Warfare is hugely important. At times the fates of nations, and even continents, rests on the outcome of war and thus on how its practitioners consider war. The Human Face of War is a new exploration of military thought. It starts with the observation that much military thought is poorly developed - often incoherent, riddled with paradox and at times almost mythological. The author contends that what is missing from British and American writing on warfare is any underpinning mental approach or philosophy. Why are some tank commanders, snipers, fighter pilots or submarine commanders far more effective than others? Why are many generals sacked at the outbreak of war? Why are armoured divisions twice as large today as they were during the Second World War? The Human Face of War examines these and similar phenomena, and seeks to explain them. The author argues that military thought should be based on an approach which reflects the nature of conflict and, in particular, combat. Combat - fighting - is primarily a human phenomenon. It is dominated by human behaviour in ways which practitioners intuitively accept, but have largely failed to enunciate. The book explores some of those human issues and their practical consequences. It uses a generally empirical but historically-based approach to consider aspects of operational analysis and the behavioural sciences. The Human Face of War calls for, and suggests, a new way of considering war and warfare.

What can we learn from the unfought battles of the Cold War? Could any supposed British superiority at the unit level, or superior American equipment and technology, have as much effect on a possible Warsaw Pact attack as the Bundeswehr's apparent mastery of formation tactics? The Cold War dominated the global events for over 40 years. Much of the world genuinely believed that a nuclear war might break out at any moment. Millions of men were involved. National budgets strained to equip and sustain them. Much of Europe had to endure conscription, tank convoys clogging up the roads, low-flying jet aircraft and large-scale mobilisation exercises. But what do we really know about the Cold War? More importantly, what can we learn from it? Battlegroup! investigates the unfought land battles of the Cold War on the Central Front. It focusses on the 1980s. It looks solely at high-intensity, conventional warfare; largely from NATO's perspective. It concentrates on the lower tactical levels: from company to brigade, or perhaps division. It considers the tactics, organisation and equipment and of the American, British, West German, French and Soviet armies. The book discusses what battles would have been fought; then how they would have been fought; and, lastly, what we can learn from that. The first section looks at the strategic and operational setting and the armies involved. The second section looks at the components of a land force; how those components were organized, and would fight; and assembles them into battlegroups, brigades and divisions. Battlegroup! then steps through the tactics of land warfare: delay, defence and withdrawal; advance, attack and counterattack; fighting in woods, built up areas and at night; and air support to land operations. The final section of the book illustrates some of the possible early engagements of any war on the Central Front. It then draws out the major observations and conclusions. Battlegroup! relies heavily on two previously untapped sources, virtually unknown to English-speaking audiences. They explain much of the Bundeswehr's highly individual approach to defeating a potential Warsaw Pact attack. This is not a counterfactual history. It does not attempt to say who would have won the Third World War. It explodes some myths. It will be uncomfortable reading for some, and contentious in places. 'Battlegroup!' will be essential reading for anyone interested in the warfare of the last decade of the Cold War: be it as a professional, an academic, or a wargamer.

King Arthur's Wars describes one of the biggest archaeological finds of our times; yet there is nothing new to see. There are secrets hidden in plain sight. We speak English today, because the Anglo-Saxons took over most of post-Roman Britain. How did that happen? There is little evidence: not much little archaeology, and even less written history. There is, however, a huge amount of speculation. King Arthur's Wars brings an entirely new approach to the subject. The answers are out there, in the countryside, waiting to be found. Months of field work and map study allow us to understand, for the first time, how the Anglo-Saxons conquered England; county by county and decade by decade. King Arthur's Wars exposes what the landscape and the place names tell us. As a result, we can now know far more about this 'Dark Age'. What is so special about Essex? Why is Buckinghamshire an odd shape? Why is the legend of King Arthur so special to us? Why don't Cumbrian farmers use English numbers, when they count sheep? Why don't we know where Camelot was? Why did the Romano-British stop eating oysters? King Arthur's Wars tells that story.

Warfare is hugely important. The fates of nations, and even continents, often rests on the outcome of war and thus on how its practitioners consider war. The Human Face of War is a new exploration of military thought. It starts with the observation that much military thought is poorly developed - often incoherent and riddled with paradox. The author contends that what is missing from British and American writing on warfare is any underpinning mental approach or philosophy. Why are some tank commanders, snipers, fighter pilots or submarine commanders far more effective than others? Why are many generals sacked at the outbreak of war? The Human Face of War examines such phenomena and seeks to explain them. The author argues that military thought should be based on an approach which reflects the nature of combat. Combat - fighting - is primarily a human phenomenon dominated by human behaviour. The book explores some of those human issues and their practical consequences. The Human Face of War calls for, and suggests, a new way of considering war and warfare.