No theory is more passionately and widely defined, or decried, than is liberalism in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. But what is this theory, on which so much ink is spilled? This collection of original essays by leading specialists in political philosophy, legal theory, and economics offers answers to that question, by exploring the theoretical commitments of liberals and some of the practical implications of their view. Among the topics explored is the distinction between liberalism and conservatism, and the degree to which liberals must be committed to neutrality, individualism, equality, freedom, and a contractarian theory of justification. The practical implications of liberalism are further examined by considerations of the proper role of the liberal state in undertaking egalitarian redistribution, the provision of public goods, and retributive punishment. The papers assembled by Narveson and Dimock will be of benefit to anyone working in the areas of political philosophy, political theory, or political economics.

Jan Narveson asks the provocative, philosophical question: is the state necessary? In this unusual introduction to political philosophy, Narveson draws on the history of political philosophy and discusses its main theories_classic liberal, democratic, socialist, radical_with reference to how each sees the place of the individual in the political order. Narveson's critique is situated within issues of freedom, authority, economic welfare, international relations and others to explore how and whether the state is necessary. His argument is ultimately anti-statist and takes seriously the question of whether and how some version of anarchism might make sense.

Ethical questions lie at the very heart of all philosophy, and no one is better equipped to untangle the many facets of ethical theory than respected thinker and professor Jan Narveson. Drawing from theoretical notions as well as everyday applications, Narveson simplifies these nuanced ideas for any beginning ethicist. Discussing theoretical elements ranging from intuitionism to naturalism, emotivism to metaethics, Narveson's approach to this complex topic is one that any reader will find accessible.

Respecting Persons in Theory and Practice is a collection of essays of the moral and political philosophy of Jan Narveson. The essays in this collection share a consistent theme running through much of Narveson's moral and political philosophy, namely that politics and morals stem from the interests of individual people, and have no antecedent authority over us. Rather, the source of such authority lies in the way people are related to one another, and most especially, in the exigencies of cooperation. Humans have plenty of problems, Narveson argues, but we are perhaps unique among animals in that our worst enemies, often enough, are other humans. The rules of morals and the devices of politics, in the view Narveson holds, deal with these problems by identifying the potential for gain from cooperation, and loss from the reverse. The essays express a collective antipathy for the ways in which modern political and moral philosophy has ridden roughshod over sane and efficient social restrictions, leaving us with a social scene devoted mainly to satisfying the cravings for power of the politically ambitious. Politics, Narveson argues with distress, has subverted morals. The essays in this collection, in various ways and as applied to various aspects of the scene, detail these charges, arguing that the ultimate and true point of politics and morals is to enable us to make our lives better, according to our varied senses of what that might mean.

Jan Narveson asks the provocative, philosophical question: is the state necessary? In this unusual introduction to political philosophy, Narveson draws on the history of political philosophy and discusses its main theories_classic liberal, democratic, socialist, radical_with reference to how each sees the place of the individual in the political order. Narveson's critique is situated within issues of freedom, authority, economic welfare, international relations and others to explore how and whether the state is necessary. His argument is ultimately anti-statist and takes seriously the question of whether and how some version of anarchism might make sense.

Is government justified? This perennial question is central to political philosophy and has never been more alive than at the present time, in the midst of continuing political and social upheaval worldwide. This collection of new essays by thirteen philosophers addresses questions of political authority in light of recent work in political theory. Whether supporters or critics of the state, the authors make their arguments using up-to-date analytical tools, such as game and decision theory, and the hindsight provided by modern history. For and Against the State will be an important collection for students of philosophy, politics, economics, and history.

In Political Correctness: For and Against, two prominent philosophers engage each other in a forthright debate over some of the centrally disputed topics in the controversy now being waged on college campuses across the nation. In her lead essay supporting political correctness, Marilyn Friedman challenges the critical response to hate speech codes, disputes the supposed preeminence of the Western canon, and champions thick multiculturalism over a thin global diversity approach. She also argues that a politically correct perspective need not abandon the concept of truth even while recognising its political vulnerabilities, and she defends feminism and feminists against widespread distortion and caricature.

Are the political ideals of liberty and equality compatible? This question is of central and continuing importance in political philosophy, moral philosophy, and welfare economics. In this book, two distinguished philosophers take up the debate. Jan Narveson argues that a political ideal of negative liberty is incompatible with any substantive ideal of equality, while James P. Sterba argues that Narveson's own ideal of negative liberty is compatible, and in fact leads to the requirements of a substantive ideal of equality. Of course, they cannot both be right. Thus, the details of their arguments about the political ideal of negative liberty and its requirements will determine which of them is right. Engagingly and accessibly written, their debate will be of value to all who are interested in the central issue of what are the practical requirements of a political ideal of liberty.

No theory is more passionately and widely defined, or decried, than is liberalism in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy. But what is this theory, on which so much ink is spilled? This collection of original essays by leading specialists in political philosophy, legal theory, and economics offers answers to that question, by exploring the theoretical commitments of liberals and some of the practical implications of their view. Among the topics explored is the distinction between liberalism and conservatism, and the degree to which liberals must be committed to neutrality, individualism, equality, freedom, and a contractarian theory of justification. The practical implications of liberalism are further examined by considerations of the proper role of the liberal state in undertaking egalitarian redistribution, the provision of public goods, and retributive punishment. The papers assembled by Narveson and Dimock will be of benefit to anyone working in the areas of political philosophy, political theory, or political economics.

Originally published in 1967. In the past half-century, Utilitarianism has fallen out of favor among professional philosophers, except in such "amended" forms as "Ideal" and "Rule" Utilitarianism. Professor Narveson contends that amendments and qualifications are unnecessary and misguided, and that a careful interpretation and application of the original theory, as advocated by Bentham, the Mills, and Sidgwick, obviates any need for modification. Drawing on the analytical work of such influential recent thinkers as Stevenson, Toulmin, Hare, Nowell-Smith, and Baier, the author attempts to draw a more careful and detailed picture than has previously been offered of the logical status and workings of the Principle of Utility. He then turns to the traditional objections to the theory as developed by such respected thinkers as Ross, Frankena, Hart, and Rawls and attempts to show how Utilitarianism can account for our undoubted obligations in the areas of punishment, promising, distributive justice, and the other principal moral convictions of mankind. He contends that the Principle of Utility implies whatever is recognized to be clearly true in these convictions and that it leaves room to doubt whatever is doubtful in them. Narveson concludes with a rationally forceful proof of the Principle of Utility. In the course of this argument, which draws on the most widely accepted recent findings in analytical ethics, Narveson discovers an essential identity between the ethical outlooks of Kant and of Mill, which are traditionally held to be antithetical. Both thinkers, he shows, center on the principle that the interests of others are to be regarded as equal in value to one's own. A new view of Mill's celebrated "proof of utilitarianism" is developed in the course of the discussion.

Libertarianism is both a philosophy and a political view. The key concepts defining Libertarianism are: Individual Rights as inherent to human beings, not granted by government; a Spontaneous Order through which people conduct their daily interactions and through which society is organized independent of central (government) direction; the Rule of Law which dictates that everyone is free to do as they please so long as they do not infringe upon the rights of others; a Divided and Limited Government, checked by written constitution; Free Markets in which price and exchange is agreed upon mutually by individuals; Virtue of Production whereby the productive labour of the individual and any translation of that labour into earnings belongs, by right, to the individual who should not have to sacrifice those earnings to taxes; and Peace which has, throughout history, most commonly been disrupted by the interests of the ruling class or centralized government.

Though this moderately-priced anthology dates back to 1983, its lively articles are as relevant as ever. Topics covered include suicide, euthanasia, war, punishment, world hunger, abortion, sexual relations, equality, affirmative action, and future generations.

Are the political ideals of liberty and equality compatible? This question is of central and continuing importance in political philosophy, moral philosophy, and welfare economics. In this book, two distinguished philosophers take up the debate. Jan Narveson argues that a political ideal of negative liberty is incompatible with any substantive ideal of equality, while James P. Sterba argues that Narveson's own ideal of negative liberty is compatible, and in fact leads to the requirements of a substantive ideal of equality. Of course, they cannot both be right. Thus, the details of their arguments about the political ideal of negative liberty and its requirements will determine which of them is right. Engagingly and accessibly written, their debate will be of value to all who are interested in the central issue of what are the practical requirements of a political ideal of liberty.