In this third volume of a monumental four book survey of Phenome- nology world-wide fifty years after the death of its chief founder, Edmund Husserl, we have a collection of studies which, in the first place, consider Husserl's legacy in the postmodern world. The extent of our indebtedness to the Master is shown in explora- tions of the archeology of knowledge, hermeneutics, and critical studies of language by A. Ales Bello, P. Pefialver, P. Million, V. Martinez Guzman, H. Rodriguez Pifiero, Y. Vlaisavlevich, and others. There follow calls for renewing the critique of reason by C. Schrag, F. Bosio, and J. Lerin Riera and discussion by D. Laskey, K. G6rniak-Kocikowska, M. R. Barral, Y. Park, and N. Delle Site on A-T. Tymieniecka's phe- nomenology of life, which proposes a total reorientation of phenome- nology by introducing a conception of the human condition in which the human creative act is the Archimedean point for philosophy.

The essays collected in the present volume introduce the reader to the phenomenological work done in the Nordic countries today. The material is organized under three general headings: metaphysics, facticity, and interpretation. The volume is of interest to researchers and students working in the areas of epistemology and ontology as well as philosophy of language, history, and intersubjectivity.

1. Remarks on the Current Status of the Problematic. The literature treating the relationship between the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger has not been kind to Husserl. Heidegger's "devastating" phenomenologically ontological critique of traditional epistemology and ontology, advanced under the rubric of "fundamental ontology" in Being and Time, has almost been universallyl received, despite the paucity of its references to Husserl, as sounding the death knell for Husserl's original formulation of phenomenology. The recent publication of Heidegger's lectures from the period surrounding his composition of Being and Time, lectures that contain detailed references and critical analyses of Husserl's phenomenology, and which, in the words of one respected commentator, Rudolf Bernet, "offer at long last, insight into the principal sources of fundamental ontology,"2 will, if 3 the conclusions reached by the same commentator are any indication, serve only to reinforce the perception of Heidegger's phenomenological /I superiority" over Husserl. This is not to suggest that the tendency toward Heidegger partisan ship in the literature treating the relationship of his phenomenology to Husserl's has its basis in extra-philosophical or extra-phenome nological concerns and considerations. Rather, it is to draw attention to the undeniable 'fact' that Heidegger's reformulation of Husserl's phenomenology has cast a "spell" over all subsequent discussions of the basic problems and issues involved in what has become known as their "controversy."

Die Idee eines selbstandigen Bandes von "Pfander-Studien" entstand nach dem Internationalen Kongress "Die Munchener Phanomenologie", der an lasslich des hundertsten Geburtstags von Alexander Pfander in Munchen stattfand. Ursprunglich war geplant, die im zweiten Teil des Kongresses im Rahmen einer Arbeitstagung uber "Das Werk und die Bedeutung Alexander pfanders" gehaltenen Referate, die bereits vervielfaltigt waren, nebst Diskussionsberichten in den vorgesehenen Gesamtband uber die Konferenz fur die Serie Phaenomenologica einzuschlie- ssen. Als sich herausstellte, dass der dort verfugbare Raum -fur die meisten Beitrage zu knapp bemessen war und nur die abgekurz- ten Texte ohne Diskussion hatten aufgenommen werden' konnen, tauchte die Idee eines gesonderten Bandes auf. Sie fuhrte alsbald zur Erwagung neuer Beitrage und sonstiger Hilfen fur das Ver- standnis des alten und neuen Werkes Pfanders. Von den Kon- gressbeitragen war ohnehin der von Karl Schuhmann ftir ein gesondertes selbstandiges Buch" Husserl uber Pfander" vorgese- hen, das inzwischen in der Reihe Phaenomenologica erschienen ist. 1 Der Beitrag von Peter Schwankl "Alexander pfanders Nachlasstexte uber das virtuell Psychische" erschien im Journal 0/ Phenomenological Psychology. 2 Die beiden einleitenden Refe- rate von Schwankl und Spiegel berg uber die damals noch unge- druckten Nachlasswerke Philosophie auf phanomenologischer Grundlage und Ethik in kurzer Darstellung konnten nach deren Erscheinen fortbleiben.

This is an unashamed collection of studies grown, but not planned before hand, whose belated unity sterns from an unconscious pattern ofwhich I was not aware at the time ofwriting. I call it "unashamed" not only because I have made no effort to patch up this collection by completely new pieces, but also because there seems to me nothing shamefully wrong about following up some loose ends left dangling from my main study of the Phenomenological Movement which I had to cut off from the body of my account in order to preserve its unity and proportion. This disc1aimer does not mean that there is no connection among the pieces he re assembled. They belong together, while not requiring consecutive reading, as attempts to establish common ground 1lnd lines of communication between the Phenomenological Movement and related enterprises in philo sophy. They are not put together arbitrarily, but because ofintrinsic affinities to phenomenology. This does not mean an attempt to blur its edges. But since they are growing edges, any boundaries cannot be drawn sharply without interfering with the phenomena. Nevertheless, in the end the figure of the Phenomenological Movement should stand out more distinctIy as the text against its surrounding context, ofwhich these studies are to provide some ofthe comparative and historical background. This is why I gave to this collection the titIe "The Context ofthe Phenomenological Movement" in contrast to the central "text" as contained in my historical introduction to this movement."

This volume tackles Goedel's two-stage project of first using Husserl's transcendental phenomenology to reconstruct and develop Leibniz' monadology, and then founding classical mathematics on the metaphysics thus obtained. The author analyses the historical and systematic aspects of that project, and then evaluates it, with an emphasis on the second stage. The book is organised around Goedel's use of Leibniz, Husserl and Brouwer. Far from considering past philosophers irrelevant to actual systematic concerns, Goedel embraced the use of historical authors to frame his own philosophical perspective. The philosophies of Leibniz and Husserl define his project, while Brouwer's intuitionism is its principal foil: the close affinities between phenomenology and intuitionism set the bar for Goedel's attempt to go far beyond intuitionism. The four central essays are `Monads and sets', `On the philosophical development of Kurt Goedel', `Goedel and intuitionism', and `Construction and constitution in mathematics'. The first analyses and criticises Goedel's attempt to justify, by an argument from analogy with the monadology, the reflection principle in set theory. It also provides further support for Goedel's idea that the monadology needs to be reconstructed phenomenologically, by showing that the unsupplemented monadology is not able to found mathematics directly. The second studies Goedel's reading of Husserl, its relation to Leibniz' monadology, and its influence on his publishe d writings. The third discusses how on various occasions Brouwer's intuitionism actually inspired Goedel's work, in particular the Dialectica Interpretation. The fourth addresses the question whether classical mathematics admits of the phenomenological foundation that Goedel envisaged, and concludes that it does not. The remaining essays provide further context. The essays collected here were written and published over the last decade. Notes have been added to record further thoughts, changes of mind, connections between the essays, and updates of references.

The Myth of Sisyphus is one of the most profound philosophical statements written this century. It is a discussion of the central idea of Absurdity that Camus was to develop in his novel The Outsider. Here Camus poses the fundamental question: Is life worth living? If existence has ceased to retain significance when confronted with the fragmented reality of the human condition, what then can keep us from suicide? Camus movingly argues for an acceptance of reality that encompasses revolt, passion and, above all, liberty.

This volume contains several other essays, including lyrical evocations of the sunlit cities of Algiers and Oran.

ihr Wesen, iiber die Eigenart ihres Gebiets ins klare zu kommen, das ist in der Tat eins der Hauptstiicke und Grundstiicke der Erkennt- nistheorie, wie sich ohne weiteres begreift aus der allumspannenden Weite der rein logischen Begriffe und der normativen Anwendung 5 der formallogischen Gesetze. Das formallogische Denken, das analytische im pragnantesten Sinn des W ortes, ist nach meinen Logischen Untersuchungen ein Denken auf Grund bloBer Bedeutungen. Es bezieht sich auf aIle und jede Gegenstandlichkeit (mag sie eine reale sein oder nicht) darum, 10 weil Gegenstande iiberhaupt fUr das Denken Gegenstande nur sind durch sein Bedeuten und weil Gesetze, die im Wesen der Bedeutun- gen als solcher, die also in ihren wesentlichen Arten oder Formen griinden, notwendig fUr aIle bedeutungsmaBig so und so gefaBten bestimmten Gegenstandlichkeiten gelten miissen. 15 Da tritt uns also gleich zu Anfang der Begriff der Bedeutung e- gegen, der nun freilich so allerlei bedeuten kann und der KIarlegung allergroBte Schwierigkeiten bietet. Ihm werden wir und den mit ihm zusammenhangenden Begriffen und Phanomenen umfassende Be- trachtungen zuwenden; solche Betrachtungen sind iibrigens auch, 20 unabhangig von dem Interesse an der klaren Bestimmung des Sinnes formaler Logik, fUr die Logik selbst und die Erkenntniskritik von selbstverstandlicher und aIlergroBter Wichtigkeit. So werden ver- schiedene, obschon nahe zusammenhangende Interessen ihre Befrie- digung finden konnen, und darauf habe ich es urn so mehr abgese- 25 hen, als ich ja weiB, welche Bemiihungen meine jungen Freunde in der Philosophischen Gesellschaft in den beiden letzten Semestern den Bedeutungsproblemen in ihren Diskussionen zugewendet haben.

There is no author's introduction to Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences, either as published here in the first English translation or in the standard German edition, because its proper introduction is its companion volume: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. 2 The latter is the first book of Edmund Husserl's larger work: Ideas Toward a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, and is commonly referred to as Ideas I (or Ideen 1). The former is commonly called Ideen III. Between these two parts of the whole stands a third: Phenomeno 3 logical Investigations of Constitution, generally known as Ideen II. In this introduction the Roman numeral designations will be used, as well as the abbreviation PFS for the translation at hand. In many translation projects there is an initial problem of establish ing the text to be translated. That problem confronts translators of the books of Husserl's Ideas in different ways. The Ideas was written in 1912, during Husserl's years in Gottingen (1901-1916). Books I and II were extensively revised over nearly two decades and the changes were incorporated by the editors into the texts of the Husserliana editions of 1950 and 1952 respectively. Manuscripts of the various reworkings of the texts are preserved in the Husserl Archives, but for those unable to work there the only one directly available for Ideen II is the reconstructed one."

Focusing on the topics of self-awareness, temporality, and alterity, this anthology contains contributions by prominent phenomenologists from Germany, Belgium, France, Japan, USA, Canada and Denmark, all addressing questions very much in the center of current phenomenological debate. What is the relation between the self and the Other? How are self-awareness and intentionality intertwined? To what extent do the temporality and corporeality of subjectivity contain a dimension of alterity? How should one account for the intersubjectivity, interculturality and historicity of the subject? These questions are not only of relevance for phenomenologists, but for anybody coming from disciplines influenced by phenomenological methodology, such as sociology, psychology, psychiatry and anthropology.

For both continental and analytic styles of philosophy, the thought of Martin Heidegger must be counted as one of the most important influences in contemporary philosophy. In this book, essays by internationally noted scholars, ranging from David B. Allison to Slavoj Zizek, honour the interpretive contributions of William J. Richardson's pathbreaking Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought. The essays move from traditional phenomenology to the idea of essential (another) thinking, the questions of translation and existential expressions of the turn of Heidegger's thought, the intersection of politics and language, the philosophic significance of Jacques Lacan, and several essays on science and technology. All show the influence of Richardson's first study. A valuable emphasis appears in Richardson's interpretation of Heidegger's conception of die Irre, interpreted as Errancy, set in its current locus in a discussion of Heidegger's debacle with the political in his involvement with National Socialism.

The ass had been coming the other way too long. He had none left to spare a dime of and as they are, had come to the part he had wanted most. It was more tours. The canceled check was of him and he wrote it for all you had been worth, as men do there. He wanted war. I had wanted both women and money. It was motion she was of. The inert had died of sin. So many were it and all came to rescue the baggage claim of it coming to the Vatican. This is sainted material and we had not understood sexual issues were the matter in sin of folly. So much is effected as the science of new millennia speaks as God.

The tale is of a man who had not known why he did as he did. It was of a nation that had been effected of that. It was a Church that sanctified what was said of men. Send mother this.

"Das Problem der verborgenen Vernunft" ist es, das auch dieser Aufhellung der Verantwortlichkeit den Horizont gibt, in welchem als Klarung der Einheit der Teleologie die phanomeno- logische Geduld sich entfalten kann. - Die hier vorgelegte Untersuchung wurde von der Philo so- phischen Fakultat der Universitat zu Koln im Sommer 1973 als Dissertation angenommen; sie wurde fur die Veroffentlichung durchgesehen. Danken mochte ich vor aHem Herrn Professor Dr. Ludwig Land- grebe. Seinem philosophischen Vorbild und seiner groBzugigen Forderung ist die vorliegende Arbeit entscheidend verpflichtet. Herrn Professor Dr. Lothar Eley sage ich Dank fUr seine stetige freundliche Hilfe. EbenfaHs danke ich Herrn Heinz Runi, der in zahlreichen Gesprachen durch seine Anregungen an der Entwick- lung dieser Arbeit teilgenommen und zu ihrem Gelingen beige- tragen hat. Die folgenden Untersuchungen stutzen sich hauptsachlich auf die veroffentlichten Werke Husserls; daruber hinaus war das Studium unveroffentlichter Manuskripte von groBem Nutzen, und fUr die Erlaubnis zu ihrer Verwendung gilt mein Dank dem ver- storbenen Direktor des Russerl-Archivs in Lowen, Rerrn Profes- sor Dr. Herman Leo van Breda. - Bedanken mochte ich mich auch :beim Deutschen Akademischen Austauschdienst, der mir fur mein Studium in KOln ein Stipendium gewahrte.

Ever since the beginning of the modern phenomenological movement disciplined attention has been paid to various patterns of human experi- ence as they are actually lived through in the concrete. This has brought forth many attempts to tind a general philosophical position which can do justice to these experiences without reduction or distQrtion. In France, the best known of these recent attempts have been made by Sartre in his Being and Nothingness and by Merleau-Ponty in his Phenomenol- ogy of Perception and certain later fragments. Sartre has a keen sense for life as it is lived, and his work is marked by many penetrating descrip- tions. But his dualistic ontology of the en-soi versus the pour-soi has seemed over-simple and inadequate to many critics, and has been seriously qualitied by the author himself in his latest Marxist work, The Critique of Dialetical Reason. Merleau-Ponty's major work is a lasting contri- but ion to the phenomenology of the pre-objective world of perception. But asi de from a few brief hints and sketches, he was unable, before his unfortunate death in 1961, to work out carefully his ultimate philosophi- cal point of view. This leaves us then with the German philosopher, Heidegger, as the only contemporary thinker who has formulated a total ontology which claims to do justice to the stable results of phenomenology and to the liv- ing existential thought of our time.

The Ethics of Time utilizes the resources of phenomenology and hermeneutics to explore this under-charted field of philosophical inquiry. Its rigorous analyses of such phenomena as waiting, memory, and the body are carried out phenomenologically, as it engages in a hermeneutical reading of such classical texts as Augustine's Confessions and Sophocles's Oedipus Rex, among others. The Ethics of Time takes seriously phenomenology's claim of a consciousness both constituting time and being constituted by time. This claim has some important implications for the "ethical" self or, rather, for the ways in which such a self informed by time, might come to understand anew the problems of imperfection and ethical goodness. Even though a strictly philosophical endeavour, this book engages knowledgeably and deftly with subjects across literature, theology and the arts and will be of interest to scholars throughout these disciplines.

This is an unusual volume. During his periods of study with Ed mund Husserl - first from I924 1. 0 I926, then from I93I to I932 - Dorion Cairns had become imnlensely impressed with the stri king philosophical quality of Husserl's conversations with his students and co-workers. Not unlike his daily writing (five to six hours a day was not uncommon, as Husserl reports herein, the nature of which was a continuous searching, reassessing, modi fying, advancing and even rejecting of former views), Husserl's conversations, especially evidenced from Cairns's record, were remarkable for their depth and probing character. Because of this, and because of the importaIlt light they threw on Husserl's written and published works, Cairns had early resolved to set down in writing, as accurately as possible, the details of these conversations. Largely prompted by the questions and concerns of his students, including Cairns, the present Conversations (from the second period, I93I-I932, except for the initial conversation) provide a significant, intriguing, and always fascinating insight into both the issues which were prominent to Husserl at this time, and the way he had come to view the systematic and historical placement of his own earlier studies. Cairns had often insisted - principally in his remarkable lec 1 tures at the Graduate Faculty of the New School - that attaining a fair and accurate view of Husserl's enormously rich and complex 1 Cairns's lectures between 1956 and 1964 are especially important."

Examining the revival of Bergsonism for phenomenology, leading scholars of both areas inaugurate a dialogue long overdue. By assessing phenomenology's readings of Bergson and Bergsonian challenges to phenomenological methods, the essays in this volume explore anew the issues of central concern in contemporary continental philosophy.

The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy provides an annual international forum for phenomenological research in the spirit of Husserl's groundbreaking work and the extension of this work by such figures as Scheler, Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty and Gadamer.

Alfred Schutz devoted his life to a clarification of the foun dations of the social sciences. His first formulation of the perti nent problems is contained in DER SINNHAFTE AUFBAU DER SOZIALEN WELT, EINE EINLEITUNG IN DIE VERSTEHENDE SOZIOLOGIE, now available in a second unrevised German edition with an English translation in preparation. Since I932, the date of this work, Alfred Schutz pursued painstaking and detailed investigations of issues which arose in connection with his early endeavors. These investigations were originally published as a series of essays and monographs over a period of about twenty years and are now assembled in the COLLECTED PAPERS of which this is the third and final volume. They form a unitary whole insofar as a common core of problems and theoretical ideas is presented from varying perspectives. Together DER SINNHAFTE AUFBAu DER SOZIALEN WELT and the three volumes of COL LECTED PAPERS set forth a comprehensive and consistent theory of the world of everyday life as the reality with which the social sciences are essentially concerned. Alfred Schutz was preparing a systematic presentation of his theory and of the results of his investigations into the struc tures of the world of everyday life when death overtook him. The manuscript containing the final statement of his philosophical and sociological thinking was not completely ready for publi cation at the time of his death. It is now being brought into book form by Professor Thomas Luckmann, one of his former students."

The preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) is one of the most widely-read texts in Hegel's corpus, and yet we still lack a clear understanding of its aims. Providing a fresh perspective on Hegel's preface, Andrew Davis contends that it should be read as an overview of what philosophy is not. Contesting previous investigations that have assumed Hegel's purpose in the preface is to introduce the reader to his own philosophical method, Davis moves Hegel's positive comments about the nature of philosophy to the background. This is, after all, where they belong in a preface, according to Hegelian philosophy, as Hegel contends that the actual nature of philosophy cannot be presented in advance of specific inquiries. Examining the nature of philosophy through negation, each chapter in the book explores a different form of pseudo-philosophy that Hegel addresses in his preface. Together, they allow Hegelian philosophy to appear in relief as precisely what cannot be achieved through explanation, edification, formalism, phenomenology, mathematical proof, propositional truth, or personal revelation. With an appendix featuring synopses of every paragraph of the preface, Hegel on Pseudo-Philosophy not only offers a jargon-free introduction to Hegel's thought, but it also yields crucial insights into the organisation of a preface that has long been decried as haphazard or incomprehensible.

This book charts and challenges the bruising impact of post-Saussurean thought on the categories of experience and self-presence. It attempts a reappropriation of the category of lived experience in dialogue with poststructuralist thinking. Following the insight that mediated subjectivity need not mean alienated selfhood, Meredith forwards a postmetaphysical model of the experiential based on the interpenetration of poststructuralist thinking and hermeneutic phenomenology. Since poststructuralist approaches in feminist theory have often placed women's lived experiences "under erasure," Meredith uses this hermeneutic/deconstructive model to attempt a rehabilitation of the singular "flesh and blood" female existent.

Although pain is widely recognized by clinicians and researchers as an experience, pain is always felt in a patient-specific way rather than experienced for what it objectively is, making perceived meaning important in the study of pain. The book contributors explain why meaning is important in the way that pain is felt and promote the integration of quantitative and qualitative methods to study meanings of pain. For the first time in a book, the study of the meanings of pain is given the attention it deserves. All pain research and medicine inevitably have to negotiate how pain is perceived, how meanings of pain can be described within the fabric of a person's life and neurophysiology, what factors mediate them, how they interact and change over time, and how the relationship between patient, researcher, and clinician might be understood in terms of meaning. Though meanings of pain are not intensively studied in contemporary pain research or thoroughly described as part of clinical assessment, no pain researcher or clinician can avoid asking questions about how pain is perceived or the types of data and scientific methods relevant in discovering the answers.

In Being and Nothingness Sartre picks up diverging threads in the phenomenological tradition, weaves them together with ideas from Gestalt and behaviourist psychology, and asks: What is consciousness? What is its relationship to the body, to the external world, and to other minds? Sartre believes that the mind and its states are by-products of introspection, created in the act that purports to discover them. How does this happen? And how are we able to perceive ourselves as persons - physical objects with mental states? Sartre's Phenomenology reconstructs Sartre's answers to these crucial questions. On Sartre's view, consciousness originally apprehends itself in terms of what it is consciousness of, that is, as an activity of apprehending the world. David Reisman traces the path from this minimal form of self-consciousness to the perception of oneself as a full-blown person. Similar considerations apply to the perception of others. Reisman describes Sartre's account of the transition from one's original apprehension of another consciousness to the perception of other persons. An understanding of the various levels of self-apprehension and of the apprehension of others allows Reisman to penetrate the key ideas in Being and Nothingness, and to compare Sartre to analytic philosophers on fundamental questions in the philosophy of mind.

As the fields of philosophy of medicine and bioethics have developed in the United States, the philosophical perspective of phenomenology has been largely ignored. Yet, the central conviction that informs this volume is that phenomenology provides extraordinary insights into many of the issues that are directly addressed within the world of medicine. Such issues include: the nature of medicine itself; the distinction between immediate experience and scientific conceptualization; the nature of the body - and the implications of embodiment in the realm of clinical practice; the meaning of health, illness and disease; the problem of intersubjectivity - particularly with respect to achieving successful communication with another; the complexity of decision-making in the clinical context (and in the realm of medical ethics); the possibility of empathic understanding; the theory and method of clinical practice; and the essential characteristics of the therapeutic relationship - i.e. the relationship between the sick person and the one who professes to help. Some of the authors who have contributed to this volume are philosophers, some are engaged in other academic disciplines, and several are practicing healthcare professionals.