Inspired by F.A. Hayek's Individualism and Economic Order, this book, edited by Yong Yoon, stands in contrast to the themes of that work by emphasizing that collective action operates differently from the way the market works. The chapters comprise papers written by James M. Buchanan, both with and without Yoon's co-authorship, after the publication of his Collected Works. In this book, the authors analyze political disorder that is caused by individualism and self-interest in democracy, focusing specifically on the American political commons. Buchanan and Yoon expertly examine a variety of topics within this theme: the public choice approach to political disorder, rigorous economic models, the dysfunction of American fiscal institutions, the psychological aspects of political rules, and Fukuyama's vetocracy as a case of anti-commons. Readers will gain many new insights from Individualism and Political Disorder, and it will prove invaluable for academics and students in an array of areas, such as economics, politics, public policy and public administration, social psychology, and law and economics.

The very logic of majority rule implies unequal treatment or discrimination. If left unconstrained, majority coalitions will promote the interests of their own members at the expense of other persons. This book focuses on the effects of applying a generality constraint on the political process. Under this requirement, majorities would be constitutionally prohibited from treating different persons and groups differently. The generality principle is familiar in that all persons are to be treated equally. In summary, this book extends the generality norm to politics. Several defences of equal treatment or generality are developed and applied. These include the familiar intuition that invokes fairness. But the primary argument here is centred on political efficiency, which is increased when governments are constrained to treat persons or groups generally rather than differentially. The political efficiency defence of the generality constraint is based on a public choice analysis of the implication of majoritarian discrimination.

James Buchanan has been a key figure in the integration of the analysis of political decision-making into the corpus of economic theory, the source for what is now called 'public choice economics'. This notable volume seeks to identify for future generations the landmark contributions to this area made in the twentieth century.

This is the second volume of Liberty Fund's "The Selected Works of Gordon Tullock", it is a reprint edition of the ground-breaking economic classic written by two of the world's preeminent economists -- Gordon Tullock and Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan. This book is a unique blend of economics and political science that helped create significant new subfields in each discipline respectively, namely, the public choice school and constitutional political economy. Charles K. Rowley, Duncan Black Professor of Economics at George Mason University, points out in his introduction, "The Calculus of Consent" is, by a wide margin, the most widely cited publication of each coauthor and, by general agreement, their most important scientific contribution." The book is divided into four parts, each consisting of several chapters. The introduction by Professor Rowley provides a short overview of the book and identifies key insights that permeated the bounds of economics and political science and created an enduring nexus between the two sciences. Part I establishes the conceptual framework of the book's subject; part II defines the realm of social choice; part III applies the logic developed in part II to describe a range of decision-making rules, most notably, the rule of simple majority; while part IV explores the economics and ethics of democracy.

This volume contains the papers, along with the discussant's re marks, presented at a conference on 'Federal Fiscal Responsibility', held at The Homestead, Hot Springs, Virginia, on 26-27 March 1976. Additionally, we, the editors, have included an introductory essay which sets forth some of our background thoughts that in formed our organization of the conference and which also de scribes some of our reactions to the conference. This conference was sponsored by the Liberty Fund, Inc. of Indianapolis, Indiana, which incorporated this conference into its overall program directed toward the study of the ideals of a free society of responsible individuals. Related to this effort, the Liberty Fund also assisted in supporting research on Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes, by James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner (New York: Academic Press, 1977). Both Democracy in Deficit and the conference were de signed to examine one important aspect of the Liberty Fund's general set of concerns, namely the' way in which political con siderations influence the macroeconomic aspects of budgetary policy, thereby, in turn, influencing the future of American liberty and prosperity. We are most grateful to the Liberty Fund for their efforts, and we are pleased that Enid Goodrich, William Fletcher, Neil McLeod, and Helen Schultz of the Liberty Fund were able to attend the conference."

This volume presents a comprehensive index to the entire series of "The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan." Included is an annotated copy of the entire curriculum vitae, indicating in which volume in the series the various items appear and, correspondingly, those items that have been omitted.
As the editors observe, "This is a series that no serious scholar of public choice theory, public economics, or contemporary political theory will want to be without. It is a series that will also appeal to the general student of liberty, for Buchanan has--perhaps more than any other contemporary scholar--helped us to view politics without the romantic gloss that characterizes so much normative political theory and that slips unthinkingly into so much popular commentary. Buchanan has been a resolute defender of 'the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals, ' and has been a painstaking analyst of the institutional structure that might best support such a society. Buchanan stands with von Mises, Hayek, Popper, and Friedman as one of the great twentieth-century scholars of liberty."
The entire series includes:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"

This volume presents a comprehensive index to the entire series of 'The Collected Works of James M Buchanan'. Included is an annotated copy of the entire curriculum vitae, indicating in which volume in the series the various items appear and, correspondingly, those items that have been omitted. As the editors observe, "This is a series that no serious scholar of public choice theory, public economics, or contemporary political theory will want to be without. It is a series that will also appeal to the general student of liberty, for Buchanan has -- perhaps more than any other contemporary scholar -- helped us to view politics without the romantic gloss that characterises so much normative political theory and that slips unthinkingly into so much popular commentary. Buchanan has been a resolute defender of 'the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals,' and has been a painstaking analyst of the institutional structure that might best support such a society. Buchanan stands with von Mises, Hayek, Popper, and Friedman as one of the great twentieth-century scholars of liberty."

"Politics by principle is that which modern politics is not. What we observe is 'politics by interest', whether in the form of explicitly discriminatory treatment (rewarding or punishing) of particular groupings of citizens or of some elitist-dirigiste classification of citizens into the deserving or non-deserving on the basis of a presumed superior wisdom about what is really 'good' for us all. The proper principle for politics is that of generalization of generality." -- James M Buchanan, from the Preface. In his foreword, Hartmut Kliemt sums up the main objective of James M Buchanan and Roger Congleton's 'Politics by Principle': "Imposing constitutional constraints on majoritarian politics such that a more principled pattern might emerge must be a political aim of high priority for all who wish for free and responsible citizens to live together peacefully as political equals under the rule of general laws. Buchanan and Congleton's efforts to revive the classical liberal agenda in Politics by Principle, Not Interest are of the greatest interest in that regard. And this interest is not merely a theoretical one." As James Buchanan notes in introducing his co-author Roger Congleton, 'Politics by Principle, Not Interest' "embodies the working out and presentation of a single idea...the extension and application of the generality principle to majoritarian politics." After laying out the theory, Buchanan and Congleton attempt to work it out in practical political reality. Buchanan notes that "it is much easier to discuss the generality principle as an abstract ideal than it is to define the precise conditions for its satisfaction in any particular setting." Not daunted by the difficulty of the task, the two authors succeed brilliantly in applying the generality principle to the political arena. They are interested not in laying down precise do's and don'ts for politics, but in pointing out the ideal of nondiscriminatory governance and calling for constitutional constraints on political action so it conforms more closely to the generality norm.

Societies function on the basis of rules. These rules, rather like the rules of the road, coordinate the activities of individuals who have a variety of goals and purposes. Whether the rules work well or ill, and how they can be made to work better, is a matter of major concern. Appropriately interpreted, the working of social rules is also the central subject matter of modern political economy. This book is about rules - what they are, how they work, and how they can be properly analysed. The authors' objective is to understand the workings of alternative political institutions so that choices among such institutions (rules) can be more fully informed. Thus, broadly defined, the methodology of constitutional political economy is the subject matter of The Reason of Rules. The authors have examined how rules for political order work, how such rules might be chosen, and how normative criteria for such choices might be established.

The very logic of majority rule implies unequal treatment or discrimination. If left unconstrained, majority coalitions will promote the interests of their own members at the expense of other persons. This book focuses on the effects of applying a generality constraint on the political process. Under this requirement, majorities would be constitutionally prohibited from treating different persons and groups differently. The generality principle is familiar in that all persons are to be treated equally. In summary, this book extends the generality norm to politics. Several defences of equal treatment or generality are developed and applied. These include the familiar intuition that invokes fairness. But the primary argument here is centred on political efficiency, which is increased when governments are constrained to treat persons or groups generally rather than differentially. The political efficiency defence of the generality constraint is based on a public choice analysis of the implication of majoritarian discrimination.

Should government's power to tax be limited? The events of the late 1970s in the wake of California's Proposition 13 brought this question very sharply into popular focus. Whether the power to tax should be restricted, and if so how, are issues of immediate policy significance. Providing a serious analysis of these issues, the authors of this 1980 book offer an approach to the understanding and evaluation of the fiscal system, one that yields profound implications. The central question becomes: how much 'power to tax' would the citizen voluntarily grant to government as a party to some initial social contract devising a fiscal constitution? Those in office are assumed to exploit the power assigned to them to the maximum possible extent: government is modelled as 'revenue-maximizing Leviathan'. Armed with such a model, the authors proceed to trace out the restrictions on the power to tax that might be expected to emerge from the citizen's constitutional deliberations.

Should government's power to tax be limited? The events of the late 1970s in the wake of California's Proposition 13 brought this question very sharply into popular focus. Whether the power to tax should be restricted, and if so how, are issues of immediate policy significance. Providing a serious analysis of these issues, the authors of this 1980 book offer an approach to the understanding and evaluation of the fiscal system, one that yields profound implications. The central question becomes: how much 'power to tax' would the citizen voluntarily grant to government as a party to some initial social contract devising a fiscal constitution? Those in office are assumed to exploit the power assigned to them to the maximum possible extent: government is modelled as 'revenue-maximizing Leviathan'. Armed with such a model, the authors proceed to trace out the restrictions on the power to tax that might be expected to emerge from the citizen's constitutional deliberations.

"Public Principles of Public Debt" is one of James M. Buchanan's most important and influential books. The radical idea he conceived was that: our reliance on public debt has amassed a sort of orthodoxy that is commonly--and needlessly--assumed by taxpayers, by politicians, and by economists themselves.
Buchanan dismisses the nearly universal belief (which continues to this day) that the burden of debt is borne by the current generation, and he argues persuasively that public debt is shouldered in large part by generations still to come.
Written in 1958, this book represents Buchanan's first published monograph, and its publication met with much controversy, confusion, and speculation in the economic community. But the book also added to Buchanan's rising stature in the early part of his career as a brilliant and original thinker.
The arguments Buchanan lays out in this book had a considerable impact on much of his later work. Buchanan's object here is to establish a set of analytical claims about debt incidence. Current anxieties over implicit Social Security debt are clear indications of the rightness of Buchanan's then-revolutionary theory.
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series includes: Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"

This book presents a critical assessment of the political and social order in the post-revolutionary decade of the 1990s in both the transitional economies and Western welfare states confronting fiscal crises. As we enter the new post-socialist century, James M. Buchanan argues that we need to think and act on the premise that the future is uncertain. James M. Buchanan examines the political economy of the post-socialist era, analysing the events of 1989-91 and some of their predicted consequences. In addition he reflects upon the influence of those revolutionary years and the reactions to the changes, as well as the role of economists in the new socio-political environment. The political economy of the post-socialist era will be determined by the forces of historical development, social and cultural evolution, directed political change and exogenous shocks. To a large extent, many of these forces cannot be planned for, except directed political change. This insightful new book will be welcomed by political economists, legal and political philosophers, political scientists and public choice economists.

"Public Finance in Democratic Process" is James M. Buchanan's monumental work that outlines the dynamics of individual choice as it is displayed in the process of public finance.
Buchanan is perhaps nowhere more clearly a disciple of the great Swedish economist Knut Wicksell than he is in the underlying principles of this seminal work. Specifically, he elaborates on these three central Wicksellian themes:
1.Analysis of market failure in the provision of public goods.
2.The insistence on conceiving policy decisions as the outcome of political processes.
3.The necessity of treating the tax and expense sides of the budget as interconnected.
Echoing Wicksell's antipathy to the "benevolent despot" model of government, Buchanan lays out in this book a starting point for modern public-choice analysis. Recognizing the pathbreaking work he is about to begin, Buchanan opens his preface by stating, "Fiscal theory is normally discussed in a frame of reference wholly different from that adopted in this book. This dramatic shift of emphasis . . . . requires that I consider the processes through which individual choices are transmitted, combined, and transformed into collective outcomes. Careful research in this area is in its infancy, and the necessary reliance on crude, unsophisticated models underscores the exploratory nature of the work."
According to Geoffrey Brennan in the foreword, ""Public Finance in Democratic Process" is a work more hospitable to public finance orthodoxy and could be treated as an extension (albeit an important one) of the conventional approach."
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series includes:
Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"

"The Calculus of Consent" was co-authored by Buchanan with Gordon Tullock, with whom Buchanan collaborated on many books and academic enterprises throughout their careers. As Robert D. Tollison states in the foreword, " this book] is a radical departure from the way democracies conduct their business. The "Calculus" is already a book for the ages."
This classic work analyzes the political organization of a free society through the lens of the economic organization of society. The authors acknowledge their unease as economists in analyzing the political organization, but they take the risk of forging into unfamiliar territory because they believe the benefits of their perspective will bear much fruit.
As the authors state, their objective in this book is "to analyze the calculus of the rational individual when he is faced with questions of constitutional choice . . . .We examine the choice] process extensively only with reference to the problem of decision-making rules."
The authors describe their approach as "economic individualism." They believe that economists have explored individual choice extensively in the market sector while social scientists have largely ignored the dynamics of individual decision-making in the dynamics of forming group action in the public sector.
Written in the early 1960s, "The Calculus of Consent" has become a bulwark of the public choice movement for which James M. Buchanan is so justly famous.
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series includes: Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"

"Public Principles of Public Debt" is one of James M. Buchanan's most important and influential books. The radical idea he conceived was that: our reliance on public debt has amassed a sort of orthodoxy that is commonly--and needlessly--assumed by taxpayers, by politicians, and by economists themselves.
Buchanan dismisses the nearly universal belief (which continues to this day) that the burden of debt is borne by the current generation, and he argues persuasively that public debt is shouldered in large part by generations still to come.
Written in 1958, this book represents Buchanan's first published monograph, and its publication met with much controversy, confusion, and speculation in the economic community. But the book also added to Buchanan's rising stature in the early part of his career as a brilliant and original thinker.
The arguments Buchanan lays out in this book had a considerable impact on much of his later work. Buchanan's object here is to establish a set of analytical claims about debt incidence. Current anxieties over implicit Social Security debt are clear indications of the rightness of Buchanan's then-revolutionary theory.
James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.
The entire series includes: Volume 1 "The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty"
Volume 2 "Public Principles of Public Debt "
Volume 3 "The Calculus of Consent "
Volume 4 "Public Finance in Democratic Process"
Volume 5 "The Demand and Supply of Public Goods"
Volume 6 "Cost and Choice"
Volume 7 "The Limits of Liberty"
Volume 8 "Democracy in Deficit"
Volume 9 "The Power to Tax"
Volume 10 "The Reason of Rules"
Volume 11 "Politics by Principle, Not Interest"
Volume 12 "Economic Inquiry and Its Logic"
Volume 13 "Politics as Public Choice"
Volume 14 "Debt and Taxes"
Volume 15 "Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory"
Volume 16 "Choice, Contract, and Constitutions"
Volume 17 "Moral Science and Moral Order"
Volume 18 "Federalism, Liberty, and the Law"
Volume 19 "Ideas, Persons, and Events"
Volume 20 "Indexes"

These thirtyone essays form the foundation of 1986 Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan's work on the constitutional economics paradigm he founded. Following the earlier collection, Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, these essays include many that appeared in journals not easily accessible as well as some which have not previously been published. The volume is organized in two parts: theoretical foundations and applications. The latter part includes papers on aspects of voting, monetary and fiscal constitutions, public goods supply, taxation and public debt, and property rights and externalities. This edition provides easier access and gives a wider exposure to a set of arguments and ideas that mark important steps in Buchanan's building of the Constitutional Economics Paradigm. The vision of a new political economy developed and applied in the contributions of this volume will be of interest to scholars and students of economics as well as other disciplines from political science to philosophy, providing a valuable perspective and orientation to anyone who is concerned with the practical issues of policy making.

Studies of public finance, as traditionally developed, have analyzed the effects of fiscal institutions on the market-choice behavior of individuals and firms, but this book takes a different approach. It analyzes the effects of fiscal institutions on the political-choice behavior of individuals as they participate variously in the decision-making processes of democracies. What effect will the form of a new tax have on individuals' attitudes toward more or less public spending? To what extent does the private sector--public sector mix depend on the way in which tax payments are made? How do the various taxes affect the fiscal consciousness of individual citizens? These are questions that have been ignored for the most part. They are, nonetheless, important and worthy of examination. This book is an attempt to provide some provisional answers. By the use of simplified models of existing tax institutions, Buchanan predicts the effects that these exert on individual behavior in the area of political choice. The relative effects of direct and indirect taxes, the ""old tax--new tax"" distinction, the effects of fiscal earmarking, the effects of unbalanced budgets -- these are a few of the topics examined. Before these questions can be fully answered, research must be conducted to find out just how much individuals know about the taxes they pay and the benefits they receive. Comparatively little research of this kind has been completed, but the author devotes a chapter to a careful review of the present state of this sort of research. Individuals' choice among alternative fiscal institutions is examined in the second part of the book. If given the opportunity, how would the individual choose to pay his or her taxes? Progressive income taxes, excise taxes, and public debt are analyzed in terms of this question. Because of its interdisciplinary approach, this imaginative study will be of interest to both economists and political scientists. |Although much has been written about the ways in which Confederate politics affected the course of the Civil War, George Rable is the first historian to investigate Confederate political culture in its own right. Focusing on the assumptions, values, and b

Though written by an economist, this book's subject is not "economics" in the ordinary sense of that term. Instead, it is James Buchanan's contribution to what he has called the "contractarian revival," the renewed interest in and emphasis on the metaphor of the social contract in evaluating political alternatives. He believes that genuine constitutional dialogue must take place in this country if America is to remain a free society and that the perspectives of an economist are valuable in the discussion of basic issues of social philosophy.
The author critically examines the basic alternatives for social order: anarchy, natural law, historical determinism, and revealed reason. He rejects each of these and opts instead for "freedom in constitutional contract." In this stance he is explicitly constructivist, holding the view that reform in constitutional-legal rules or institutions is possible.
Reform or improvement in such rules is determined, however, by conceptual contractual agreement or consensus and not by external ethical norms. Further, the choice among alternative sets of rules, alternative "constitutions," is categorically distinguished from attempts to suggest policy norms within an existing set of rules. In developing his analysis, Buchanan critically analyzes recent contributions by John Rawls, Robert Nozick, F. A. Hayek, Michael Polanyi, Frank H. Knight, and other social philosophers

""The Limits of Liberty" is concerned mainly with two topics. One is an attempt to construct a new contractarian theory of the state, and the other deals with its legitimate limits. The latter is a matter of great practical importance and is of no small significance from the standpoint of political philosophy."--Scott Gordon, "Journal of Political Economy"
James Buchanan offers a strikingly innovative approach to a pervasive problem of social philosophy. The problem is one of the classic paradoxes concerning man's freedom in society: in order to protect individual freedom, the state must restrict each person's right to act. Employing the techniques of modern economic analysis, Professor Buchanan reveals the conceptual basis of an individual's social rights by examining the evolution and development of these rights out of presocial conditions.