Martin Flanagan uses Bakhtins notions of dialogism, chronotope and polyphony to address fundamental questions about film form and reception, focusing particularly on the way cinematic narrative utilizes time and space in its very construction.

Helping students and researchers get to grips with the work of this compelling but often baffling thinker, this introductory guide surveys the impact and continuing influence of the work of Friedrich Nietzsche on modern European thought.

"Interpreting Nietzsche "explores how some of the most important thinkers of the 20th century have responded to the legacy of his writings. Each chapter focuses on how Nietzsche's work has been read by such major figures as:

Martin HeideggerJacques DerridaGiles DeleuzeLuce IrigarayGianni Vattimo

Encouraging students to take their studies further, each chapter also includes annotated guides to further primary and secondary reading.

This is the first English translation of one of Heidegger's most important early lecture courses, including his most extensive treatment of the topic of destruction. "Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression" is a crucial text for understanding the early development of Heidegger's thought. This lecture course was presented in the summer semester of 1920 at the University of Freiburg. At the center of this course is Heidegger's elaboration of the meaning and function of the phenomenological destruction. In no other work by Heidegger do we find as comprehensive a treatment of the theme of destruction as in this lecture course. Culminating in a destruction of contemporaneous philosophy in terms of its understanding of 'life' as a primal phenomenon, this lecture course can be seen to open the way towards a renewal of the meaning of philosophy as such. This hugely important philosophical work is now available in English for the first time.

While many of the phenomenological currents in philosophy allegedly utilize a peculiar method, the type under consideration here is characterized by Franz Brentano s ambition to make philosophy scientific by adopting no other method but that of natural science. Brentano became particularly influential in teaching his students (such as Carl Stumpf, Anton Marty, Alexius Meinong, and Edmund Husserl) his descriptive psychology, which is concerned with mind as intentionally directed at objects. As Brentano and his students continued in their investigations in descriptive psychology, another side of Austrian phenomenology, namely object theory, became more and more prominent. The philosophical orientation under consideration in this collection of essays is accordingly a two-sided discipline, concerned with both mind and objects, and applicable to various areas of philosophy such as epistemology, philosophy of language, value theory, and ontology."

This book examines the phenomenological anthropology of Edith Stein. It specifically focuses on the question which Stein addressed in her work Finite and Eternal Being: What is the foundational principle that makes the individual unique and unrepeatable within the human species? Traditional analyses of Edith Stein's writings have tended to frame her views on this issue as being influenced by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, while neglecting her interest in the lesser-known figure of Duns Scotus. Yet, as this book shows, with regard to the question of individuality, Stein was critical of Aquinas' approach, finding that of Duns Scotus to be more convincing. In order to get to the heart of Stein's readings of Duns Scotus, this book looks at her published writings and her personal correspondence, in addition to conducting a meticulous analysis of the original codexes on which her sources were based. Written with diligence and flair, the book critically evaluates the authenticity of Stein's sources and shows how the position of Scotus himself evolved. It highlights the originality of Stein's contribution, which was to rediscover the relevance of Mediaeval scholastic thought and reinterpret it in the language of the Phenomenological school founded by Edmund Husserl.

It is well known that the social definition of individuals and ethnic groups helps legitimize how they are addressed by law enforcement. The philosophy of the social construction of crime and criminal behaviour reflects how individuals, such as police officers, construct meaning from the perspective from which they emerge, which in turn influences their law enforcement outlook. In the field, this is generally viewed through a positivist frame of reference which fails to critically examine assumptions of approach and practice. Written by an international specialist in this area, this is the first book which attempts to situate the social construction of crime and criminal behaviour within the philosophical context of phenomenology and how these constructions help inform, and ultimately justify, the policies employed to address them. Challenging existing thinking, this is essential reading for academics and students interested in social theory and theories of criminology.

This in-depth analysis of Heidegger's major works finds a fundamental thematic unity in the philosopher's effort to overcome the subjectivism of modern philosophy and to account for the ontological hierarchy that it alone constitutes a foundation for everything else. The author sees this challenge to the Cartesian tradition as the key to understanding Heidegger's views on human beings and language, as well as their influence in the issues of identity and representation in contemporary philosophy.

Featuring contributions by leading academics this collection is a companion to one of the most intricate of Deleuze's philosophical texts, articulating Leibnizian thought within the context of Baroque expressionism, characterized by its interdisciplinary approach to philosophy. This reader offers an incisive critical overview of its key themes

In recent years there has been a great deal of talk about a possible death of art. As the title of Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art" suggests, the essay challenges such talk, just as it in turn is challenged by such talk, talk that is supported by the current state of the art-world. It was Hegel, who most profoundly argued that the shape of our modern world no longer permits us to grant art the significance it once possessed. Hegel's proclamation of the end of art in its highest sense shadows this commentary, as it shadows Heidegger's essay. Heidegger's problematic turn from the philosopher Hegel to the poet Holderlin is born of the conviction that we must not allow Hegel to here have the last word. At stake is the future of art. But more importantly, if we are to accept Heidegger's argument, at stake is the future of humanity. But all who are eager to find in Heidegger's essay pointers concerning where not just art, but we should be heading, should be made wary by Heidegger's politicizing of art and aestheticizing of politics. Both remain temptations that demand a critical response. This commentary demonstrates the continued relevance of Heidegger's reflections."

This book presents the early existential phenomenology of Martin Heidegger as a way to reformulate academic disability studies and activist disability politics. It redresses the almost categorical neglect of human difference in the philosophy of Heidegger. It proceeds by applying a revised version of his phenomenology to social policy aimed to get disabled persons to work and to methods in rehabilitation science intended to be more 'client friendly'. Phenomenological philosophy is extended to the topic of disability, while, at the same time, two key concerns facing disability studies are addressed: the roles of capitalism in disablement, and of medical practice in the lives of disabled persons. By reframing disability as a lived way of being in the world, rather than bodily malfunction, the book asks how we might rethink medicine and capitalism in democratic ways. It aims to transform Heidegger's work in light of his troubling politics to produce a democratic social theory of human difference.

This is an exceptional volume which expands upon the World Phenomenology Institute's recent research: the study of the beautiful intertwining of the skies and the cosmos with the human pursuits of philosophy, literature and the arts. The relationship of humans to the cosmos is examined through the exploration of phenomenology, metaphysics and the arts. The authors of this volume write on a variety of topics which all seek to open the reader's eyes to the relationship of humans and our perception of our place in the cosmos. This volume offers a framework in which to present a rich panorama; a variety of perspectives illustrating how the perception of the interplay between human beings and the celestial realm advances in common experience and worldviews. This attempt to uncover our cosmic position is a great and worthwhile intellectual challenge. Philosophy as well as literature and the arts are nourished by this human quest for knowledge and understanding.

Sartre has more to say about Evil--its origins in, effects on modern man, and how to fight it--than any other philosopher in the 20th century. In this book, the authors examine many of Sartre's literary and philosophical writings for what they have to say about the nature of Evil and its effect on our lives. From this, they evolve guidelines for those wishing to fight Evil in their own lives. Using examples from their experience with human rights violations, the authors suggest that Evil is any attempt to purposely destroy the freedom of a person, and clearly demonstrate that Sartre's work can be useful as a guide for getting along in the contemporary world.

This book addresses an epidemic that has developed on a global scale, and, which under the heading of "addiction," presents a new narrative about the travails of the human predicament. The book introduces phenomenological motifs, such as desire, embodiment, and temporality, to uncover the existential roots of addiction, and develops Martin Heidegger's insights into technology to uncover the challenge of becoming a self within the impulsiveness and depersonalization of our digital age. By charting a new path of philosophical inquiry, the book allows a pervasive, cultural phenomenon, ordinarily reserved to psychology, to speak as a referendum about the danger which technology poses to us on a daily basis. In this regard, addiction ceases to be merely a clinical malady, and instead becomes a "signpost" to exposing a hidden danger posed by the assimilation of our culture within a technological framework.

"In 12 excellent essays by scholars East and West, this collection explores the many dimensions of Heidegger's relation to Eastern thinking.... Because of the quality of the contributions, the eminence of the many contributors... this volume must be considered an indispensable reference on the subject. Highly recommended." --Choice.

This work is devoted to developing as well as expounding the theory of the cultural sciences of the philosopher Alfred Schutz (1899-1959). Drawing on all of Schutz's seven volumes in English, the book shows how his philosophical theory consists of the reflective clarifications of the disciplinary definitions, basic concepts, and distinctive methods of particular cultural sciences as well as their species and genus. The book first expounds Schutz's own theories of economics, jurisprudence, political science, sociology, and psychology. It then extends his approach to other disciplines, offering new theories of archaeology, ethnology, and psychotherapy in his spirit in order to stimulate the development of Schutzian theories in these and other disciplines. The second part of the book contains complementary philosophical chapters devoted to culture, groups, ideal types, interdisciplinarity, meaning, relevance, social tension, and verification.

Philosophical work on the mind flowed in two streams through the 20th century: phenomenology and analytic philosophy. The phenomenological tradition began with Brentano and was developed by such great European philosophers as Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. As the century advanced, Anglophone philosophers increasingly developed their own distinct styles and methods of studying the mind, and a gulf seemed to open up between the two traditions. This volume aims to bring them together again, by demonstrating how work in phenomenology may lead to significant progress on problems central to current analytic research, and how analytical philosophy of mind may shed light on phenomenological concerns. Leading figures from both traditions contribute specially written essays on such central topics as consciousness, intentionality, perception, action, self-knowledge, temporal awareness, and mental content. Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind demonstrates that these different approaches to the mind should not stand in opposition to each other, but can be mutually illuminating.

In this thoroughly revised edition, James Cox provides an easily accessible introduction to the phenomenology of religion, which he contends continues as a foundational method for the academic study of religion in the twenty-first century. After dealing with the problematic issue of defining religion, he describes the historical background to phenomenology by tracing its roots to developments in philosophy and the social sciences in the early twentieth century. The phenomenological method is then outlined as a step-by-step process, which includes a survey of the important classifications of religious behaviour. The author concludes with a discussion of the place of the phenomenology of religion in the current academic climate and argues that it can be aligned with the growing scholarly interest in the cognitive science of religion.>

Every attempt to examine our consciousness's passive life and its dynamic in its various forms inevitably intersects with our primal awareness of the future. Even though Husserl's theory of time-consciousness enjoys a certain fame, his conception of our primordial relation to the future has not been adequately accounted for. The book at hand aims to offer a close study of Husserl's view of protentional consciousness and to trace its unique contribution to our overall awareness of time. It offers an extensive analysis of various aspects of protention by investigating its connection to different fields and levels of experience. To achieve such a task, the book stresses the need to enrich the familiar formal account of protention with a material one. Thus, alongside issues pertaining exclusively to the form of protention, such as its relation to fulfillment as well as its double-intentional structure, various other dimensions are discussed, such as the phenomena of disappointment and correction as well as the role hyle plays in both of them. In the same vein, special attention is given to the relation between protentional consciousness and affectivity, thus shedding light on the dynamic unity of our living-present. What this study purports to show is that Husserl's phenomenology is equipped to offer a solid account of the thinnest and subtlest ways in which we are aware of the future in our experiential life.

If I am asked in the framework of Book 1, "Who are you?" I, in answering, might say "I don't know who in the world I am." Nevertheless there is a sense in which I always know what "I" refers to and can never not know, even if I have become, e.g., amnesiac. Yet in Book 2, "Who are you?" has other senses of oneself in mind than the non-sortal "myself". For example, it might be the pragmatic context, as in a bureaucratic setting; but "Who are you?" or "Who am I?" might be more anguished and be rendered by "What sort of person are you?" or "What sort am I?" Such a question often surfaces in the face of a "limit-situation", such as one's death or in the wake of a shameful deed where we are compelled to find our "centers", what we also will call "Existenz". "Existenz" here refers to the center of the person. In the face of the limit-situation one is called upon to act unconditionally in the determination of oneself and one's being in the world. In this Book 2 we discuss chiefly one's normative personal-moral identity which stands in contrast to the transcendental I where one's non-sortal unique identity is given from the start. This moral identity requires a unique self-determination and normative self-constitution which may be thought of with the help of the metaphor of "vocation". We will see that it has especial ties to one's Existenz as well as to love. This Book 2 claims that the moral-personal ideal sense of who one is is linked to the transcendental who through a notion of entelechy. The person strives to embody the I-ness that one both ineluctably is and which, however, points to who one is not yet and who one ought to be. The final two chapters tell a philosophical-theological likely story of a basic theme of Plotinus: We must learn to honor ourselves because of our honorable kinship and lineage "Yonder".

The present volume contains many of the papers presented at a four-day conference held by the Husserl-Archives in Leuven in April 2009 to c- memorate the one hundred and ?ftieth anniversary of Edmund Husserl's birth. The conference was organized to facilitate the critical evaluation of Husserl's philosophical project from various perspectives and in light of the current philosophical and scienti?c climate. Still today, the characteristic tension between Husserl's concrete and detailed descriptions of consciousness, on the one hand, and his radical philosophical claim to ultimate truth and certainty in thinking, feeling, and acting, on the other, calls for a sustained re?ection on the relation between a Husserlian phenomenological philosophy and philosophy in general. What can phenomenological re?ection contribute to the ongoing discussion of certain perennial philosophical questions and which phi- sophical problems are raised by a phenomenological philosophy itself? In addition to addressing the question of the relation between p- nomenology and philosophy in general, phenomenology today cannot avoid addressing the nature of its relation to the methods and results of the natural and human sciences. In fact, for Husserl, phenomenology is not just one among many philosophical methods and entirely unrelated to the sciences. Rather, according to Husserl, phenomenology should be a "?rst philosophy" and should aim to become the standard for all true science.

This book explores the ways deconstruction addresses the issue of futurity (what Jacques Derrida calls the "to-come," [l'a-venir]). In order to achieve this, it focuses on three French expressions, venue, survenue, and voir-venir, each taken from the work of Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Catherine Malabou. The idea behind this focus is to elude the issue of the one and only "to-come," as if this was a uniform and coherent entity or structure of experience, and to put forward instead the possibility of a multiplicity of structures, each with a different intonation or pitch. Overall, this book makes an original contribution to the way deconstruction addresses the issue of futurity in the act of writing and translation.

When I heard the rumor that the findings about the central nervous system obtained with new technology, such as Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) and Positron Emission Tomography (PET), were too subtle to correlate with the crude results of many decades of behavioristic psychology, and that some psychologists were now turning to descriptions of subjective phenomena in William James, Edmund Husserl, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty-and even in Buddhism-I asked myself, "Why not Aron Gurwitsch as well?" After all, my teacher regularly reflected on the types, basic concepts, and methods of psychology, worked with Adhemar Gelb and Kurt Goldstein in the institute investigating brain-injured veterans at Frankfurt in the 1920s, conspicuously employed Gestalt theory to revise central Husserlian doctrines, and taught Merleau-Ponty a thing or two. That the last book from his Nachlass had recently been published and that I had recently written an essay on his theory of 1 psychology no doubt helped crystallize this project for me. What is "cognitive science"? At one point in assembling this volume I polled the participants, asking whether they preferred "the cognitive sciences" or "cognitive science. " Most who answered preferred the latter expression. There is still some vagueness here for me, but I do suspect that cognitive science is 2 another example of what I call a "multidiscipline. " A multidiscipline includes participants who confront a set of issues that is best approached under more than one disciplinary perspective."

The editor, Iso Kern, of the three volumes on intersubjectivity in Husserliana XIII-XV, observes that in his "Nachlass" Husserl probably refers to no other lecture so often as this one, i.e., "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1910-1911)." Husserl regarded this work (along with the 1907 "Five Lectures") as basic for his theory of the phenomenological reduction. He regarded these lectures as equally fundamental for the theory of empathy and intersubjectivity, for his theory of the life-world, and for his planned "great systematic work." It contrasts favorably with several later "introductions" because, although quite brief, it has a larger scope than they do and conveys in a relatively elementary way to the students the sense of fresh new beginnings. Further, with the appendices, it reveals Husserl in a critical dialogue with himself. That the second part of the lectures was never written down, can be accounted for in part, because at that time Husserl was busy writing the 1911 path-breaking essay, which complements these lectures, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science."

Consciousness: From Perception to Reflection in the History of Philosophy shows that the concept of consciousness was explicated relatively late in the tradition, but that its central features, such as reflexivity, subjectivity and aboutness, attained avid interest very early in philosophical debates. This book reveals how these features have been related to other central topics, such as selfhood, perception, attention and embodiment. At the same time, the articles display that consciousness is not just an isolated issue of philosophy of mind, but is bound to ontological, epistemological and moral discussions. Integrating historical inquiries into the systematic ones enables understanding the complexity and richness of conscious phenomena.