The present collection represents an attempt to bring together several contributions to the ongoing debate pertaining to supervenience of the normative in law and morals and strives to be the first work that addresses the topic comprehensively. It addresses the controversies surrounding the idea of normative supervenience and the philosophical conceptions they generated, deserve a recapitulation, as well as a new impulse for further development. Recently, there has been renewed interest in the concepts of normativity and supervenience. The research on normativity - a term introduced to the philosophical jargon by Edmund Husserl almost one hundred years ago - gained impetus in the 1990s through the works of such philosophers as Robert Audi, Christine Korsgaard, Robert Brandom, Paul Boghossian or Joseph Raz. The problem of the nature and sources of normativity has been investigated not only in morals and in relation to language, but also in other domains, e.g. in law or in the c ontext of the theories of rationality. Supervenience, understood as a special kind of relation between properties and weaker than entailment, has become analytic philosophers' favorite formal tool since 1980s. It features in the theories pertaining to mental properties, but also in aesthetics or the law. In recent years, the 'marriage' of normativity and supervenience has become an object of many philosophical theories as well as heated debates. It seems that the conceptual apparatus of the supervenience theory makes it possible to state precisely some claims pertaining to normativity, as well as illuminate the problems surrounding it.

The book attempts to describe and criticize four methods used in legal practice, legal dogmatics and legal theory: logic, analysis, argumentation and hermeneutics. Apart from a presentation of basic ideas connected with the above mentioned methods, the essays contained in this book seek to answer questions concerning the assumptions standing behind these methods, the limits of using them and their usefulness in the practice and theory of law. A specific feature of the book is that in one study four different, sometimes competing concepts of legal method are discussed. The panorama, sketched like this, allows one to reflect deeply on the questions concerning the methodological conditioning of legal science and the existence of a unique, specific legal method. The authors argue that there exists no such method. They claim that the methodologies presented in the book may serve as a basis for constructing a coherent and useful conception of legal thinking.

This edited volume explores ideas of legal realism which emerge through the works of Russian legal philosophers. Apart from the well-known American and Scandinavian versions of legal realism, there also exists a Russian one: readers will discover fresh perspectives and that the collection of early twentieth century ideas on law discussed in Russia can be understood as a unified school of legal thought - as Russian legal realism. These chapters by renowned European and Eastern European legal philosophers add to ongoing discussions about the nature of law, especially in the context of developments around our scientific knowledge about the mind and behaviour. Analyses of legal phenomena carried out by legal realists in Russia offer novel arguments in favour of embracing psychological and sociological perspectives on the law. The book includes analysis of the St. Petersburg school of legal philosophy and Leon Petrazycki's psychological theory of law. This original and multifaceted research on Russian realists is of considerable value to an international audience. Researchers and postgraduate students of law, legal theory and legal ethics will find the book particularly appealing, but it will also interest those investigating the philosophy or sociology of law, or legal history.

Methods of Legal Reasoning describes and criticizes four methods used in legal practice, legal dogmatics and legal theory: logic, analysis, argumentation and hermeneutics. The book takes the unusual approach of discussing in a single study four different, sometimes competing concepts of legal method. Sketched this way, the panorama allows the reader to reflect deeply on questions concerning the methodological conditioning of legal science and the existence of a unique, specific legal method.

This collection of essays assesses the origins of various rule-based systems, including, but not limited to, morality, rationality, and justice from the perspectives of both philosophy and psychology. The reader will learn about diverse cognitive and neurocognitive phenomena that are responsible for the emergence of normative orders, such as imitation, time preferences, and the dual-processing mind. Furthermore, the essays include different philosophical insights into the genealogy of norms.

The contributions in this book deal with the issue of normativity from various academic and scientific perspectives. The reader will learn how phenomena - such as norms, morality, and rule-following - are described and explained in philosophy, biology, psychology, linguistics, and neuroscience. In addition, a discussion of the naturalistic fallacy, from philosophical and ethical perspectives, is included.

This book examines the fundamental issues in neuroscience from methodological and philosophical perspectives. The reader will learn about the methodological difficulties connected with the use of neuroscientific experiments in philosophical argumentation and about the nature of scientific explanation in neuroscience. In addition, the book includes case studies of several issues lying at the intersection of neuroscience and philosophy, such as theory of mind, self-consciousness, self-deception, depression, and morality.

The present book is the fifth volume of the series Studies in the Philosophy of Law which has appeared since 2001. The previous three volumes had a monographic character, the last one being devoted to the various issues of bioethics, law, and philosophy and the previous one to the topic of the economic analysis of law. Both of these were published in English. This volume is part of a research project "Biojurisprudence" pursued from 2007 through 2010 by the Department of Philosophy of Law and Legal Ethics at the Jagiellonian University and sponsored by the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education. Within the project our team has published many articles, monographs and edited works such as the Studies in the "Philosophy of Law, vol. 4: Legal Philosophy and the Challenges of Biosciences" (edited by J. Stelmach, M. Soniewicka and W. Zaluski, Jagiellonian University Press, 2010). One monograph, entitled "Evolutionary Foundations of Law" was written by Dr. Wojciech Zaluski and was published in both Polish and English in 2009. We have also prepared a joint monograph entitled Paradoxes of Legal Bioethics and which is forthcoming this year.