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From the late imperial period until 1922, the British and French
made private and government loans to Russia, making it the foremost
international debtor country in pre-World War I Europe. To finance
the modernization of industry, the construction of public works
projects, railroad construction, and the development and adventures
of the military-industrial complex, Russia's ministers of finance,
municipal leaders, and nascent manufacturing class turned, time and
time again, to foreign capital. From the forging of the
Franco-Russian alliance onwards, Russia's needs were met, first and
foremost, its allies and diplomatic partners in the developing
Triple Entente. In the case of Russia's relationships with both
France and Great Britain, an open pocketbook primed the pump,
facilitating the good spirits that fostered agreement. Russia's
continued access to those ready lenders ensured that the empire of
the Tsars would not be tempted away from its alliance and entente
partners. This web of financial and political interdependence
affected both foreign policy and domestic society in all three
countries. The Russian state was so heavily indebted to its western
creditors, rendering those western economies almost prisoners to
this debt, that the debtor nation in many ways had the upper hand;
the Russian government at times was actually able to dictate policy
to its French and British counterparts. Those nations' investing
classes-which, in France in particular, spanned not only the upper
classes but the middle, rentier class, as well-had such a vast
proportion of their savings wrapped up in Russian bonds that any
default would have been catastrophic for their own economies. That
default came not long after the Bolshevik Revolution brought to
power a government who felt no responsibility whatsoever for the
debts accrued by the tsars for the purpose of oppressing Russia's
workers and peasants. The ensuing effect on allied morale, the
French and British economies and, ultimately, on the Anglo-French
relationship, was grim and far-reaching. This book will contribute
to understandings of the ways that non-governmental and sometimes
transnational actors were able to influence both British and French
foreign policy and Russian foreign and domestic policy. It will
address the role of individual financiers and policy makers-men
like Lord Revelstoke, chairman of Baring Brothers, the British and
French Rothschild cousins, Edouard Noetzlin of the Banque de Paris
et de Pays Bas, and Sergei Witte, Russia's authoritative finance
minister during much of this age of expansion; the importance of
foreign capital in late imperial Russian policy; and the particular
role of British capital and financial investment in the
construction and strengthening of the Anglo-Russo-French entente.
It will illustrate the interrelationship of political and economic
decision-making with the ideas and beliefs that inform security
policy. Drawing upon both the traditional archival sources for
diplomatic history-the government holdings of Great Britain,
France, and Russia-and the non-governmental archival holdings of
international finance-this project looks beyond the realm of high
politics and state-centered decision making in the formation of
foreign policy, offering insights into the forms and functions of
diplomatic alliances while elucidating the connections between
finance and foreign policy. It is a classic tale of money and power
in the modern era-an age of economic interconnectivity and great
power interdependency.
Intelligence has never been a more important factor in
international affairs than it is today. Since the end of the Second
World War, vast intelligence bureaucracies have emerged to play an
increasingly important role in the making of national policy within
all major states. One of the biggest problems within the
contemporary thinking about intelligence and international
relations is a lack of historical context. Observers routinely
comment on the challenges facing intelligence communities without
reflecting on the historical forces that have shaped these
communities over the past two centuries. As presented in this
volume, new perspectives on the evolution of intelligence services
and intelligence practice over the past 200 years can only enrich
ongoing debates over how best to reform national intelligence
structures. The practices of war and international politics were
transformed by the conflicts of the French Revolution and the
Napoleonic era. One of the most important outcomes of this
transformation was the gradual emergence of permanent and
increasingly professionalized intelligence services within the
military and foreign policy establishments of the Great Powers. The
contributions in this volume consider the causes and consequences
of this trend as well as its impact on war, strategy, and
statecraft. The rise of permanent intelligence bureaucracies has
combined with technological progress to transform practices of
intelligence collection and analysis that have remained essentially
unchanged since the Roman era. Ultimately, however, the nature and
limits of intelligence have remained constant, rendering
intelligence little or no more effective in reducing uncertainty at
theopening of the 21st century than in centuries past.
By the start of the twenteith century both Britain and Russia,
suspicious of Imperial Germany, decided to stabilize relations and
replace their rivalry in Central Asia - the 'Great Game' - with
rapprochement. Jennifer Siegel demonstrates that reality in the
field told a different story: the momentum of imperial rivalry,
spiced by oil and railway development, could not be arrested and
various interests on both sides continued to stoke the fire with
increasing aggressiveness. By 1914, Britain and Russia were on the
brink of war once again, to be saved only by the outbreak of the
First World War. This book is a ground-breaking and original study,
based on hitherto unseen archival sources in Moscow and St
Petersburg and original research in London.
From the late imperial period until 1922, the British and French
made private and government loans to Russia, making it the foremost
international debtor country in pre-World War I Europe. To finance
the modernization of industry, the construction of public works
projects, the building of railroads, and the development of the
military-industrial complex, Russia's ministers of finance,
municipal leaders, and nascent manufacturing class turned, time and
time again, to foreign capital. From the forging of the
Franco-Russian alliance onwards, Russia's needs were met, first and
foremost, by France and Great Britain, its allies, and diplomatic
partners in the developing Triple Entente. Russia's continued
access to those ready lenders ensured that the empire of the Tsars
would not be tempted away from its alliance and entente partners.
This web of financial and political interdependence affected both
foreign policy and domestic society in all three countries. The
Russian state was so heavily indebted to its western creditors,
rendering those western economies almost prisoners to this debt,
that the debtor nation in many ways had the upper hand; the Russian
government at times was actually able to dictate policy to its
French and British counterparts. Those nations' investing
classes-which, in France in particular, spanned not only the upper
classes but the middle, rentier class, as well-had such a vast
proportion of their savings wrapped up in Russian bonds that any
default would have been catastrophic for their own economies. That
default came not long after the Bolshevik Revolution brought to
power a government who felt no responsibility, whatsoever, for the
debts accrued by the tsars for the purpose of oppressing Russia's
workers and peasants. The ensuing effect on allied morale, the
Anglo-French relationship, and, ultimately, on international
relations in the twentieth century, was grim and far-reaching.
Jennifer Siegel narrates a classic tale of money and power in the
modern era-an age of economic interconnectivity and great power
interdependency-involving such figures as Lord Revelstoke, chairman
of Baring Brothers, the British and French Rothschild cousins, and
Sergei Witte, Russia's authoritative finance minister during much
of this age of expansion. For Peace and Money highlights the
importance of foreign capital in policymaking on the origins and
conduct of World War I.
By the early 1900s both Britain and Russia, suspicious of Imperial
Germany, decided to stabilize their relations and replace their
rivalry in Central Asia - the 'Great Game' - with rapprochement.
But as Jennifer Siegel here demonstrates, reality in the field told
a different story. The momentum of imperial rivalry, spiced by oil
and railway development, could not be arrested and various
interests on both sides continued to stoke the fire with increasing
aggressiveness. By 1914 Britain and Russia were on the brink of war
with each other to be saved only by the outbreak of World War I.
This book is a groundbreaking and original study based on hitherto
unseen archives in Moscow and St Petersburg, as well as original
research in London.
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