The book focuses on policy-making at the highest levels of the United States government. Chapter contributors examine political, military, and foreign policy processes from micro and macro perspectives in documenting how President Bush personally dominated U.S. national security policy and was the driving force behind the United Nations-backed coalition of nations against Saddam Hussein. The authors place the president's actions into political and historical perspective and examine the consequences of the Gulf War in both military and diplomatic terms. Among the subjects discussed by experts are the president's political and constitutional roles in war-making; the foreign policy implications and military issues in the war; the domestic implications; and the postwar environment and planning for peace.

The decision to go to war in Iraq has had historic repercussions throughout the world. The editors of this volume bring together scholarly analysis of the decision-making in the U.S and U.K. that led to the war, inside accounts of CIA decision-making, and key speeches and documents related to going to war. The book presents a fascinating case study of decision-making at the highest levels in the United States and Britain as their leaders planned to go to war in Iraq. Just as the Cuban Missile Crisis has been used for decades as a case study in good decision-making, the decision to go to war in Iraq will be analysed for years to come for lessons about what can go wrong in decisions about war. The book presents a fascinating and truly comparative perspective on how President Bush and Prime Minister Blair took their countries to war in Iraq. Each had to convince his legislature and public that war was necessary, and both used intelligence in questionable ways to do so. This book brings together some of the best scholarship and most relevant documents on these important decisions that will reverberate for decades to come. -- .