The notion that neutrality is a phenomenon only relevant to the Cold War is false in many ways. The Cold War was about building blocks, neutrality about staying out of them. From 1975 until the end of the Cold War, neutral states offered mediation and good offices and fought against the stagnation of the detente policy especially in the framework of the CSCE. After the end of the Cold War, neutral states became active in peace-operations outside of military alliances. The concept of neutrality has proven time and again that it can adapt to new situations. In many ways, small neutral states have more room to maneuver than members of alliances or big powers. They have more acceptance and fewer geopolitical interests. Neutrality has been declared obsolete many times in its long and layered history., yet it has also made many comebacks in varying forms and contexts. Neutrality in the 21st century does not involve to staying out but engaging. In contrast to disengagement and staying out, engaged neutrality entails active participation in the international security policy in general and in international peace operations in particular. Engaged neutrality means involvement whenever possible and staying out only if necessary.

This book opens new perspectives into the Cold War ideological confrontations. Using Austria and Finland as an example, it shows how the Cold War battles for the hearts and minds of the people also influenced policies in countries that wished to stay outside the conflict. Following the model of older European neutrals, Austria and Finland sought to combine neutrality with democracy. The combination was eagerly challenged by ideological Cold Warriors on both sides of the divide and questioned at home too. Was neutrality risking the neutrals' commitment to democracy, or did the commitment to the western type of democracy threaten their commitment to neutrality? Confronting these doubts grew into an organic part of practicing neutrality in the Cold War world. The neutrals needed to be exceptionally clear regarding the ideological foundations of their neutrality. Successful neutrality required a great deal of conceptual consistence and domestic unanimity. None of this was pre-given in Austria or Finland. However, in the model of Switzerland and Sweden, (armed) neutrality was systematically integrated with the official state ideology and promoted as a part of national identity. Legacies of these policies outlived the end of the Cold War.