* John Connor describes and evaluates the results of his extensive survey of reports of cartel overcharges.
* Dennis Weisman models the price effects of mergers that not only increase concentration in the relevant market but also increase the merged firms' participation in other, complementary markets.
* Malcolm Coate and Mark Williams develop a superior method for calculating critical loss in markets that are relatively homogenous and competitive premerger.
* Zhiqi Chen surveys recent developments in economic theories of buyer power and creates a general framework for antitrust analysis.
* Thomas J. Miceli and Kathern Segerson, given the difficulty of collecting damages after a long latency period, examine the desirability of granting toxic exposure victims an independent cause of action for medical monitoring at the time of exposure. They shows that such a cause of action incarease incentives for injurer care but only at the cost of greater litigation cost. the reluctance of courts to adopt such a proposed cause of action reflects theri awareness of this trade-off.
*Each chapter examines in depth a topic in law and economics.
*Written by leading experts in the field.

This volume contains ten papers, by many prominent authors, examining antitrust issues of current interest. The first paper summarizes the other papers and presents original research on the meaning of consumer welfare and the sources of buyer power. The next five articles evaluate older antitrust cases to determine whether the decisions reached, the relief ordered, or both, enhanced consumer welfare. The seventh paper describes a new measure of efficiency that gives greater weight to consumer harm and applies it to a recent merger. The next paper explains a new way in which vertical foreclosure can enhance the market power of an upstream supplier. The ninth article refines an innovative technique for identifying substitutes among a set of differentiated products. The tenth paper confronts a contentious policy issue - the treatment of patent settlements in which the patent holder pays the challenger to exit the market - and concludes that they should be per se illegal.

Since 1979 Research in Law and Economics has been presenting original research that explores the extent to which the constraints of law explain economic behavior and the role of economics in forming the law. The first chapter in this volume proposes three different definitions for market power from an antitrust perspective. Chapter two suggests a new means of measuring market power by moving away from traditional indicators of averaging industry profits. The third chapter is an analysis of efforts exerted and utilities obtained in a double lawsuit. Chapter four surveys recent developments in economics of contract interpretation. The fifth chapter examines the impact of changes in foreign exchange legislation on the levels of R&D undertaken by pharmaceutical firms in India. Chapter six addresses the role of transaction costs in explaining governance in environmental economics can play in helping choose environmental policy tools. The final chapter is an examination of economic evidence relating to the allegations in litigation against cigarette manufacturers.

Since 1979 "Research in Law and Economics" has been presenting original research that explores the extent to which the constraints of law explain economic behavior and the role of economics in forming the law. Leading scholars, including Kenneth Arrow, Kenneth Elzinga, Victor Goldberg, Jack Hirschliefer, Paul Joskow, and Vernon Smith, have chosen "Research in Law and Economics" as the right forum for presenting their research. Now published bi-annually, each issue of "Research in Law and Economics" focuses on a timely and relevant topic. Such topics have included economics of environmental policy, urban property rights, antitrust and evolutionary models in economics and law. This volume focuses on cost-benefit analysis and the law, whereas the next special issue will concentrate on corporate finance