Making history useful to the reader - this is one of the missions of the Combat Studies Institute. We strive to produce works that recount historical events to inform decision makers and to enable experiential learning. This collection of events put together by John McGrath, which occurred in Iraq during the 2003-2005 timeframe, addresses that mission. The authors largely used primary source material - interviews and unit histories - to develop these vignettes and in doing so have made the works relatable not only to Soldiers who experienced similar situations but to any reader who can imagine themselves having to function in these types of situations. We honor those involved in these actions and hope that by recounting their stories others may not only recognize them for their service but may also learn and grow from their experience. This work is the continuation and revision of a project started in 2006 with the publication of "In Contact " by the Combat Studies Institute. The original concept was to present a series of military vignettes in a style similar to the widely used case-study methodology commonly found in military literature. The final version of "Between the Rivers," instead of following this strict case-study format, presents combat action vignettes as narrative accounts of the various types of actions challenging combat leaders in Iraq in 2003-2005. The present volume lies directly within the tradition of these predecessor works on small-unit actions. Since the fall of2001, the United States Army, along with the other American armed services, has been engaged in military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because the current conflict has so many different fronts and facets, no handful of small- unit case studies could do justice to such a complex tapestry of events. This book thus represents a volume that showcases the American soldier in combat operations within the context of the Global War on Terrorism/The Long War. This series of five case studies is drawn from events in Iraq. Four of the studies discuss combat operations within a counterinsurgency framework at the company and battalion levels. The final case study presents a deployment dilemma facing a brigade-level task force commander when he was asked to replace a whole division in the same geographical space. In each case, the story is derived from oral interviews and key documents and is fully annotated. The primary purpose for presenting these vignettes is to provide a vicarious education in what future participants will face as the War on Terrorism continues and beyond.

John McGrath's Crossing the Line of Departure is a wide-ranging historical overview of that most difficult aspect of military leadership, the art of battle command. McGrath leads the reader through case studies beginning with Alexander the Great leading up to the recent war in Iraq. Among others, he analyzes Napoleon's technique, French and British practices in World War I, the German experience with "Blitzkreig" in World War II, and the Soviet approach to battle command. McGrath also extends his historical analysis to the present day by presenting a description of battle command theory in the "Modular Army" and the Information Age. Through it all, he finds that the key to successful command in battle, particularly in mobile operations, is found in the successful interplay between technology and personal technique. Unlike some pundits today, McGrath does not conclude that information age technology is likely to shift the balance between these poles in favor of technology dependence. The commander's personal sense of where to be on the battlefield, where to locate and how to use his headquarters staffs, and how to communicate with his subordinates have been-and remain today-crucial elements of successful battle command. A 21st century commander has use of technology beyond the comprehension of an Alexander, a Napoleon, or a Guderian; but he will continue to grapple with the same issues of personal presence and technique that they mastered so well. Crossing the Line of Departure brings to the fore insights, trends, and leadership qualities needed for successful battle command. While possessing knowledge of these traits does not guarantee success on the battlefield, their absence will almost assuredly bring defeat.

The genesis of this work, "Fire for Effect: Field Artillery and Close Air Support in the US Army," was the controversial decision in 2001 to deploy Army combat units to Afghanistan without their supporting field artillery units. Fire for Effect provides a historical survey of the relationship between field artillery and close air support (CAS) in the US Army since World War I. A recurring theme in this survey is the desire of air operators for independence in operations. This first occurs at the organizational level in the development of strategic bombing theories and forces. The desire for independence emerges also in Air Force doctrine which stressed the importance of interdiction over CAS missions. Eventually, the Army aviation community also sought independence in the idea of the independent strike of attack helicopters, known as the deep attack. This last concept became at least partially discredited in the sands of Iraq in 2003. Independent air operations contrast with the Army's traditional combined arms concept where the arms and services work together to complement each other's strengths and cover weaknesses. The field artillery has long been a key member of the combined arms team. The Army ground commander has controlled all the elements of this team except the fixed-wing close air support. Despite the differences in theory and practice, since the 1960s the two services have developed cooperative and coordinated systems that have solved most difficulties. Over these last 40 years, much progress has also been made with the development of precision guided munitions, giving both services the ability to use point fire weapons in their delivery of CAS. As this study shows, the introduction of sophisticated precision weapons has separated CAS from artillery, creating distinct and complementary systems of fire support. Both, however, remain necessary to give the ground commander responsive and powerful fires in the broad variety of combat situations that characterize the modern battlefield.

This work is the continuation and revision of a project started in 2006 with the publication of In Contact by the Combat Studies Institute. The original concept was to present a series of military vignettes in a style similar to the widely used case-study methodology commonly found in military literature. The final version of Between the Rivers, instead of following this strict case-study format, presents combat action vignettes as narrative accounts of the various types of actions challenging combat leaders in Iraq in 2003-2005.

John McGrath's The Other End of the Spear is a timely historical analysis and an important follow-on work to his earlier analysis of troop density trends in CSI Occasional Paper 16, Boots on the Ground. As that work showed, this paper also shows the timeless value of history and its relevance to current events. Boots on the Ground analyzed the ratio between the numbers of troops employed in military operations relative to the population in a number of irregular conflicts. This study analyzes the composition of such forces to answer the question: what have been the historical trends in the ratio of deployed forces directly engaged in fighting, relative to those engaged in noncombat functions? This ratio is commonly, if inaccurately, called the "tooth-to-tail ratio." McGrath's study finds that the tooth-to-tail ratio, among types of deployed US forces, has steadily declined since World War II, just as the nature of warfare itself has changed. At the same time, the percentage of deployed forces devoted to logistics functions and to base and life support functions have both increased, especially with the advent of the large-scale of use of civilian contractors. A segment of American military historians and policy makers has long been enamored with a genre of military history that seeks to quantify war, to reduce it to known variables, and to posit solutions to future military conflicts based on mathematical formulae. The practice of war contains a strong element of science, but in the end, the practice of war is an art. This study cannot be used to guarantee victory simply by composing a force of the proportional figures presented in the conclusion. However, it does provide a good baseline, based on historical precedent, for future planning. This work, coupled with Boots on the Ground, provides a unique analysis of the size and composition of military forces as found in historical patterns. Policy makers, commanders, and staff officers should use these two studies as a basis from which to begin their analysis of the particular campaign at hand. They will then need to apply their understanding of the objectives, the nature of the conflict, and local and regional culture and conditions to the analysis to create a winning military plan. It is our belief at CSI that this kind of historical analysis will inform and educate today's military and civilian leaders as they carry out our nation's most important policies.

This Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper (GWOT OP), by Dr. Lawrence Yates, provides his thoughts and analysis of the US Army's participation in stability operations (SO) since 1789. Dr. Yates, a member of the CSI Team since 1981, has spent twenty plus years intensely studying this aspect of Army operations. Prior to his retirement in 2005, CSI asked him to put in writing his impressions formed by his research in this field. The result is this monograph. Dr. Yates makes several key arguments about the Army's involvement in SO. Among the key points he makes is his contention that the Army has an institutional habit of forgetting the lesson learned about SO, when, after conducting a stability operation, it returns to conventional warfare preparation. He also point out, correctly, that the Army, which has participated in far more SO-type activities sine 1789 than it has conventional wars, has hitherto retained a mindset that stability operations are an anomaly rather than the norm in American military operations. It is our hope that this GWOT OP will be of great value in providing the military professional with a broad overview of the history of the US Army's participation in stability operations, and at least one historian's view on how well it performed. Some may disagree with Dr. Yates' views on specific aspects of his analysis; that is well and good. If this GWOT OP stimulates a vigorous debate, Dr. Yates' study will have achieved its purpose.

The Combat Studies Institute provides a wide range of military, historical, and educational support to the Combined Arms Center, Training and Doctrine Command, and the United States Army. The Combat Studies Institute researches, writes, and publishes original interpretive works on issues of relevance to the US Army. The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) publication collection contains reports and books pertaining to American history, military guidelines, foreign affairs, and more. Titles featured in this collection include: Art of War Papers: Protecting, Isolating, and Controlling Behavior, Law of War: Can 20th Century Standards Apply to the Global War on Terrorism? and Traditions, Changes, and Challenges: Military Operations and the Middle Eastern City. This title is one of many in the Combat Studies Institute collection.

The Combat Studies Institute provides a wide range of military, historical, and educational support to the Combined Arms Center, Training and Doctrine Command, and the United States Army. The Combat Studies Institute researches, writes, and publishes original interpretive works on issues of relevance to the US Army. The Combat Studies Institute (CSI) publication collection contains reports and books pertaining to American history, military guidelines, foreign affairs, and more. Titles featured in this collection include: Art of War Papers: Protecting, Isolating, and Controlling Behavior, Law of War: Can 20th Century Standards Apply to the Global War on Terrorism? and Traditions, Changes, and Challenges: Military Operations and the Middle Eastern City. This title is one of many in the Combat Studies Institute collection.

These proceedings are the third volume to be published in a series generated by the annual military history symposium sponsored by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Each year, these conferences bring together both military and civilian historians, as well as formal and informal students of military history, literally from around the world, for the purposes of presenting ideas and points of view on current military issues from a historical perspective. This year's symposium, hosted by the Combat Studies Institute, was held 2-4 August 2005 at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The 2005 symposium's theme was An Army at War: Change in the Midst of Conflict. As this title indicates, presentations at this event focused on how an Army changes while concurrently fighting a war. Changing an Army in peacetime is difficult enough. Transformation can include changes to the personnel system, the turning in old and the fielding of new equipment, new training requirements, and at times, learning an entirely new way of viewing the enemy and the battle space in which operations will occur. Practical and cultural changes in an Army always cause tremendous turbulence and angst, both inside and outside of the Army. The United States Army and the nation are facing these challenges today, and they must make these changes not in a peacetime environment, but while fighting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The panelists presented a series of topics addressing the current transformation challenge that ranged from maneuver warfare, to asymmetrical operations, to insurgencies, to logistics, to unit manning, to doctrine and many others. This third collection of proceedings contains the papers and presentations of participating panelists. It also includes transcriptions of the question and answer periods following the panelists' presentations. These annual symposiums are proving to be a key annual event for those students and masters of military history who believe that the past has something useful to provide in the analysis of current military problems.

This work is the continuation and revision of a project started in 2006 with the publication of In Contact by the Combat Studies Institute. The original concept was to present a series of military vignettes in a style similar to the widely used case-study methodology commonly found in military literature. The final version of Between the Rivers, instead of following this strict case-study format, presents combat action vignettes as narrative accounts of the various types of actions challenging combat leaders in Iraq in 2003-2005.

This work studies the evolution, organizational structure, and employment of the maneuver brigade. In passing, it discusses other army brigades, such as those consisting of field artillery, aviation, and engineer units. This special study illuminates the history and evolution of the brigade as an organization in the US Army, from the earliest days to the current era. It follows both organizational structure and how it was actually employed on the battlefield. It provides an organizational history of the maneuver brigade and case studies of its employment throughout the various wars. Apart from the text, the appendices at the end of the work provide a ready reference to all brigade organizations used in the Army since 1917 and the history of the brigade colors.

This book looks at several troop categories based on primary function and analyzes the ratio between these categories to develop a general historical ratio. This ratio is called the Tooth-to-Tail Ratio. McGrath's study finds that this ratio, among types of deployed US forces, has steadily declined since World War II, just as the nature of warfare itself has changed. At the same time, the percentage of deployed forces devoted to logistics functions and to base and life support functions have increased, especially with the advent of the large-scale of use of civilian contractors. This work provides a unique analysis of the size and composition of military forces as found in historical patterns. Extensively illustrated with charts, diagrams, and tables. (Originally published by the Combat Studies Institute Press)

The Combat Studies Institute is pleased to present Scouts Out The Development of Reconnaissance Units in Modern Armies by CSI historian John J. McGrath. Scouts Out is a wide-ranging historical survey of the theory, doctrine, organization, and employment of reconnaissance units since the era of mechanization in the early 20th century. Reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance are battlefield missions as old as military history itself and missions for which many armies have created specialized units to perform. In most cases, these units were trained, equipped, and used differently from the majority of an army's fighting units. Horse cavalry performed these missions for centuries, for it had speed and mobility far in excess of main battle units. Once the horse was replaced by mechanization, however, the mobility advantage once enjoyed by the horse cavalry disappeared. Since the early 20th century, the search for the proper mix of equipment, the proper organization, and the proper employment of reconnaissance units has bedeviled armies around the world. This survey uses a diverse variety of historical cases to illustrate the enduring issues that surround the equipping, organizing, and employment of reconnaissance units. It seems that these specialized units are either too heavily or too lightly equipped and too narrowly specialized or too conventionally organized. Prewar reconnaissance doctrines tend to undergo significant change once fighting begins, leading to postconflict analysis that reconnaissance units were "misused" in one way or another. McGrath ends his study with an intriguing conclusion about the role that specialized reconnaissance units should have in the future that may surprise many readers. Scouts Out is a thought-provoking historical study that we believe will contribute to the Army's current and future transformation efforts.

Originally published by the United States Army Combat Studies Institute Press in 2009, this monograph is a wide-ranging historical survey of the theory, doctrine, organization, and employment of reconnaissance units since the era of mechanization in the early 20th century. This study examines the development, role, and employment of units in modern armies designed specifically to perform reconnaissance and security (counterreconnaissance) missions. The analysis discerns common threads from the past. Conclusions are drawn from historical trends that may apply to future force development planning and unit operational employment. In the past, dedicated reconnaissance units were unique in their organization and capabilities due to the presence of the horse. This provided cavalry with a marked mobility differential over infantry and artillery. In the mechanized age, this monopoly on mobility vanished. Nonreconnaissance mechanized and motorized forces were equipped with similar weapons and vehicles. Reconnaissance units then became distinctive primarily by their organizational structure and specialized mission rather than by their equipment. This conceptual transformation has created a great dichotomy for modern reconnaissance forces. Should such forces be light or heavy? A lighter force might be able to conduct reconnaissance operations, at least theoretically, in a more nimble fashion, while a heavier force could defend itself when conducting reconnaissance and security operations. An additional consideration is the question as to what organizational level should dedicated reconnaissance forces be provided and used. This work examines these two major threads from a historical perspective since World War I.

John McGrath's Crossing the Line of Departure is a wide-ranging historical overview of that most difficult aspect of military leadership, the art of battle command. McGrath leads the reader through case studies beginning with Alexander the Great leading up to the recent war in Iraq. Among others, he analyzes Napoleon's technique, French and British practices in World War I, the German experience with "Blitzkreig" in World War II, and the Soviet approach to battle command. McGrath also extends his historical analysis to the present day by presenting a description of battle command theory in the "Modular Army" and the Information Age. Through it all, he finds that the key to successful command in battle, particularly in mobile operations, is found in the successful interplay between technology and personal technique. Unlike some pundits today, McGrath does not conclude that information age technology is likely to shift the balance between these poles in favor of technology dependence. The commander's personal sense of where to be on the battlefield, where to locate and how to use his headquarters staffs, and how to communicate with his subordinates have been-and remain today-crucial elements of successful battle command. A 21st century commander has use of technology beyond the comprehension of an Alexander, a Napoleon, or a Guderian; but he will continue to grapple with the same issues of personal presence and technique that they mastered so well. Crossing the Line of Departure brings to the fore insights, trends, and leadership qualities needed for successful battle command. While possessing knowledge of these traits does not guarantee success on the battlefield, their absence will almost assuredly bring defeat. We at the Combat Studies Institute believe that McGrath's monograph, by casting light on the art and science of battle command through the ages, will be a useful tool for commanders and staffs as they prepare for future operations.

John McGrath's Crossing the Line of Departure is a wide-ranging historical overview of that most difficult aspect of military leadership, the art of battle command. McGrath leads the reader through case studies beginning with Alexander the Great leading up to the recent war in Iraq. Among others, he analyzes Napoleon's technique, French and British practices in World War I, the German experience with "Blitzkreig" in World War II, and the Soviet approach to battle command. McGrath also extends his historical analysis to the present day by presenting a description of battle command theory in the "Modular Army" and the Inforamation Age. Through it all, he finds that the key to successful command in battle, particularly in mobile operations, is found in the successful interplay between technology and personal technique. Unlike some pundits today, McGrath does not conclude that information age technology is likely to shift the balance between these poles in favor of technology dependence. The commander's personal sense of where to be on the battlefield, where to locate and how to use his headquarters staffs, and how to communicate with his subordinates have been-and remain today-crucial elements of successful battle command. A 21st century commander has use of technology beyond the comprehension of an Alexander, a Napoleon, or a Guderian; but he will continue to grapple with the same issues of personal presence and technique that they mastered so well.