From the late imperial period until 1922, the British and French
made private and government loans to Russia, making it the foremost
international debtor country in pre-World War I Europe. To finance
the modernization of industry, the construction of public works
projects, railroad construction, and the development and adventures
of the military-industrial complex, Russia's ministers of finance,
municipal leaders, and nascent manufacturing class turned, time and
time again, to foreign capital. From the forging of the
Franco-Russian alliance onwards, Russia's needs were met, first and
foremost, its allies and diplomatic partners in the developing
Triple Entente. In the case of Russia's relationships with both
France and Great Britain, an open pocketbook primed the pump,
facilitating the good spirits that fostered agreement. Russia's
continued access to those ready lenders ensured that the empire of
the Tsars would not be tempted away from its alliance and entente
partners. This web of financial and political interdependence
affected both foreign policy and domestic society in all three
countries. The Russian state was so heavily indebted to its western
creditors, rendering those western economies almost prisoners to
this debt, that the debtor nation in many ways had the upper hand;
the Russian government at times was actually able to dictate policy
to its French and British counterparts. Those nations' investing
classes-which, in France in particular, spanned not only the upper
classes but the middle, rentier class, as well-had such a vast
proportion of their savings wrapped up in Russian bonds that any
default would have been catastrophic for their own economies. That
default came not long after the Bolshevik Revolution brought to
power a government who felt no responsibility whatsoever for the
debts accrued by the tsars for the purpose of oppressing Russia's
workers and peasants. The ensuing effect on allied morale, the
French and British economies and, ultimately, on the Anglo-French
relationship, was grim and far-reaching. This book will contribute
to understandings of the ways that non-governmental and sometimes
transnational actors were able to influence both British and French
foreign policy and Russian foreign and domestic policy. It will
address the role of individual financiers and policy makers-men
like Lord Revelstoke, chairman of Baring Brothers, the British and
French Rothschild cousins, Edouard Noetzlin of the Banque de Paris
et de Pays Bas, and Sergei Witte, Russia's authoritative finance
minister during much of this age of expansion; the importance of
foreign capital in late imperial Russian policy; and the particular
role of British capital and financial investment in the
construction and strengthening of the Anglo-Russo-French entente.
It will illustrate the interrelationship of political and economic
decision-making with the ideas and beliefs that inform security
policy. Drawing upon both the traditional archival sources for
diplomatic history-the government holdings of Great Britain,
France, and Russia-and the non-governmental archival holdings of
international finance-this project looks beyond the realm of high
politics and state-centered decision making in the formation of
foreign policy, offering insights into the forms and functions of
diplomatic alliances while elucidating the connections between
finance and foreign policy. It is a classic tale of money and power
in the modern era-an age of economic interconnectivity and great
power interdependency.
General
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