Since World War II, the United States has done much to support economic, political, and social development in the Third World. At the same time, its policies toward developing nations often reflect an overly narrow conception of national and global security in which the influences of the modernization process seem scarcely to have been taken into account. Both strains in US policy are mirrored in strong academic traditions upon which policy-makers have drawn liberally in the postwar years. Developmentalists and security scholars alike will find much that is familiar in the case studies presented in Military Industry in Taiwan and South Korea. Dr Nolan's discussion of the stresses of rapid economic and political development in both states draws deeply on the modernization and dependencia studies of the last two decades, while her treatment of the 'security environment' within which domestic policies must be made will satisfy the international relationist concerned with states as actors within the international system. Throughout, Dr Nolan provides a detailed presentation of the behaviour of both polities that will be of interest to North-east Asian area specialists and students of US arms policy.

Since World War II, the United States has done much to support economic, political, and social development in the Third World. At the same time, its policies toward developing nations often reflect an overly narrow conception of national and global security in which the influences of the modernization process seem scarcely to have been taken into account. Both strains in US policy are mirrored in strong academic traditions upon which policy-makers have drawn liberally in the postwar years. Developmentalists and security scholars alike will find much that is familiar in the case studies presented in Military Industry in Taiwan and South Korea. Dr Nolan's discussion of the stresses of rapid economic and political development in both states draws deeply on the modernization and dependencia studies of the last two decades, while her treatment of the 'security environment' within which domestic policies must be made will satisfy the international relationist concerned with states as actors within the international system. Throughout, Dr Nolan provides a detailed presentation of the behaviour of both polities that will be of interest to North-east Asian area specialists and students of US arms policy.

The United States continues to maintain a large nuclear arsenal guided by a deterrence strategy little changed since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Notwithstanding changes in the size and composition of nuclear forces brought about since 1991, the fundamental rationales and planning principles which informed U.S. nuclear policy for decades remain in place--despite the disappearance of a superpower nuclear enemy. In this work, Janne E. Nolan traces the effort to articulate a post-cold war nuclear doctrine through decisions taken in the Bush and Clinton administrations, focusing on the leadership styles of presidents, bureaucratic politics, and broader foreign policy objectives. Based on in-depth interviews with policy participants, this study illuminates in detail the dynamics by which the U.S. government has tried to reflect the dramatically altered international arena in its nuclear policies. In two major policy developments--the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review and the decision to sign the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty--U.S. policy makers sought to define the utility of nuclear weapons after the cold war and to gain broad-based consensus. For many reasons, these efforts were largely unsuccessful in developing coherent policies, with the absence of sustained presidential leadership proving most decisive.

Since the beginning of the crisis precipitated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the threat posed by Iraq's arsenal of ballistic missiles has been the focus of international attention. In the opening days of the U.S.-led military counteroffensive beginning on January 16, 1992, Iraq launched ballistic missiles against population centers in Israel and military bases in Saudi Arabia. The attacks intensified the terror of the war and prompted renewed efforts by the multinational force to destroy Saddam Hussein's military machine. The countries aligned against Iraq were prepared for attacks by chemically armed missiles, but Iraq's missile force proved to be of little military consequence. The missiles that survived the opening hours of Operation Desert Storm were conventionally armed, inaccurate and unreliable. Most of those that were actually launched either were intercepted by American antimissile defenses or failed to hit vital targets. But the political impact of the missiles was inestimable. The strikes symbolized Iraq's determination to prosecute the war no matter what the cost. By threatening to involve Israel, they created severe tensions and posed the risk that multinational military coalition would be dissolved, and they underscored the potential vulnerability of all the states in the region to Iraqi aggression. In this book, Janne E. Nolan argues that the use of missiles is a harbinger of the altered international security environment confronting the Untied States and its allies in the late twentieth century. Long believed to be a distant prospect, the adoption of technological resources to missile development is already occurring in over a dozen developing countries, many of them long-standing regional antagonists. These capabilities present complicated challenges to American interests and foreign policy, challenges that have only begun to be explored as a result of the Iraqi crisis. The author examines the evolution of the international technology market, surveys third world missile programs, and analyzes the military significance of ballistic missiles in potential third world combat. She also discusses the way in which domestic and international policy decisions are made to promote or restrain the export of military technology, and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of current policy. Finally, she emphasizes the need for institutional reforms to balance the requirements of protecting the technological edge on which the United States relies for its own security against the growing pressures of international miniaturization.