Ever since the beginning of the modern phenomenological movement disciplined attention has been paid to various patterns of human experi- ence as they are actually lived through in the concrete. This has brought forth many attempts to tind a general philosophical position which can do justice to these experiences without reduction or distQrtion. In France, the best known of these recent attempts have been made by Sartre in his Being and Nothingness and by Merleau-Ponty in his Phenomenol- ogy of Perception and certain later fragments. Sartre has a keen sense for life as it is lived, and his work is marked by many penetrating descrip- tions. But his dualistic ontology of the en-soi versus the pour-soi has seemed over-simple and inadequate to many critics, and has been seriously qualitied by the author himself in his latest Marxist work, The Critique of Dialetical Reason. Merleau-Ponty's major work is a lasting contri- but ion to the phenomenology of the pre-objective world of perception. But asi de from a few brief hints and sketches, he was unable, before his unfortunate death in 1961, to work out carefully his ultimate philosophi- cal point of view. This leaves us then with the German philosopher, Heidegger, as the only contemporary thinker who has formulated a total ontology which claims to do justice to the stable results of phenomenology and to the liv- ing existential thought of our time.

The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.

This is an unusual volume. During his periods of study with Ed mund Husserl - first from I924 1. 0 I926, then from I93I to I932 - Dorion Cairns had become imnlensely impressed with the stri king philosophical quality of Husserl's conversations with his students and co-workers. Not unlike his daily writing (five to six hours a day was not uncommon, as Husserl reports herein, the nature of which was a continuous searching, reassessing, modi fying, advancing and even rejecting of former views), Husserl's conversations, especially evidenced from Cairns's record, were remarkable for their depth and probing character. Because of this, and because of the importaIlt light they threw on Husserl's written and published works, Cairns had early resolved to set down in writing, as accurately as possible, the details of these conversations. Largely prompted by the questions and concerns of his students, including Cairns, the present Conversations (from the second period, I93I-I932, except for the initial conversation) provide a significant, intriguing, and always fascinating insight into both the issues which were prominent to Husserl at this time, and the way he had come to view the systematic and historical placement of his own earlier studies. Cairns had often insisted - principally in his remarkable lec 1 tures at the Graduate Faculty of the New School - that attaining a fair and accurate view of Husserl's enormously rich and complex 1 Cairns's lectures between 1956 and 1964 are especially important."

The Ethics of Time utilizes the resources of phenomenology and hermeneutics to explore this under-charted field of philosophical inquiry. Its rigorous analyses of such phenomena as waiting, memory, and the body are carried out phenomenologically, as it engages in a hermeneutical reading of such classical texts as Augustine's Confessions and Sophocles's Oedipus Rex, among others. The Ethics of Time takes seriously phenomenology's claim of a consciousness both constituting time and being constituted by time. This claim has some important implications for the "ethical" self or, rather, for the ways in which such a self informed by time, might come to understand anew the problems of imperfection and ethical goodness. Even though a strictly philosophical endeavour, this book engages knowledgeably and deftly with subjects across literature, theology and the arts and will be of interest to scholars throughout these disciplines.

This hardcover edition of Hegel's landmark work of philosophy contains the authoritative and respected translation of J.B. Baillie. The Phenomenology of Spirit, also known as The Phenomenology of Mind, contains methodical discussions of Hegelian examination of mind and mental functioning. In Hegelianist philosophy, the notion of the spirit or mind commences with a consideration of the subjective (i.e. individual) mind. After some contemplation however, it is realised that this 'individual' sort of mind is but the initial stage of the process - the so-called 'in-itself stage'. The stage which follows this is that of the objective mind - it is this type of mind that finds itself object of law, morals and government. This frames the condition of the mind when it is out-of-itself. The final stage of the Hegelianist posit upon the mind is that of the 'absolute mind'. At this point, the mind ascends above the constraints of the natural world and of mankind's institutions and laws.

This edited collection discusses phenomenological critiques of formalism and their relevance to the problem of responsibility and the life-world. The book deals with themes of formalization of knowledge in connection to the life-world, the natural world, the history of science and our responsibility for both our epistemic claims and the world in which we live. Readers will discover critiques of formalization, the life-world and responsibility, and a collation and comparison of Patocka's and Husserl's work on these themes. Considerable literature on Husserl is presented here and the two themes of epistemic responsibility and the life-world are discussed together. This work specifically emphasizes the interrelatedness of these existential aspects of his work - self-responsibility and the crisis - as not only epistemological, but also related to human life. This volume also introduces Jan Patocka to English-speaking readers as a phenomenologist in his own right. Patocka shows us, in particular, the significance of the modern abyss between our thinking and the world. Readers will discover that this abyss is of concern for our everyday experience because it leads to a rupture in our understanding of the world: between the world of our living and its scientific construct. We see that Patocka continually emphasized the relevance of Husserl's work to existential questions relating to human responsibility and the life-world, which he admits is left largely implicit in Husserl's work. This edited collection will spark discussion on the question of responsibility against the backdrop of formalized knowledge which is increasingly inaccessible to human understanding. Despite the complexity of some of the analyzed ideas, this book discusses these themes in a clear and readable way. This work is scholarly, exact in its discussion and authoritative in its reading, but at the same time accessible to anyone motivated to understand these debates.

This book charts and challenges the bruising impact of post-Saussurean thought on the categories of experience and self-presence. It attempts a reappropriation of the category of lived experience in dialogue with poststructuralist thinking. Following the insight that mediated subjectivity need not mean alienated selfhood, Meredith forwards a postmetaphysical model of the experiential based on the interpenetration of poststructuralist thinking and hermeneutic phenomenology. Since poststructuralist approaches in feminist theory have often placed women's lived experiences "under erasure," Meredith uses this hermeneutic/deconstructive model to attempt a rehabilitation of the singular "flesh and blood" female existent.

Alfred Schutz devoted his life to a clarification of the foun dations of the social sciences. His first formulation of the perti nent problems is contained in DER SINNHAFTE AUFBAU DER SOZIALEN WELT, EINE EINLEITUNG IN DIE VERSTEHENDE SOZIOLOGIE, now available in a second unrevised German edition with an English translation in preparation. Since I932, the date of this work, Alfred Schutz pursued painstaking and detailed investigations of issues which arose in connection with his early endeavors. These investigations were originally published as a series of essays and monographs over a period of about twenty years and are now assembled in the COLLECTED PAPERS of which this is the third and final volume. They form a unitary whole insofar as a common core of problems and theoretical ideas is presented from varying perspectives. Together DER SINNHAFTE AUFBAu DER SOZIALEN WELT and the three volumes of COL LECTED PAPERS set forth a comprehensive and consistent theory of the world of everyday life as the reality with which the social sciences are essentially concerned. Alfred Schutz was preparing a systematic presentation of his theory and of the results of his investigations into the struc tures of the world of everyday life when death overtook him. The manuscript containing the final statement of his philosophical and sociological thinking was not completely ready for publi cation at the time of his death. It is now being brought into book form by Professor Thomas Luckmann, one of his former students."

In Being and Nothingness Sartre picks up diverging threads in the phenomenological tradition, weaves them together with ideas from Gestalt and behaviourist psychology, and asks: What is consciousness? What is its relationship to the body, to the external world, and to other minds? Sartre believes that the mind and its states are by-products of introspection, created in the act that purports to discover them. How does this happen? And how are we able to perceive ourselves as persons - physical objects with mental states? Sartre's Phenomenology reconstructs Sartre's answers to these crucial questions. On Sartre's view, consciousness originally apprehends itself in terms of what it is consciousness of, that is, as an activity of apprehending the world. David Reisman traces the path from this minimal form of self-consciousness to the perception of oneself as a full-blown person. Similar considerations apply to the perception of others. Reisman describes Sartre's account of the transition from one's original apprehension of another consciousness to the perception of other persons. An understanding of the various levels of self-apprehension and of the apprehension of others allows Reisman to penetrate the key ideas in Being and Nothingness, and to compare Sartre to analytic philosophers on fundamental questions in the philosophy of mind.

The preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) is one of the most widely-read texts in Hegel's corpus, and yet we still lack a clear understanding of its aims. Providing a fresh perspective on Hegel's preface, Andrew Davis contends that it should be read as an overview of what philosophy is not. Contesting previous investigations that have assumed Hegel's purpose in the preface is to introduce the reader to his own philosophical method, Davis moves Hegel's positive comments about the nature of philosophy to the background. This is, after all, where they belong in a preface, according to Hegelian philosophy, as Hegel contends that the actual nature of philosophy cannot be presented in advance of specific inquiries. Examining the nature of philosophy through negation, each chapter in the book explores a different form of pseudo-philosophy that Hegel addresses in his preface. Together, they allow Hegelian philosophy to appear in relief as precisely what cannot be achieved through explanation, edification, formalism, phenomenology, mathematical proof, propositional truth, or personal revelation. With an appendix featuring synopses of every paragraph of the preface, Hegel on Pseudo-Philosophy not only offers a jargon-free introduction to Hegel's thought, but it also yields crucial insights into the organisation of a preface that has long been decried as haphazard or incomprehensible.

As the fields of philosophy of medicine and bioethics have developed in the United States, the philosophical perspective of phenomenology has been largely ignored. Yet, the central conviction that informs this volume is that phenomenology provides extraordinary insights into many of the issues that are directly addressed within the world of medicine. Such issues include: the nature of medicine itself; the distinction between immediate experience and scientific conceptualization; the nature of the body - and the implications of embodiment in the realm of clinical practice; the meaning of health, illness and disease; the problem of intersubjectivity - particularly with respect to achieving successful communication with another; the complexity of decision-making in the clinical context (and in the realm of medical ethics); the possibility of empathic understanding; the theory and method of clinical practice; and the essential characteristics of the therapeutic relationship - i.e. the relationship between the sick person and the one who professes to help. Some of the authors who have contributed to this volume are philosophers, some are engaged in other academic disciplines, and several are practicing healthcare professionals.

In the same spirit as his most recent book, Living With Nietzsche, and his earlier study In the Spirit of Hegel, Robert Solomon turns to the existential thinkers Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre, in an attempt to get past the academic and political debates and focus on what is truly interesting and valuable about their philosophies. Solomon makes the case that--despite their very different responses to the political questions of their day--Camus and Sartre were both fundamentally moralists, and their philosophies cannot be understood apart from their deep ethical commitments. He focuses on Sartre's early, pre-1950 work, and on Camus's best known novels The Stranger, The Plague, and The Fall. Throughout Solomon makes the important point that their shared interest in phenomenology was much more important than their supposed affiliation with "existentialism." Solomon's reappraisal will be of interest to anyone who is still or ever has been fascinated by these eccentric but monumental figures.

Although pain is widely recognized by clinicians and researchers as an experience, pain is always felt in a patient-specific way rather than experienced for what it objectively is, making perceived meaning important in the study of pain. The book contributors explain why meaning is important in the way that pain is felt and promote the integration of quantitative and qualitative methods to study meanings of pain. For the first time in a book, the study of the meanings of pain is given the attention it deserves. All pain research and medicine inevitably have to negotiate how pain is perceived, how meanings of pain can be described within the fabric of a person's life and neurophysiology, what factors mediate them, how they interact and change over time, and how the relationship between patient, researcher, and clinician might be understood in terms of meaning. Though meanings of pain are not intensively studied in contemporary pain research or thoroughly described as part of clinical assessment, no pain researcher or clinician can avoid asking questions about how pain is perceived or the types of data and scientific methods relevant in discovering the answers.

Le present volume rassemble plusieurs etudes qu' Alfred Schutz avait consacrees a diverses questions qui gravitent autour d'un probleme philosophique majeur: celui de la socialite. La plupart de ces etudes ont Me publiees ailleurs, mais elles etaient dispersees et d'un acces parfois difficile. Tel quel, l'ouvrage que nous presentons n' est que la premiere partie d'un ensemble dans lequell'auteur se proposait de faire reunir par son disciple et ami Maurice Natanson les nombreux essais qu'il avait ecrits depuis son arrivee aux Etats-Unis au debut de la demiere guerre. La mort l'empecha de voir realiser ce projet. 11 nous a semble que la pUblication successive de cet ensemble, dans la fidelite aux indications laissees par l'auteur, etait Ie plus bel hommage que nous pussions rendre a ce penseur qui fut notre ami et meritait sans nul doute de tenir dans Ie courant phenomenologique une place de premier plan que faillirent lui refuser les circonstances dramatiques de sa vie, jointes a sa trop grande modestie per- sonnelle. II me faudrait ici parler de l'homme, evoquer sa finesse d'esprit, son ironie penetrante, sa serenite et son courage dans l' exil, l' event ail tres vaste de ses preoccupations, Ie don de jeu- nesse et de sympathie grftce auquel il entreprit a quarante ans d'assimiler avec bonheur une culture nouvelle, pour y exceller bientOt.

In his award-winning book "The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl: A Historical Development," J. N. Mohanty charted Husserl's philosophical development from the young man's earliest studies--informed by his work as a mathematician--to the publication of his "Ideas" in 1913. In this welcome new volume, the author takes up the final decades of Husserl's life, addressing the work of his Freiburg period, from 1916 until his death in 1938.

As in his earlier work, Mohanty here offers close readings of Husserl's main texts accompanied by accurate summaries, informative commentaries, and original analyses. This book, along with its companion volume, completes the most up-to-date, well-informed, and comprehensive account ever written on Husserl's phenomenological philosophy and its development.

Martin Heidegger is one of the most important as well as one of the most difficult thinkers of the last century. Raymond Tallis, who has been arguing with Heidegger for over thirty years, illuminates his fundamental ideas through an imaginary conversation, which is both relaxed and rigorous, witty and profound.

The principal differences between the contemporary philosophic traditions which have come to be known loosely as analytic philosophy and phenomenology are all related to the central issue of the interplay between predication and perception. Frege's critique of psychologism has led to the conviction within the analytic tradition that philosophy may best defend rationality from relativism by detaching logic and semantics from all dependence on subjective intuitions. On this interpretation, logical analysis must account for the relationship of sense to reference without having recourse to a description of how we identify particulars through their perceived features. Husserl' s emphasis on the priority and objective import of perception, and on the continuity between predicative articulations and perceptual discriminations, has yielded the conviction within the phenomenological tradition that logical analysis should always be comple mented by description of pre-predicative intuitions. These methodological differences are related to broader differences in the philosophic projects of analysis and phenomenology. The two traditions have adopted markedly divergent positions in reaction to the critique of ancient and medieval philosophy initiated by Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes at the beginning of the modern era. The analytic approach generally endorses the modern preference for calculative rationality and remains suspicious of pre-modern categories, such as formal causality and eidetic intuition. Its goal is to give an account of human intelligence that is compatible with the modern interpretation of nature as an ensemble of quantifiable entities and relations."

History doesn't have to mean only an effort to know the past. It can be instead, according to Kierkegaard, a willful and personal choice regarding the creation of the future. Kierkegaard offers us an amazing new approach to the problem of what is history and who makes it.

This volume explores the role and status of phenomena such as feelings, values, willing, and action in the domain of perception and (social) cognition, as well as the way in which they are related. In its exploration, the book takes Husserl's lifelong project Studien zur Struktur des Bewusstseins (1909-1930) as its point of departure, and investigates these phenomena with Husserl but also beyond Husserl. Divided into two parts, the volume brings together essays that address the topics from different phenomenological, philosophical, and psychological perspectives. They discuss Husserl's position in dialogue with historical and recent philosophical and psychological debates and develop phenomenological accounts and descriptions with the help of Geiger, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Plessner, Sartre, Scheler, Schopenhauer, and Reinach.

At the heart of this book, a question: what to make of the creeping competences of the EU and of the role the European Court of Justice plays in this respect? Taking the implied powers doctrine as its starting point, the hypothesis is that it shows what is ultimately at stake in the concept of legal competence: the problem of creation in law, or the relationship between constituent and constituted power. By rethinking this relationship, a new conceptual framework to make sense of creeping competences is designed. For this, the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty is used. Tracing back the philosophical roots of creation, legal constitution is understood as constitution in passivity. This leads to a whole new interpretation of the relationship between law and politics, rule following, authority, competences and European integration. From this perspective specific chapters in the case law of the European Court of Justice are reread and the logic behind the competence creep is unmasked. new back cover copy: Europe's constitutional journey has not been a smooth one, and a better division and definition of competence in the European Union is a key issue that needs to be addressed. How can the division of competence be made more transparent? Does there need to be a reorganization of competence? How can it be ensured that the redefined division of competence will not lead to a creeping expansion of the competence of the Union or to encroachment upon the exclusive areas of competence of the Member States and, where there is provision, regions? And how can it be ensured that the European dynamic does not come to a halt? Indeed, has the creeping expansion of the competence of the Union already come to a halt? These are the questions this book explores. The Passivity of Law: Competence and Constitution in the European Court of Justice opens with a legal account of competence creep, including the role that the European Court of Justice plays in it and a sketch of the present division of competences and the main principles regulating it. It then discusses the relationship between constituent power and constituted or constitutional power from the viewpoint of the history of constitutional history before offering an alternative theory of their relationship, known as "chiastic theory," which is based on the philosophical investigations of Merleau-Ponty. It details how chiastic theory can be used to make sense of the Court's role in the competence creep in general and the doctrine of implied powers in particular, and it utilizes several case studies concerning competences to sustain this claim. Aimed at researchers and practitioners in Philosophy, Phenomenology, Political Science, the Social Sciences and numerous fields of law, this monograph is a seminal work in the evolving theory and practice of EU law.

This volume sheds light upon the omnipresent discussion of 'crisis' in our times by returning to the thought of the two philosophers upon which much of this talk is consciously (or unconsciously) based, namely, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. By tracing the narrative of the 'crisis' from Husserl's early treatment of arithmetic and logic through to Heidegger's meditations on the essence of technology, the author not only proposes a unified reading of both Husserl's and Heidegger's work, but points to important elements of the often underplayed continuity between these phenomenologists. At the same time, the concept of 'crisis' also illustrates the difference between Husserl and Heidegger. Though both define the crisis as one of 'forgetting', and both view this 'forgetting' as a matter of philosophical responsibility, essential divergence emerges in their interpretation of this phenomenon. Three questions uncover these points of convergence and divergence. First, does not the 'forgetfulness' reveal itself as a type of felix culpa, a necessary decay that now reveals itself in a positive light, indeed, as the precondition of history itself? Second, what is presupposed when the subjects is held responsible for forgetting? Third, what are the political consequences of such 'crisis'-philosophy? This last question allows access not only to hidden political aspects of Husserl's thought, but opens a further perspective for considering Heidegger's overt political activities.