This study comprises an analysis of the legitimacy of dissent by Admiral Sharp and General Westmoreland following the Vietnam War. The author does this by using Huntington's theories of objective civilian control of the military and his four different cases of dissent to devise a two-step dissent analysis model. The model addresses first, whether the military officer has a valid message of dissent, and second, whether there are extenuating circumstances to justify going directly to the public with the dissent rather than using more traditional and appropriate avenues. The conclusion is that Sharp and Westmoreland's dissent was inappropriate because they criticized President Johnson on political grounds in which they did not have the requisite expertise. The study then briefly addresses recent dissent during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Again, the study found that the dissent presented failed to meet the criteria for legitimacy. The retired generals challenged Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld on political grounds. Additionally, there was not a sufficiently strong case for going directly to the public rather than using their chain-of-command while still on active duty.

The US should stop blaming the American mainstream media for the failure of Iraqi citizens to more strongly support the country's efforts in Iraq. The key to making US efforts more effective is to connect with the Iraqi people who are not watching the American networks. In order to compete with the enemy for the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people, the US must realize that first, the target audience identifies much closer culturally with the enemy than they do with Americans. Second, the Iraqi people by nature are skeptical of government promoted propaganda. Considering these challenges, it becomes increasingly critical that the US avoid incidents that undermine US credibility while simultaneously strengthening the enemy's. The United States' vulnerability to further credibility gaps is so critical that it may want to consider adopting more cooperative policies that are less likely to further escalate Iraqi distrust of its efforts. Although this cooperative policy may not be the optimum course of action for purely fighting terrorists in the short term, it would increase the chances of success in the Iraqi conflict. Success in that fight would ultimately strengthen US terrorist efforts in the long term. The internet is here to stay and that means in future conflicts, the enemy will always have a voice. Rather than wasting effort trying to silence that voice, the US will reap bigger dividends by fighting the enemy's propaganda content rather than the channel that it is transmitted by-- attack the message, not necessarily the messenger.