Best known for his groundbreaking and influential work in Buddhist philosophy, Mark Siderits is the pioneer of "fusion" or "confluence philosophy", a boldly systematic approach to doing philosophy premised on the idea that rational reconstruction of positions in one tradition in light of another can sometimes help address perennial problems and often lead to new and valuable insights. Exemplifying the many virtues of the confluence approach, this collection of essays covers all core areas of Buddhist philosophy, as well as topics and disputes in contemporary Western philosophy relevant to its study. They consider in particular the ways in which questions concerning personal identity figure in debates about agency, cognition, causality, ontological foundations, foundational truths, and moral cultivation. Most of these essays engage Siderits' work directly, building on his pathbreaking ideas and interpretations. Many deal with issues that have become a common staple in philosophical engagements with traditions outside the West. Their variety and breadth bear testimony to the legacy of Siderits' impact in shaping the contemporary conversation in Buddhist philosophy and its reverberations in mainstream philosophy, giving readers a clear sense of the remarkable scope of his work.

In a bold new argument, Ulrika Carlsson grasps hold of the figure of Eros that haunts Soren Kierkegaard's The Concept of Irony, and for the first time, uses it as key to interpret that text and his second book, Either/Or. According to Carlsson, Kierkegaard adopts Plato's idea of Eros as the fundamental force that drives humans in all their pursuits. For him, every existential stance-every way of living and relating to the outside world-is at heart a way of loving. By intensely examining Kierkegaard's erotic language, she also challenges the theory that the philosopher's first two books have little common ground and reveals that they are in fact intimately connected by the central and explicit topic of love. In this text suitable for both students and the Kierkegaard specialist, Carlsson claims that despite long-held beliefs about the disparity of his early work, his first two books both relate to love and Part I of Either/Or should be treated as the sequel to The Concept of Irony.

Historical Imagination defends a phenomenological and hermeneutical account of historical knowledge. The book's central questions are what is historical imagination, what is the relation between the imaginative and the empirical, in what sense is historical knowledge always already imaginative, how does such knowledge serve us, and what is the relation of historical understanding and self-understanding? Paul Fairfield revisits some familiar hermeneutical themes and endeavors to develop these further while examining two important periods in which historical reassessments or re-imaginings of the past occurred on a large scale. The conception of historical imagination that emerges seeks to advance beyond the debate between empiricists and postmodern constructivists while focusing on narrative as well as a more encompassing interpretation of who an historical people were, how things stood with them, and how this comes to be known. Fairfield supplements the philosophical argument with an historical examination of how and why during late antiquity, early Christian thinkers began to reimagine their Greek and Roman past, followed by how and why renaissance and later enlightenment figures reimagined their ancient and medieval past.

In her new book, Corine Pelluchon argues that the dichotomy between nature and culture privileges the latter. She laments that the political system protects the sovereignty of the human and leaves them immune to impending environmental disaster. Using the phenomenological writings of French philosophers like Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, and Paul Ricoeur, Pelluchon contends that human beings have to recognise humanity's dependence upon the natural world for survival and adopt a new philosophy of existence that advocates for animal welfare and ecological preservation. In an extension of Heidegger's ontology of concern, Pelluchon declares that this dependence is not negative or a sign of weakness. She argues instead, that we are nourished by the natural world and that the very idea of nourishment contains an element of pleasure. This sustenance comforts humans and gives their lives taste. Pelluchon's new philosophy claims then, that eating has an affective, social and cultural dimension, but that most importantly it is a political act. It solidifies the eternal link between human beings and animals, and warns that the human consumption of animals and other natural resources impacts upon humanity's future.

This book is dedicated to a critical analysis of race relations and inequality through the prism of Schutzian social phenomenology, which focuses on the world of intersubjectivity and the complex of meanings that orient the conduct of individuals and groups. The phenomenological approach provides a more intimate look at how the societal imposition of negative racial meanings on racialized persons crucially determines the construction of the minority subjectivity as essential otherness, thus becoming a pivotal support of race-based inequality.

Addressing Merleau-Ponty's work Phenomenology of Perception, in dialogue with The Visible and the Invisible, his lectures at the College de France, and his reading of Proust, this book argues that at play in his thought is a philosophy of "ontological lateness". This describes the manner in which philosophical reflection is fated to lag behind its objects; therefore an absolute grasp on being remains beyond its reach. Merleau-Ponty articulates this philosophy against the backdrop of what he calls "cruel thought", a style of reflecting that seeks resolution by limiting, circumscribing, and arresting its object. By contrast, the philosophy of ontological lateness seeks no such finality-no apocalypsis or unveiling-but is characterized by its ability to accept the veiling of being and its own constitutive lack of punctuality. To this extent, his thinking inaugurates a new relation to the becoming of sense that overcomes cruel thought. Merleau-Ponty's work gives voice to a wisdom of dispossession that allows for the withdrawal of being. Never before has anyone engaged with the theme of Merleau-Ponty's own understanding of philosophy in such a sustained way as Whitmoyer does in this volume.

Based upon an attentive reading of Nietzsche's writings and situated within a framework derived largely from such post-Nietzschean thinkers as Deleuze, Guattari, Klossowski, Foucault, Derrida, Negri, and Sloterdijk, this study develops a treatment of Nietzsche's philosophical enterprise as constituting a materialist metaphysics of pure becoming, of pure immanence and the power of the virtual. It thus seeks to challenge traditional characterizations of Nietzsche as laying claim either to the end of metaphysics or the circular repetition of the same. The study instead argues that Nietzsche's great conceptual triumvirate of the eternal return, the will to power, and the transvaluation of values be recast as invoking the groundless ground of a subjectless subject and, indeed, the repetition of difference rather than sameness. Distinguishing itself from the representational schemes set forth by the Platonic idea, the Christian God, or Hegelian reason and world-spirit, Nietzsche's undertaking is here characterized, rather, as inaugurating the age of energies and establishing a generative metaphysics no longer amenable to the inner essence of the concept or the inner soul of consciousness. While the first part of the study develops the philosophical background for this reappraisal of the Nietzschean enterprise, along with an accompanying treatment of the specific problems posed by Nietzsche's style and discourse, the second part of the study is directed more particularly to the historico-critical relationships between Nietzsche and his various precursors and heirs. Despite his frequent and often exorbitant to originality, Nietzsche's intellectual proximity to the culture of the sophists, the Renaissance world of Machiavelli, and the poet-philosopher Hoelderlin demonstrates a long-standing tendency within Western thought towards what in Nietzsche's hands would eventually culminate in a counter-philosophy of pure becoming, later to be more fully realized in the writings of Nietzsche's greatest and most overlooked heir of the early-twentieth century, the Viennese novelist Robert Musil. The study thus spans a line extending from the Presocratics to postmodernity, with Nietzsche's great philosophical project serving as its essential fulcrum.

Recent discussions around limit-problems, namely the questions concerning what can appear in phenomenological reflection, as well as what phenomenology as philosophical reflection can handle, call for a concerted treatment of the problem of limit-phenomena. In this important new book, Anthony J. Steinbock, a leading voice in contemporary phenomenology, explores that question in the context of an interrelated series of problems in Husserl's phenomenology. Representing a continued struggle with these insights and problems, the first section sketches out the problem of limit-phenomena, and addresses generally that rich estuary of liminal experience that commanded Husserl's attention in his research manuscripts. The book goes on to offer a correlative reflection on the issue of method and finally explores a specific set of what have been called recently "limit-problems" within phenomenology, relating to the problem of individuation and on a more personal level, vocation. This rich and timely volume offers an excellent demonstration of phenomenology in practice.

This book aims to enrich our understanding of the role the environment plays in processes of life and cognition, from the perspective of enactive cognitive science. Miguel A. Sepulveda-Pedro offers an unprecedented interpretation of the central claims of the enactive approach to cognition, supported by contemporary works of ecological psychology and phenomenology. The enactive approach conceives cognition as sense-making, a phenomenon emerging from the organizational nature of the living body that evolves in human beings through sensorimotor, intercorporeal, and linguistic interactions with the environment. From this standpoint, Sepulveda-Pedro suggests incorporating three new theses into the theoretical body of the enactive approach: sense-making and cognition fundamentally consist of processes of norm development; the environment, cognitive agents actually interact with, is an active ecological field enacted in their historical past; and sense-making occurs in a domain consisting of multiple normative dimensions that the author names enactive place.

We and Ouri argues that we-ness should be approached not only from a self-centered or a self-less point of view, in which the we is only either a collection of individuals or an anonymous whole, but should be based on 'relation.' This relation is pre-subjective, meaning that the conscious, reflective, subjective self is not the conceptual basis of the relation. The irreducible metaphysical distinction between self and other is always there, but the awareness of it is not prior to this relation, which is an ontological pre-condition of self. The author argues that the distinction and unity of self and other in this relation can be comprehended spatially by applying knot logic. The author analyzes certain linguistic practices in Korean to show one representation of pre-subjective we-ness in language, but not in an ethnographical manner. By doing so, the author criticizes and challenges the Eurocentric tendency of philosophy and seeks to expand the diversity in philosophy.

The concept of community is one of the most frequently used and abused of recent philosophical or socio-political concepts. In the 1980s, faced with the imminent collapse of communism and the unchecked supremacy of free-market capitalism, the philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy (in The Inoperative Community) and the writer Maurice Blanchot (in The Unavowable Community) both thought it essential to rethink the fundamental basis of "community" as such. More recently, Nancy has renewed the debate by unexpectedly attacking Blanchot's account of community, claiming that it embodies a dangerously nostalgic desire for mythic and religious communion. This book examines the history and implications of this controversy. It analyses in forensic detail Nancy's and Blanchot's contrasting interpretations of German Romanticism, and the work of Heidegger, Bataille, and Marguerite Duras, and examines closely their divergent approaches to the contradictory legacy of Christianity. At a time when politics are increasingly inseparable from a deep-seated sense of crisis, it provides an incisive account of what, in the concept of community, is thought yet crucially still remains unthought.

When do we interpret? That is the question at the heart of this important new work by Johann Michel. The human being does not spend his time interpreting in everyday life. We interpret when we are confronted with a blurred, confused, problematic sense. Such is the originality of the author's perspective which removes the anthropological interdict that has hampered hermeneutics since Heidegger. Michel proposes an anthropology of homo interpretans as the first and founding principle of fundamental ontology (relating to the meaning of being) as well as of the theory of knowledge (relating to interpretation in the human sciences). He argues that the root of hermeneutics lies in ordinary interpretative techniques (explication, clarification, unveiling), rather than as a set of learned technologies applied to specific fields (texts, symbols, actions).

Paul Ricoeur's first book, Freedom and Nature, introduces many themes that resurface in various ways throughout his later work, but its significance has been mostly overlooked in the field of Ricoeur studies. Gathering together an international group of scholars, The Companion to Freedom and Nature is the first book-length study to focus exclusively on Freedom and Nature. It helps readers to understand this complex work by providing careful textual analysis of specific arguments in the book and by situating them in relation to Ricoeur's early influences, including Merleau-Ponty, Nabert, and Ravaisson. But most importantly, this book demonstrates that Freedom and Nature remains a compelling and vital resource for readers today, precisely because it resonates with recent developments in the areas of embodied cognition, philosophical psychology, and philosophy of the will. Freedom and Nature is fundamentally a book about embodiment, and it situates the human body at the crossroads of activity and passivity, motivation and causation, the voluntary and the involuntary. This conception of the body informs Ricoeur's unique treatment of topics such as effort, habit, and attention that are of much interest to scholars today. Together the chapters of this book provide a renewed appreciation of this important and innovative work.

Before now, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the multiple relations between A. Comte's and J.S. Mill's positive philosophy and Franz Brentano's work. The present volume aims to fill this gap and to identify Brentano's position in the context of the positive philosophy of the 19th century by analyzing the following themes: the concept of positive knowledge; philosophy and empirical, genetic and descriptive psychology as sciences in Brentano, Comte and Mill; the strategies for the rebirth of philosophy in these three authors; the theory of the ascending stages of thought, of their decline, of the intentionality in Comte and Brentano; the reception of Comte's positivism in Whewell and Mill; induction and phenomenalism in Brentano, Mill and Bain; the problem of the "I" in Hume and Brentano; mathematics as a foundational science in Brentano, Kant and Mill; Brentano's critique of Mach's positivism; the concept of positive science in Brentano's metaphysics and in Husserl's early phenomenology; the reception of Brentano's psychology in Twardowski; The Brentano Institute at Oxford. The volume also contains the translation of the most significant writings of Brentano regarding philosophy as science. I. Tanasescu, Romanian Academy; A. Bejinariu, Romanian Society of Phenomenology; S. Krantz Gabriel, Saint Anselm College; C. Stoenescu, University of Bucharest.

Within the vast reception history of Martin Heidegger's philosophical thought poets, novelists, and playwrights have occupied a central place. This collection of essays opens up new perspectives by tracing the manifold, often surprising ways in which Heideggerian concepts, motifs, and concerns have been taken up in literary and poetic writing since the middle of the 20th century. In their contributions, scholars from the Americas, Asia, and Europe explore intellectual constellations between Heidegger and selected literary figures such as John Ashbery, Julia de Burgos, Paul Celan, Elfriede Jelinek, and Velimir Khlebnikov. The volume unveils the immense creativity that crystallizes in these poetic and literary traces and disseminations of Heidegger's thinking. Hence, it points to new and fruitful ways to critically intervene in current philosophical and literary debates.

The holy (Being-as-the-holy) is a distinctive theme in Heidegger's work that is perhaps well-known to readers, yet not attended to sufficiently in contemporary Heidegger studies. The essays in this volume, authored by an international group of scholars, offer readers an opportunity to consider the many dimensions and possibilities of the notion of "the holy" (das Heilige) in his thinking. The authors in this volume document the multiple texts and contexts of Heidegger's discussions of the holy, and they offer detailed readings and their own particular interpretations and applications. The chapters, taken together, make a significant contribution not only to Heidegger scholarship but also to our understanding of our fundamental human situation in relation to Being-as-the holy.

The Phenomenology of Revelation in Heidegger, Marion, and Ricoeur provides a critical framework for understanding the phenomenology of revelation through a series of close readings that serve as the basis for an imagined dialogue between Martin Heidegger, Jean-Luc Marion, and Paul Ricoeur. Adam J. Graves distinguishes between two dominant approaches to revelation: a "radical" approach that seeks to disclose a pre-linguistic experience of revelation through a radicalization of the phenomenological reduction, and a "hermeneutical" one that characterizes revelation as an eruption of meaning arising from our encounter with concrete symbols, narratives, and texts. According to Graves, the radical approach is often driven by a misplaced concern for maintaining philosophical rigor and for avoiding theological biases, or "contaminations." This preoccupation leads to a process of "counter-contamination" in which the concept of revelation is ultimately estranged from the phenomenon's rich historical and linguistic content. While Ricoeur's hermeneutic phenomenology may do a better job of accommodating the concrete content of revelation, it does so at the price of having to renouncing the kind of "presuppositionlessness" generally associated with phenomenological method. Ultimately, Graves argues that a more nuanced appreciation of the complex nature of our linguistic inheritance enables us to reconceive the relationship between revelation and philosophical thought.

GWF Hegel famously described philosophy as 'its own time apprehended in thoughts', reflecting a desire that we increasingly experience, namely, the desire to understand our complex and fast-changing world. But how can we philosophically describe the world we live in? When Hegel attempted his systematic account of the historical world, he needed to conceive of history as rational progress to allow for such description. After the events of the twentieth century, we are rightfully doubtful about such progress. However, in the twentieth century, another German philosophy, Edmund Husserl, attempted a similar project when he realised that a philosophical account of our human experience requires attending to the historical world we live in. According to Husserl, the Western world is a world in crisis. In this book, Tanja Staehler explores how Husserl thus radicalises Hegel's philosophy by providing an account of historical movement as open. Husserl's phenomenology allows thinking of historical worlds in the plural, without hierarchy, determined by ethics and aesthetics. Staehler argues that, through his radicalization of Hegel's philosophy, Husserl provides us with a historical phenomenology and a coherent concept of a culture that points to the future for phenomenology as a philosophy that provides the methodological grounding for a variety of qualitative approaches in the humanities and social sciences.

Ironically, the philosophy of love has long been neglected by philosophers, so-called "lovers of wisdom," who would seemingly need to understand how one best becomes a lover. In Kierkegaard and the Philosophy of Love, Michael Strawser shows that the philosophy of love lies at the heart of Kierkegaard's writings, as he argues that the central issue of Kierkegaard's authorship can and should be understood more broadly as the task of becoming a lover. Strawser starts by identifying the questions (How should I love the other? Is self-love possible? How can I love God?) and themes (love's immediacy, intentionality, unity, and eternity) that are central to the philosophy of love, and he develops a rich context that includes analyses of the conceptions of love found in Plato, Spinoza, and Hegel, as well as prominent contemporary thinkers. Strawser provides an original and wide-ranging analysis of Kierkegaard's writings-from the early The Concept of Irony and Edifying Discourses to the late The Moment, while maintaining the prominence of Works of Love- to demonstrate how Kierkegaard's writings on love are relevant to the emerging study of the philosophy of love today. The most unique perspective of this work, however, is Strawser's argument that Kierkegaard's writings on love are most fruitfully understood within the context of a phenomenology of love. In interpreting Kierkegaard as a phenomenologist of love, Strawser claims that it is not Husserl and Heidegger that we should look to for a connection in the first instance, but rather Max Scheler, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Emmanuel Levinas, and most importantly, Jean-Luc Marion, who for the most part center their thinking on the phenomenological nature of love. Based on an analysis of the works of these thinkers together with Kierkegaard's writings, Strawser argues that Kierkegaard presents readers with a first phenomenology of love, a point of view that serves as a unifying perspective throughout this work while also pointing to areas for future scholarship. Overall, this work brings seemingly divergent perspectives into a unity brought about through a focus on love-which is, after all, a unifying force.

Existential Medicine explores the recent impact that the philosophies of existentialism, phenomenology, and hermeneutics have had on the health care professions. A growing body of scholarship drawing primarily on the work of Martin Heidegger and other influential twentieth-century figures such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Hans-Georg Gadamer has shaped contemporary research in the fields of bioethics, narrative medicine, gerontology, enhancement medicine, psychiatry and psychotherapy, and palliative care, among others. By regarding the human body as a decontextualized object, the prevailing paradigm of medical science often overlooks the body as it is lived. As a result, it fails to critically engage the experience of illness and the core questions of 'what it means' and 'what it feels like' to be ill. With work from emerging and renowned scholars in the field, this collection aims to shed light on these issues and the crucial need for clinicians to situate the experience of illness within the context of a patient's life-world. To this end, Existential Medicine offers a valuable resource for philosophers and medical humanists as well as health care practitioners.

The Sound of Ontology: Music as a Model for Metaphysics explores connections between Western art music in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and the ideas that dominated philosophy leading up to and during that period. In the process of establishing John Cage as Richard Wagner's heir via Arnold Schoenberg, the author discovers that the old metaphysics of representation is still in charge of how we think about music and about experience in general. Instead of settling for the positivist definition of music as mere sound framed by time, LaFave provides a phenomenology of music that reveals pitch as the ontological counterpart to frequency, and music as a vehicle for understanding how, as Heidegger observed, the Being of "things of value" are invariably grounded in the Being of "things of nature." Numerous musical examples and a poem by Wallace Stevens illustrate LaFave's case that hierarchy is intrinsic to this understanding. Alfred North Whitehead's process philosophy is brought to bear alongside Heidegger's phenomenological ontology to show that not only music, but reality itself, depends on a play of interlocking hierarchies to effect the nature-value connection, making aesthetics first philosophy.