The Army team at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy has been doing technology studies for the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology since 2003. In 2007 we published Enhancing Army S&T: Lessons Learned From Project Hindsight Revisited, which we refer to here as Vo l. I. That publication was a summary of critical technology contributions to the development of four successful Army warfighting systems. Since then, we have completed a number of studies of important aspects of the Army science and technology (S&T) program with an emphasis on the Army laboratories. In the present paper, Vol. II, we integrate the findings of these studies and make recommendations after each chapter, as well as in a separate final chapter. Chapter I of this volume is an introduction, and Chapter II offers an updated view of the work discussed in Vol. I with an emphasis on the relative roles played by the Army laboratories and the contractors that manufactured the systems. The close collaboration between the two groups was judged by us to be the key to the successful outcomes. Both the Army laboratories and the technical personnel at the contractors were essential-without either group the work would have cost more, taken more time, and might well have failed. We believe the collaboration was the result of the efforts of the mid-level managers who pressed technologists to work together. In Chapter III, we discuss the impact of the lack of publicity given to the Army laboratories' work. This lack of publicity has caused some observers to conclude that the laboratories are not significant contributors to the warfighters. This belief in turn has produced recommendations from outside the military to close the laboratories and assign the research to the private sector. We do not agree with the criticism or the recommendation. We discuss two aspects of addressing this problem: the need to maintain high-quality work and the need to provide detailed information about the contributions of the laboratories to all parties concerned-namely, Army senior leadership, officials in the Department of Defense (DOD), the Administration, the Congress, and the general public. Chapter IV explores the laboratory quality question. We begin by asserting that the most important asset of a laboratory is its technical staff members and that, therefore, ensuring staff quality should be a top priority of management. We discuss a number of methods for locating and bringing new employees onboard, including use of the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA), post-doctoral appointments, and visiting scientists and engineers. Chapter V discusses two reports we issued on the role of technology in stabilization and reconstruction. We surveyed the experiences of recently returned soldiers from Iraq. More recently we have conducted Gedanken Experiments at Fort Bennning to explore, with experienced soldiers, various challenges facing the laboratory programs. These experiments brought together a number of officers and senior non-commissioned officers in combination with Army scientists and engineers and observers from ASAALT and other Army organizations. The participants have been enthusiastic about the experience and are urging that more such experiments be carried out. In Chapter VI we recommend that the Army laboratories be managed as the important component of developing new capabilities for warfighters that they are. The Army should emphasize reporting relationships and the role of ASAALT in developing policy affecting the laboratories.

The assumption underlying the value of peer re view is that the quality of work is substantiated or improved through critiques by individuals who are independent, objective, and have specialized knowledge in the subject matter. One of the authors (Dr. Lyons) has had firsthand experience with such reviews. Some time ago, while in the private sector, he was asked to serve on a National Research Council (NRC) ad hoc committee of external, independent experts to review the fire research program at the National Bureau of Standards (N BS). The committee found the program s to be fragmented and deficient in basic research, and made a number of recommendations on how to improve them. (For more on how such a committee operates, see the discussion of the National Institute of Standards and Technology in chapter 3.) The result was the creation of a newly focused organization with a strengthened scientific knowledge base. These reforms helped NBS become a world leader in the field of fire research.

The Army science and technology (S&T) program is conducted both in-house and in external laboratories. The program consists of basic research, applied research, and advanced development, known by their respective budget codes of 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3. The 6.1 basic research program is conducted primarily through grants to academia, although some research is conducted in-house. There are also some 6.1 efforts, such as the Army's collaborative technology alliances (CTAs), that bring together subject matter expert from industry and academia with counterparts from the DOD laboratories. The 6.2 applied research program also consists of in-house and external efforts. Here, the external efforts involve m ore industry technologists than are seen in the 6.1 program . The 6.3 program, because of its developmental nature, is primarily executed by industry, but is overseen by in-house technologists.

In this paper we review some of the landscape of research and development on power and energy as it pertains to the needs of the Army warfighter. We focus on the battlefield and consider questions related to vehicles, dismounted soldiers, and forward operating bases. The literature in the overall field of energy research is immense; we make no attempt to review all these reports but rather have looked at a few selected studies that focus on the military challenges. The context of the study is twofold: the National need to reduce the use of petroleum-based fuels and the Army's need to reduce the logistical burden and hazards of moving said fuels on the battlefield. The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the danger inherent in transporting supplies over terrain that is difficult to render safe from terrorist raids and hidden explosives. The Army seeks to reduce this dependence by improving the fuel efficiency for uses that cannot now be entirely supplied by alternatives. These efforts will also provide the opportunity to save a great deal of money and reduce the number of personnel in the logistics chain. Needless to say, there will still be convoys carrying other supplies to forward bases. However, any reduction in the amount of supplies convoyed will be desirable.

This paper presents some thoughts about research in science and technology (S&T) gleaned from my more than 50 years working in scientific and engineering research -first in the chemical industry, then at two different government laboratories, and later some years in S&T policy. It elaborates on a paper by Richard Chait in which he interviews three former S&T executives in the Department of Defense (DOD) 1 on how to manage a research laboratory. In this paper, I expand on the comments made to Dr. Chait and provide a broad context for my discussion. In addition, this paper connects a number of subjects discussed in several other papers published by the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (C TNSP). My objective is to provide some insights on what it is like to work in a scientific research establishment. My hope is that this will be of some value f or the senior manager who has no laboratory experience but is responsible for overseeing a research department. I also hop e the paper will help new technical personnel just entering the laboratory for the firs t time. For experienced laboratory staff, the paper will contain many familiar ideas and perhaps some that are controversial. Some of the paper deals with the DOD technical programs.

The long, drawn- out and expensive acquisition process in the military is a serious problem at any time, but especially so in these times of tight and declining budgets. Many times the Department of Defense (DOD) has been criticized for the manner by which it procures new weapons systems. Recent articles in the Washington Post1,2 and Defense News 3 review the Army acquisition process, presenting an analysis of some $38 billion spent on system s that were terminated for high costs and lengthy development times. Two cases in point that f ailed: the Crusader artillery system which foundered, in part, on the failure of a new propellant system, high costs, and a too-long development cycle, and the Comanche stealth helicopter, again terminated because of cost overrun s and slippage of schedules. The available funding for the Comanche was redirected into buying and upgrading existing helicopter program s where the procurement risks were reduced. A question is how much of this problem is due to technical inefficiencies, and how much is due to other factors such as the requirements process, Defense acquisitions regulations, and the complexity of the lengthy budgeting process or changes in the governing political system . We seek to show how one factor, the expanded use of high performance computing, can contribute to improving the design and production of weapons systems. This would contribute to a more responsive, more economical acquisition process.

Set in the tumultuous days of 1970 as the University of Wisconsin anti-war movement imploded after a deadly campus bombing, Death on Cache Lake takes the reader on a dark odyssey through the lake wilds of Ontario, and the woods and small towns of Wisconsin. A fishing trip in Quetico Provincial Park turns violently tragic when friends Caleb Pratt and John Short cross paths with a former acquaintance who is running for his life, aided and abetted by a sociopathic mercenary. Death on Cache Lake is a must read for anyone who has ever paddled a canoe across a northern lake, hiked on an isolated mountain, or spent a night in a lonely cabin buffeted by a roaring blizzard. This spellbinding tale of political intrigue and conspiracy will also captivate history buffs who share the authors' fascination with American crimes that seem solvable but remain mysteries. Caleb and John's adrenaline-filled flight through Ontario to unravel the conspiracy and save their lives takes them on trains, hitch-hiked rides on trucks, cross country skis, and canoes, all at a breakneck pace climaxing in an unforgettable reckoning.