This special issue on the psychology of knowing about knowing bridges the parallels between social and cognitive psychology. It further illustrates the benefits of pursuing in depth these connections and the phenomena and implications associated with them.

Are humans unique in having self-reflective consciousness? Or can precursors to this central form of human consciousness be found in non-human species? The Missing Link in Cognition brings together a diverse group of researchers who have been investigating this question from a variety of perspectives, including the extent to which non-human primates, and, indeed, young children, have consciousness, a sense of self, thought process, metacognitions, and representations. Some of the participants--Kitcher, Higgins, Nelson, and Tulving--argue that these types of cognitive abilities are uniquely human, whereas others--Call, Hampton, Kinsbourne, Menzel, Metcalfe, Schwartz, Smith, and Terrace--are convinced that at least the precursors to self-reflective consciousness exist in non-human primates.
Their debate focuses primarily on the underpinnings of consciousness. Some of the participants believe that consciousness depends on representational thought and on the mental manipulation of such representations. Is representational thought enough to ensure consciousness, or does one need more? If one needs more, exactly what is needed? Is reflection upon the representations, that is, metacognition, the link? Does a realization of the contingencies, that is, "knowing that," in Gilbert Ryle's terminology, ensure that a person or an animal is conscious? Is true episodic memory needed for consciousness, and if so, do any animals have it? Is it possible to have episodic memory or, indeed, any self-reflective processing, without language?
Other participants believe that consciousness is inextricably intertwined with a sense of self or self-awareness. From where does this sense of self or self-awareness arise? Some of the participants believe that it develops only through the use of language and the narrative form. If it does develop in this way, what about claims of a sense of self or self-awareness in non-human animals? Others believe that the autobiographical record implied by episodic memory is fundamental. To what extent must non-human animals have the linguistic, metacognitive, and/or representational abilities to develop a sense of self or self-awareness? These and other related concerns are crucial in this volume's lively debate over the nature of the missing cognitive link, and whether gorillas, chimps, or other species might be more like humans than many have supposed.

Human infants do not seem to be born with concepts of self or joint attention. One basic goal of Agency and Joint Attention is to unravel how these abilities originate. One approach that has received a lot of recent attention is social. Some argue that by virtue of an infant's intense eye gaze with her mother, she is able, by the age of four months, to establish a relationship with her mother that differentiates between "me" and "you." At about twelve months, the infant acquires the non-verbal ability to share attention with her mother or other caregivers. Although the concepts of self and joint attention are nonverbal and uniquely human, the question remains, how do we establish metacognitive control of these abilities? A tangential question is whether nonhuman animals develop abilities that are analogous to self and joint attention. Much of this volume is devoted to the development of metacognition of self and joint attention in experiments on the origin of consciousness, knowing oneself, social referencing, joint action, the neurological basis of joint attention, the role of joint action, mirror neurons, phenomenology, and cues for agency.

Metacognition is the first textbook to focus on people s extraordinary ability to evaluate and control their cognitive processes. This comprehensive text covers both theoretical and empirical metacognitive research in educational, developmental, cognitive and applied psychology.

Authors John Dunlosky and Janet Metcalfe address many of the key questions that have inspired scientists to pursue research in this domain. To answer these and many other questions, the authors assess major theoretical themes and programmatic research in the field. The authors also include chapters that define the scope of metacognition and cover its historical origins. Not only do they describe well-received theories about the nature of metacognition, but they also highlight unresolved mysteries currently on the cutting-edge of research.

Key Features

Emphasizes the practical relevance of theory and research in metacognition to learning with the use of Application boxes Introduces students to important questions that have yet to be answered by the metacognitive research literature with the inclusion of Mystery boxesProvides threeeasy-to-conduct demonstrations (e.g., tip-of-the-tongue experience, delayed-judgment-of-learning effect, etc.) that students can try themselves Offers brief biographies that introduce students to some of the most influential leaders in metacognitionIncludes a general summary at the end of each chapte

Intended Audience

This text is an ideal resource for undergraduate cognitive psychology students. It also serves as comprehensive handbook for more advanced students and psychological scientists engaged in the study of metacognitive processes. "