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The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology, the first to
appear on the topic, introduces the current state of religious
epistemology and provides a discussion of fundamental topics
related to the epistemology of religious belief. Its wide-ranging
chapters not only survey fundamental topics, but also develop
non-traditional epistemic theories and explore the religious
epistemology endorsed by non-Western traditions. In the first
section, Faith and Rationality, readers will find new essays on
Reformed epistemology, skepticism and religious belief, and on the
nature of evidence with respect to religious belief. The rich
second section, Religious Traditions, contains chapters on Hindu,
Buddhist, Islamic, Jewish, and Christian epistemologies. The final
section, New Directions, contains chapters ranging from applying
disjunctivism and knowledge-first approaches to religious belief,
to surveying responses to debunking arguments. Comprehensive and
accessible, this Handbook will advance the field for years to come.
The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology, the first to
appear on the topic, introduces the current state of religious
epistemology and provides a discussion of fundamental topics
related to the epistemology of religious belief. Its wide-ranging
chapters not only survey fundamental topics, but also develop
non-traditional epistemic theories and explore the religious
epistemology endorsed by non-Western traditions. In the first
section, Faith and Rationality, readers will find new essays on
Reformed epistemology, skepticism and religious belief, and on the
nature of evidence with respect to religious belief. The rich
second section, Religious Traditions, contains chapters on Hindu,
Buddhist, Islamic, Jewish, and Christian epistemologies. The final
section, New Directions, contains chapters ranging from applying
disjunctivism and knowledge-first approaches to religious belief,
to surveying responses to debunking arguments. Comprehensive and
accessible, this Handbook will advance the field for years to come.
Powers and Capacities in Philosophy is designed to stake out an
emerging, discipline-spanning neo-Aristotelian framework grounded
in realism about causal powers. The volume brings together for the
first time original essays by leading philosophers working on
powers in relation to metaphysics, philosophy of natural and social
science, philosophy of mind and action, epistemology, ethics and
social and political philosophy. In each area, the concern is to
show how a commitment to real causal powers affects discussion at
the level in question. In metaphysics, for example, realism about
powers is now recognized as providing an alternative to orthodox
accounts of causation, modality, properties and laws. Dispositional
realist philosophers of science, meanwhile, argue that a powers
ontology allows for a proper account of the nature of scientific
explanation. In the philosophy of mind there is the suggestion that
agency is best understood in terms of the distinctive powers of
human beings. Those who take virtue theoretic approaches in
epistemology and ethics have long been interested in the powers
that allow for knowledge and/or moral excellence. In social and
political philosophy, finally, powers theorists are interested in
the powers of sociological phenomena such as collectivities,
institutions, roles and/or social relations, but also in the
conditions of possibility for the cultivation of the powers of
individuals. The book will be of interest to philosophers working
in any of these areas, as well as to historians of philosophy,
political theorists and critical realists.
Virtue epistemology is one of the most flourishing research
programmes in contemporary epistemology. Its defining thesis is
that properties of agents and groups are the primary focus of
epistemic theorising. Within virtue epistemology two key strands
can be distinguished: virtue reliabilism, which focuses on agent
properties that are strongly truth-conducive, such as perceptual
and inferential abilities of agents; and virtue responsibilism,
which focuses on intellectual virtues in the sense of character
traits of agents, such as open-mindedness and intellectual courage.
This volume brings together ten new essays on virtue epistemology,
with contributions to both of its key strands, written by leading
authors in the field. It will advance the state of the art and
provide readers with a valuable overview of what virtue
epistemology has achieved.
How do we transmit or distribute knowledge, as distinct from
generating or producing it? In this book John Greco examines the
interpersonal relations and social structures which enable and
inhibit the sharing of knowledge within and across epistemic
communities. Drawing on resources from moral theory, the philosophy
of language, action theory and the cognitive sciences, he considers
the role of interpersonal trust in transmitting knowledge, and
argues that sharing knowledge involves a kind of shared agency
similar to giving a gift or passing a ball. He also explains why
transmitting knowledge is easy in some social contexts, such as
those involving friendship or caregiving, but impossible in
contexts characterized by suspicion and competition rather than by
trust and cooperation. His book explores phenomena that have been
undertheorized by traditional epistemology, and throws new light on
existing problems in social epistemology and the epistemology of
testimony.
Powers and Capacities in Philosophy is designed to stake out an
emerging, discipline-spanning neo-Aristotelian framework grounded
in realism about causal powers. The volume brings together for the
first time original essays by leading philosophers working on
powers in relation to metaphysics, philosophy of natural and social
science, philosophy of mind and action, epistemology, ethics and
social and political philosophy. In each area, the concern is to
show how a commitment to real causal powers affects discussion at
the level in question. In metaphysics, for example, realism about
powers is now recognized as providing an alternative to orthodox
accounts of causation, modality, properties and laws. Dispositional
realist philosophers of science, meanwhile, argue that a powers
ontology allows for a proper account of the nature of scientific
explanation. In the philosophy of mind there is the suggestion that
agency is best understood in terms of the distinctive powers of
human beings. Those who take virtue theoretic approaches in
epistemology and ethics have long been interested in the powers
that allow for knowledge and/or moral excellence. In social and
political philosophy, finally, powers theorists are interested in
the powers of sociological phenomena such as collectivities,
institutions, roles and/or social relations, but also in the
conditions of possibility for the cultivation of the powers of
individuals. The book will be of interest to philosophers working
in any of these areas, as well as to historians of philosophy,
political theorists and critical realists.
Virtue epistemology is one of the most flourishing research
programmes in contemporary epistemology. Its defining thesis is
that properties of agents and groups are the primary focus of
epistemic theorising. Within virtue epistemology two key strands
can be distinguished: virtue reliabilism, which focuses on agent
properties that are strongly truth-conducive, such as perceptual
and inferential abilities of agents; and virtue responsibilism,
which focuses on intellectual virtues in the sense of character
traits of agents, such as open-mindedness and intellectual courage.
This volume brings together ten new essays on virtue epistemology,
with contributions to both of its key strands, written by leading
authors in the field. It will advance the state of the art and
provide readers with a valuable overview of what virtue
epistemology has achieved.
When we affirm (or deny) that someone knows something, we are
making a value judgment of sorts - we are claiming that there is
something superior (or inferior) about that person's opinion, or
their evidence, or perhaps about them. A central task of the theory
of knowledge is to investigate the sort of evaluation at issue.
This is the first book to make 'epistemic normativity,' or the
normative dimension of knowledge and knowledge ascriptions, its
central focus. John Greco argues that knowledge is a kind of
achievement, as opposed to mere lucky success. This locates
knowledge within a broader, familiar normative domain. By
reflecting on our thinking and practices in this domain, it is
argued, we gain insight into what knowledge is and what kind of
value it has for us.
This book, first published in 2000, is about the nature of
skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry. John
Greco delineates three main theses: that a number of historically
prominent skeptical arguments make no obvious mistake, and
therefore cannot be easily dismissed; that the analysis of
skeptical arguments is philosophically useful and important, and
should therefore have a central place in the methodology of
philosophy; and that taking skeptical arguments seriously requires
us to adopt an externalist, reliabilist epistemology. Greco argues
that the importance of skeptical arguments is methodological. It is
further argued that taking skeptical arguments seriously requires
us to adopt a version of 'virtue epistemology', or a theory of
knowledge that makes intellectual virtue central in the analysis of
knowledge. The above methodology has consequences for moral and
religious epistemology; in particular, a theory of moral perception
is defended.
This book is about the nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry. John Greco delineates three main theses: that a number of historically prominent skeptical arguments make no obvious mistake, and therefore cannot be easily dismissed; that the analysis of skeptical arguments is philosophically useful and important, and should therefore have a central place in the methodology of philosophy; and that taking skeptical arguments seriously requires us to adopt an externalist, reliabilist epistemology. This book will be of interest to professionals and graduate students in epistemology and moral philosophy.
How do we transmit or distribute knowledge, as distinct from
generating or producing it? In this book John Greco examines the
interpersonal relations and social structures which enable and
inhibit the sharing of knowledge within and across epistemic
communities. Drawing on resources from moral theory, the philosophy
of language, action theory and the cognitive sciences, he considers
the role of interpersonal trust in transmitting knowledge, and
argues that sharing knowledge involves a kind of shared agency
similar to giving a gift or passing a ball. He also explains why
transmitting knowledge is easy in some social contexts, such as
those involving friendship or caregiving, but impossible in
contexts characterized by suspicion and competition rather than by
trust and cooperation. His book explores phenomena that have been
undertheorized by traditional epistemology, and throws new light on
existing problems in social epistemology and the epistemology of
testimony.
Discover God's heart for you at the center of redemption's story.
Brimming with poetry and praise, prayers and prophecy, the book of
Psalms is an invitation to walk with God and experience his
overwhelming love. As you journey through devotions for all 150
psalms, The Ascent - helps you get more out of your time in God's
Word, - highlights important cultural and historical background
information, - focuses on the big story the Bible tells from
Genesis to Revelation, - embraces the seemingly weird or tough
passages others avoid, and - uses a conversational manner to
inspire, inform, and encourage. Be drawn deeper into the story of
redemption, into your purpose as an image-bearer of God, and into
the embrace of the Father who loves you.
When we affirm (or deny) that someone knows something, we are
making a value judgment of sorts - we are claiming that there is
something superior (or inferior) about that person's opinion, or
their evidence, or perhaps about them. A central task of the theory
of knowledge is to investigate the sort of evaluation at issue.
This is the first book to make 'epistemic normativity,' or the
normative dimension of knowledge and knowledge ascriptions, its
central focus. John Greco argues that knowledge is a kind of
achievement, as opposed to mere lucky success. This locates
knowledge within a broader, familiar normative domain. By
reflecting on our thinking and practices in this domain, it is
argued, we gain insight into what knowledge is and what kind of
value it has for us.
In the history of philosophical thought, few themes loom as large
as skepticism. Skepticism has been the most visible and important
part of debates about knowledge. Skepticism at its most basic
questions our cognitive achievements, challenges our ability to
obtain reliable knowledge; casting doubt on our attempts to seek
and understand the truth about everything from ethics, to other
minds, religious belief, and even the underlying structure of
matter and reality. Since Descartes, the defense of knowledge
against skepticism has been one of the primary tasks not just of
epistemology but philosophy itself.
The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism features twenty-six newly
commissioned chapters by top figures in the field. Part One
contains articles explaining important kinds of skeptical
reasoning. Part Two focuses on responses to skeptical arguments.
Part Three concentrates on important contemporary issues revolving
around skepticism. As the first volume of its kind, the articles
make significant contributions to the debate on skepticism.
One of the most influential analytic philosophers of the late
twentieth century, William P. Alston is a leading light in
epistemology, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of
language. In this volume, twelve leading philosophers critically
discuss the central topics of his work in these areas, including
perception, epistemic circularity, justification, the problem of
religious diversity, and truth. Together with Alston's vigorous
responses, these articles make significant new contributions to the
literature and will be of interest to a wide range of philosophers
and students. In addition, the volume contains a comprehensive
introduction and overview of Alston's work and a complete
bibliography of his publications
There have been many books over the past decade, including
outstanding collections of essays, on the topic of the ethical
virtues and virtue-theoretic approaches in ethics. But the
professional journals of philosophy have only recently seen a
strong and growing interest in the intellectual virtues and in the
development of virtue-theoretic approaches in epistemology. There
have been four single-authored book length treatments of issues of
virtue epistemology over the last seven years, beginning with
Ernest Sosa's Knowledge in Perspective (Cambridge, 1991), and
extending to Linda Zabzebski's Virtue of the Mind (Cambridge,
1996). Weighing in with Jonathan Kvanvig's The Intellectual Virtues
and the Life of the Mind (1992), and James Montmarquet's Epistemic
Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility (1993), Rowman & Littlefield
has had a particularly strong interest in the direction and growth
of the field. To date, there has been no collection of articles
directly devoted to the growing debate over the possibility and
potential of a virtue epistemology. This volume exists in the
belief that there is now a timely opportunity to gather together
the best contributions of the influential authors working in this
growing area of epistemological research, and to create a
collection of essays as a useful course text and research source.
Several of the articles included in the volume are previously
unpublished. Several essays discuss the range and general approach
of virtue theory in comparison with other general accounts. What
advantages are supposed to accrue from a virtue-based account in
epistemology, in handling well-known problems such as "Gettier,"
and "Evil-Genie"-type problems? Can reliabilist virtue epistemology
handle skeptical challenges more satisfactorily than
non-virtue-centered forms of epistemic reliabilism? Others provide
a needed discussion of relevant analogies and disanalogies between
ethical and epistemic evaluation. The readings all contribute
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Gods (Paperback)
John Greco
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R422
Discovery Miles 4 220
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Ships in 10 - 15 working days
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