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The United States Air Force's Center for Strategy and Technology
was established at the Air War College in 1996. Its purpose is to
engage in long-term strategic thinking about technology and its
implications for United States national security. The Center (CSAT)
focuses on education, research, and publications that support the
integration of technology into national strategy and policy. This
document is one of these publications.
In examining the influence of historical analogies on decisions to
use--or not use--force, military strategist Jeffrey Record assesses
every major application of U.S. force from the Korean War to the
NATO war on Serbia. Specifically, he looks at the influence of two
analogies: the democracies? appeasement of Hitler at Munich and
America's defeat in the Vietnam War. His book judges the utility of
these two analogies on presidential decision-making and finds
considerable misuse of them in situations where force was optional.
He points to the Johnson administration's application of the Munich
analogy to the circumstances of Southeast Asia in 1965 as the most
egregious example of their misuse, but also cites the faulty
reasoning by historical analogy that prevailed among critics of
Reagan's policy in Central America and in Clinton's use of force in
Haiti and the former Yugoslavia. The author's findings show
generational experience to be a key influence on presidential
decision-making: Munich persuaded mid-twentieth-century presidents
that force should be used early and decisively while Vietnam
cautioned later presidents against using force at all. Both
analogies were at work for the Gulf War, with Munich urging a
decision for war and Vietnam warning against a graduated and highly
restricted use of force. Record also reminds us of the times when
presidents have used analogies to mobilize public support for
action they have already decided to take. Addressing both the
process of presidential decision-making and the wisdom of decisions
made, this well-reasoned book offers timely lessons to a broad
audience that includes political scientists, military historians,
defense analysts, and policy makers, as well as those simply
curious about history's influence.
The emergence of failed states as the principal source of
international political instability and the appearance of mounting
casualty phobia among U.S. political and military elites have
significant force structure and technology implications. Overseas,
intra-state and often irregular warfare is displacing large-scale
inter-state conventional combat. At home, there has arisen a new
generation of political and military leadership that displays an
unprecedented timidity in using force."--Intro. The author proceeds
to argue that in an era where the Air Force is being called on more
than ever in an attempt to reduce casualties because they are
viewed as "above the fight," the distribution of defense funding
needs to be given a hard look.
The author takes a fresh look at Japan's decision for war in 1941,
and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the
threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He
believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause
of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was
built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both
sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. He
finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor
in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of
economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese
underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American
society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of
defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure
of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States
and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing
relevance to American foreign policy and defense decisionmakers.
Preface NATOs controversial decision to attack Serbia in March 1999
because of its behavior in Kosovo prompted considerable criticism
in the United States. Some critics faulted the United States and
its NATO allies for selecting military means incompatible with the
political objective sought. Others contended that the alliance had
misjudged Belgrades strength of interest in Kosovo, and therefore
willingness to defy NATO. Still others asserted that the need to
maintain political consensus within the alliance was crippling
NATOs military effectiveness against Serbia.
Japan's decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely
regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan
hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing
an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of
Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose,
so how does one explain Tokyo's decision? Did the Japanese
recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of
victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer
a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a
fresh look at Japan's decision for war, and concludes that it was
dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction
of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression
in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that
the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese
miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural
ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans
underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations
and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a
deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion
and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their
own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material
superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual,
and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war
contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American
foreign policy and defense decisionmakers.
This landmark study of the Vietnamese conflict, examined through
the lens of the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary movements
in the rural province of Long An up until American intervention in
the area, offers a human, balanced, penetrating account of war. Two
new forewords by Robert K. Brigham of Vassar College and Jeffrey
Record of the Air War College explore the book's enduring
influence. There is a new end chapter that offers previously
unpublished scholarship on the conflict.
U.S. political and military difficulties in Iraq have prompted
comparisons to the American war in Vietnam. How, in fact, do the
two wars compare? What are the differences and similarities, and
what insights can be gained from examining them? Does the Vietnam
War have instructive lessons for those dealing with today's
challenges in Iraq, or is that war simply irrelevant? In the pages
that follow, two highly qualified analysts address these questions.
Dr. Jeffrey Record, formerly a civilian pacification advisor in
Vietnam and author of books on both the Vietnam and Iraq wars, and
W. Andrew Terrill, author and co-author of several SSI studies on
Iraq, conclude that the military dimensions of the two conflicts
bear little comparison. Among other things, the sheer scale of the
Vietnam War in terms of forces committed and losses incurred dwarfs
that of the Iraq War. They also conclude, however, that failed U.
S. state-building in Vietnam and the impact of declining domestic
political support for U. S. war aims in Vietnam are issues
pertinent to current U. S. policy in Iraq. The Strategic Studies
Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to
the national security debate over Iraq. Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
The United States is now in the third year of the global war on
terrorism. That war began as a fight against the organization that
perpetrated the heinous attacks of September 11, 2001, but soon
became a much more ambitious enterprise, encompassing, among other
things, an invasion and occupation of Iraq. As part of the war on
terrorism, the United States has committed not only to ridding the
world of terrorism as a means of violence but also to transforming
Iraq into a prosperous democratic beacon for the rest of the
autocratically ruled and economically stagnant Middle East to
follow. Dr. Jeffrey Record examines three features of the war on
terrorism as currently defined and conducted: (1) the
administration's postulation of the terrorist threat, (2) the scope
and feasibility of U.S. war aims, and (3) the war's political,
fiscal, and military sustainability. He finds that the war on
terrorism-as opposed to the campaign against al-Qaeda-lacks
strategic clarity, embraces unrealistic objectives, and may not be
sustainable over the long haul. He calls for down-sizing the scope
of the war on terrorism to reflect concrete U.S. security interests
and the limits of American military power. The Strategic Studies
Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as a contribution to
the national security debate over the aims and course of the war on
terrorism. Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr. Director, Strategic Studies
Institute
Jeffrey Record has specialised in investigating the causes of war.
In "The Specter of Munich: Reconsidering the Lessons of Appeasing
Hitler" (Potomac Books, Inc., 2006), he contended that Hitler could
not have been deterred from going to war by any action the Allies
could plausibly have taken. In "Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies
Win" (Potomac Books, Inc., 2007), Record reviewed eleven
insurgencies and evaluated the reasons for their success or
failure, including the insurgents' stronger will to prevail.
"Wanting War: Why the Bush Administration Invaded Iraq" (Potomac
Books, Inc., 2009) includes one of Record's most cogent
explanations of why an often uncritical belief in one's own victory
is frequently (but not always) a critical component of the decision
to make war. Record incorporates the lessons of these earlier books
in his latest,"A War It Was Always Going to Lose: Why Japan
Attacked America in 1941". The attack on Pearl Harbour is one of
the most perplexing cases in living memory of a weaker power
seeming to believe that it could vanquish a clearly superior force.
On closer inspection, however, Record finds that Japan did not
believe it could win; yet, the Japanese imperial command decided to
attack the United States anyway. Record finds conventional
explanations that Japan's leaders were criminally stupid, wildly
deluded, or just plumb crazy don't fully answer all our questions.
Instead, he argues, the Japanese were driven by an insatiable
appetite for national glory and economic security via the conquest
of East Asia. The scope of their ambitions and their fear of
economic destruction overwhelmed their knowledge that the
likelihood of winning was slim and propelled them into a war they
were always going to lose.
"Wanting War" is the first comprehensive analysis of the often
contradictory reasons why President George W. Bush went to war in
Iraq and of the war s impact on future U.S. armed intervention
abroad. Though the White House sold the war as a necessity to
eliminate an alleged Iraqi threat, other agendas were at play.
Drawing on new assessments of George W. Bush s presidency, recent
memoirs by key administration decision makers, and Jeffrey Record s
own expertise on U.S. military interventions since World War II,
"Wanting War" contends that Bush s invasion of Iraq was more about
the arrogance of post Cold War American power than it was about
Saddam Hussein. Ultimately, Iraq was selected not because it posed
a convincing security threat but because Baghdad was militarily
helpless. Operation Iraqi Freedom was a demonstration of American
power, especially the will to use it.Ironically, as Record points
out, a war launched to advertise American combativeness is likely
to lead U.S. foreign policymakers and military leaders to be averse
to using force in all but the most favorable circumstances. But
this new respect for the limits of America s conventional military
power, especially as an instrument of ffecting political change in
foreign cultures, and for the inherent risks and uncertainties of
war, may prove to be one of the Iraq War s few positive legacies.
Record argues that the American experience in Iraq ought to be a
cautionary tale for those who advocate for further U.S. military
action.
"Beating Goliath" examines the phenomenon of victories by the weak
over the strong more specifically, insurgencies that succeeded
against great powers. Jeffrey Record reviews eleven insurgent wars
from 1775 to the present and determines why the seemingly weaker
side won. He concludes that external assistance correlates more
consistently with insurgent success than any other explanation. He
does not disparage the critical importance of will, strategy, and
strong-side regime type or suggest that external assistance
guarantees success. Indeed, in all cases, some combination of these
factors is usually present. But Record finds few if any cases of
unassisted insurgent victories except against the most decrepit
regimes. Having identified the ingredients of insurgent success,
Record examines the present insurgency in Iraq and whether the
United States can win. In so doing, Record employs a comparative
analysis of the Vietnam War and the Iraq War. He also identifies
and assesses the influence of distinctive features of the American
way of war on the U.S. forces performance against the Iraqi
insurgency. Make no mistake: insurgent victories are the exception,
not the rule. But when David does beat Goliath, the consequences
can be earth shattering and change the course of history. Jeffrey
Record s persuasive logic and clear writing make this timely book a
must read for scholars, policymakers, military strategists, and
anyone interested in the Iraq War s outcome.
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