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Despite protests across Russia sparked by last December's
fraud-filled Duma (parliament) elections, Vladimir Putin is
preparing to return to the presidency this May. Will Putin replay
his 2004-2008 approach to Iran, during which Russia negotiated the
S-300 air defense system contract with Tehran? Or will he continue
Russia's breakthrough in finding common ground with the United
States on Iran seen under President Dmitriy Medvedev, who tore up
the S-300 contract? While coordinating more closely with Washington
on Iran during the Medvedev administration, Moscow did not and has
not closed the door to engagement with Tehran. In 2010, Russia
voted for new, enhanced sanctions against Iran at the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC). Nevertheless, Moscow and Tehran
have remained engaged diplomatically, and their relations have
stabilized and begun to recover from their winter 2010-2011 low
point. At the same time, Russia continues to insist that Iran
comply with its commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) and cooperate fully with International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) inspectors. However, Russia is wary of pushing so
hard on compliance lest Iran entirely abandon its treaty
obligations and walk out of the NPT. In February 2011, Moscow began
to oppose another round of UNSC sanctions, and in July 2011 put
forward a step-by-step initiative coordinated with other Permanent
Members of the Security Council and Germany (the so-called P5+1).
The Moscow approach offered Tehran a gradual reduction in sanctions
in return for improved cooperation with the IAEA in monitoring
Iran's nuclear enrichment program. Putin's resentment of U.S. power
and suspicion of American motives will make for frostier
atmospherics between Moscow and Washington. Nonetheless, mistrust
of Iran will continue to outweigh Putin's misgivings about the
United States. Everything else being equal, the United States will
always be more important to Russia than Iran. Most Russian experts
now believe that Iran is advancing toward a military nuclear
weapons program-though it has not made a final decision to go all
the way-and a ballistic missile program to accompany it. Russia
sees these programs as a threat to its interests. Moscow's decision
to toughen its approach to Iran on the nuclear issue is likely to
remain the basis of Russian policy in the period ahead, so long as
the U.S.-Russia reset does not totally collapse, especially if Iran
does not move toward greater cooperation with the IAEA. Russia's
looming domestic and external challenges will strengthen the
inclination to continue some variant of reset, even if through
Putin's clenched teeth. Russian experts warn that a serious fraying
in U.S.-Russia relations might cause Moscow to tilt back toward
Tehran. The record on the S-300 contract, however, suggests that
any rollback in Russian support for sanctions will depend mostly on
whether Iran decides to cooperate more fully with the IAEA in
clarifying Iran's nuclear enrichment program and moving toward
verifiable restraints on its enrichment activities. On regional
issues, however, Russia and Iran will continue at least to appear
to pursue neighborly engagement with each other. The Arab Spring
has pushed forward overlapping but not identical challenges and
opportunities to the positions of both countries in the Middle
East, including how to deal with Syria. The impending American
withdrawal from Afghanistan has raised the prospect that Russia and
Iran may once again have to partner closely in resisting Taliban
threats to their regional equities, as they did before 9/11.
Engagement has historically been Moscow's default setting for
dealing with Tehran. Russia's current step-by-step initiative
appears designed to continue engagement, while underscoring
Russia's potential role as a mediator between Iran and the
international community. the future of Russian-Iranian relations.
Independent Russia is approaching the start of its third decade of
post-Soviet existence. After the economic chaos of the Boris
Yeltsin decade and the recovery and stabilization of the Vladimir
Putin decade, Russia's leaders have high ambitions for a return to
great power status in the years ahead. Their aspirations are
tempered, however, by the realities of Russia's social, economic,
and military shortcomings and vulnerabilities, laid painfully bare
by the stress test of the recent global financial crisis. Looking
ahead, some also calculate that Russia will be increasingly
challenged in the Far East by a rising China and in the Middle East
by an Iran that aspires to regional hegemony. With energy riches
abundant enough to compensate for a multitude of governance and
managerial shortcomings, the Russian economy will likely continue
to grow in absolute terms in the years ahead. Indeed, if Russia
wants to remain a mediocre power, it can do so without effort by
not changing its current behavior patterns. But with growing
corruption, business stifling political controls, and dependency on
raw materials exports retarding the full potential of Russia's
growth, the country is facing the prospect of decades of decline
relative to other more dynamic regional and world powers. Russia
will retain its nuclear weapons and permanent veto-empowered seat
in the United Nations Security Council. But Russia will likely slip
on many of the measures commonly used to assess great power status:
size and vitality of its population, growth and vibrancy of its
economy, and the ability of its armed forces to project
conventional military power beyond its own borders. Russia will
continue to be the preponderant influence across a large swath of
former Soviet territory, but not beyond it. As a result, Moscow is
already seeking to strengthen Russia's ties with Europe and the
United States. The West is seen as crucial to Russia's
modernization as well as a hedge against what may develop to
Russia's east and south in coming decades. This process of Russia's
anchoring itself more firmly in the West will proceed with lots of
tactical hiccups and sporadic crises. Nevertheless, it will bring
consequences and opportunities for U.S. diplomacy and strategic
development, some of which the Barack Obama administration's policy
of "reset" is already reaping. But Russian policy toward the United
States is conditional on a U.S. approach that engages Russia in
positive ways. If that policy were to change, it could push Russia
and China closer together on some issues in an effort to constrain
the United States.
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