexuality, changing bodies through illness, age, and injury, and examines badly behaved men to understand the meaning of certain behaviors. This book will be an invaluable resource for sex therapists, marriage and family therapists, psychologists, and social workers in practice and in training, assisting them to develop the therapeutic skills that will improve their understanding of men's psychological experience.

Most of the papers appearing in volume 87 numbers, 1-2 are based on papers presented at the Colloquium on the Philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein held at the Department of Philosophy at Florida State University on 7-8 April 1989. We owe warm thanks to Florida State University for generously supporting this colloquium. The English translation of the chapter entitled 'Philosophie', from Wittgenstein's typescript number 213 (von Wright), appears here with permission of Wittgenstein's literary heirs, without affecting existing copyrights. The original German version of this chapter was edited by Heikki Nyman and appeared in Revue Internationale de Philosophie 43 (1989), pp. 175-203. Jaakko Hintikka's article (87, No.2) first appeared in a shorter form in The Times Literary Supplement No. 4565 (28 September to 4 October 1990, p. 1030). The present version appears with the permis sion of The Times Literary Supplement, which is gratefully acknowl edged. Our thanks are due to all the participants of the colloquium and the contributors to these special numbers."

Many of the contributions to this volume are based on research originally presented at the historic first meeting in the United States of Japanese and American phenomenologists that took place at Seattle University in the Summer of 1991. In addition, other contributions have been added in order to supplement and complement the themes of the work presented at this meeting. Owing both to the vagaries of fate and the finitude of time, the publication of these essays has taken much longer than was originally intended. Nevertheless, this delay is more than offset by the inclusion in one volume of both phenomenological thematics and phenomenological authors who do not usually appear together.

"All life upon the stage"; the Theatrum Mundi. In this volume, a seventeenth century metaphor is revisited and is seen as applying to all art in all times. In the "magic mirror of art" the human being discerns the hidden spheres of human life and commemorates and celebrates its glorious victories and mourns its ignominious defeats. Let us rediscover Art as a witness to the human predicament as well as a celebrant of humanity's most sublime moments. This is the invitation of this collection of studies by A-T. Tymieniecka, Hanna Scolnicov, Muella Erkilic, Matt Landrus, Patricia Trutty-Coohill, Monika Bakke, David Brubaker, Tammy Knipp, Howard Pearce, Ellen J. Burns, G. Backhaus, Ethan J. Leib, Lawrence Kimmel, Ingrid Scheibler, Gottfried Scholz, L.F. Werth, A. Carillo, M. Statkiewicz, K. O'Rourke, B. Meyler, H. Meltzer, Jiuan Heng, W.V. Davies. Art as mirror of life, human life as participating in a stage play, corresponds to the fervent search human being of the causes, reasons, puzzles of our existence which elude us in the concrete life. This XVII c. conception of Theatrum Mundi opens as this volume shows a fascinating field of investigation for our times.

The two eminent metaphysicians Armstrong and Grossmann exchanged letters for ten years in which they discussed crucial points of their respective ontologies. They have a common basis. Both do metaphysics proper and not linguistic philosophy. Both advocate universals and acknowledge the key position of the category of states of affairs. However, they differ on the simplicity of universals and the nature of states of affairs. There is also a fundamental methodological disagreement between them. Armstrong accepts only the evidence of natural science and has a materialist view on mind while Grossmann is a dualist and grants also the same evidential status to the phenomenological data of perception and introspection. The letters are grouped into three phases. The first is the issue of universals, the second the ontological analysis of laws of nature and the third the ontology of numbers. The book contains also longer comments and reviews, partly not published until now.