The end of the Cold War presented a paradoxical dilemma for the Intelligence Community (IC). The demise of the Soviet Union brought about a significant downsizing of the nation's intelligence apparatus while concurrently necessitating a major reallocation of intelligence resources to cover a more complex array of trans-national threats such as counter-proliferation, terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, and ethnopolitical conflict. The combination of shrinking budgets and expanding analytical requirements placed enormous demands on the Community. Among the most pressing challenges was the need for an on-demand, surged intelligence capability for coverage over a diverse range of operational requirements. A key recommendation of a 1996 House Permanent Select Committee investigation of the nation's intelligence capabilities called for the creation of a dynamic surge capacity for crisis response. The Committee concluded that such resources "need not be self-contained within the IC," but must be quickly marshaled "without undue concerns about who owns the assets." Several other independent reform studies at the time proposed initiatives to satisfy surged collection demands by leveraging nongovernmental resources. Despite these recommendations, during the 1990s there was little effort to create such a surge capacity. Bureaucratic inertia and lack of clear consensus on an intelligence reform agenda made major initiatives impossible. With the enormous intelligence demands of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) the issue of surge capacity has reemerged as a critical issue for community leaders. Collection management, remote sensing, linguistic support, document exploitation, interrogation, and technical analysis are just some intelligence support functions currently being performed by private contractors. This ad hoc response to meet the intelligence requirements of GWOT operations has produced mixed results. One report strongly recommended the permanent integration of commercial imagery products into the conventional collection management cycle for operational commanders. Conversely, a key fi nding of the Army Inspector General's report on OIF detainee operations in Iraq clearly identifi ed poor training and misuse of contract interrogators as a contributing factor in detainee abuse. These examples speak to both the promise and the liability of utilizing commercial augmentation for intelligence surge capacity. Given the current mismatch between operational requirements and intelligence force structure, there will be continuing reliance on commercial augmentation. As critical intelligence requirements are increasingly resourced through commercial augmentation, IC leaders must determine the appropriate roles for private sector firms and provide effective plans for legal oversight, operational integration, and management of contracted support. To date, few studies have adequately considered the policy implications of integrating non-governmental providers into the operational intelligence cycle. GWOT operations have required significant reliance on private sector resources for intelligence collection and analysis but have done so without sufficient measures for effective acquisition, management and accountability over commercial providers. This study assesses the value of current commercial activities used within DoD elements of the Intelligence Community, particularly dealing with operational functions such as analysis, collection management, document exploitation, interrogation, production, and linguistic support. These functions were selected due to the extensive use of commercial augmentation in these areas during recent GWOT operations.

This volume helps identify how to produce good or better intelligence - intelligence that is of use to policymakers. The authors have - across a range of areas of interest -identified some of the practices that work best "to bring about" good intelligence. The focus is on analysis rather than operations and includes pieces from currently serving professionals in the armed forces, CIA, and NSA. Editor Dr. Russell G. Swenson directed the Center for Strategic Intelligence Research at the Joint Military Intelligence College when this book was published by the Joint Military Intelligence College.

This collection of papers highlights the convergence of academic and applied factions in the pursuit of intelligence professionalism.

This study addresses the future of the Intelligence Community in light of 21st century issues/challenges/threats. In addressing this issue, the author reviews many of the chief intelligence reform proposals or legislative activities during the early years of the U.S. intelligence service and throughout the Cold-War era, to include the turbulent mid-1970s, on into the 1990s, and concludes with a review of the recommendations from the Joint Inquiry Report and the 9/11 Commission Report leading to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. At issue is whether these ongoing schemes for reform, including the new legislation, are sufficient for the effective operation of the Community in a globalized environment.

This work is a start toward encouraging debate as to how to best focus IC energies and resources to engage in what is currently being called the Global War on Terror.

This collection of papers highlights the convergence of academic and applied factions in the pursuit of intelligence professionalism.

Dr. Bodnar builds on the earlier work and isight of Cynthia Grabo, whose book Anticipating Surprise; Analysis for Strategic Warning was recently published by the Joint Military Intelligence College's Center for Strategic Intelligence Research. The author also usefully integrates into this book the often-cited but rarely-seen original work of the USAF's strategic and operational philosopher Col. John Boyd. This book reaches farther than any other toward the objective of bringing together substantive expertise with an accessible, methodologically sound analytical strategy in the ervice of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

An evaluation of U.S./U.K. Naval Intelligence Cooperation, 1935-1941

Learning With Professionals: Selected Works from the Joint Military Intelligence College is a collection of writings by present or former faculty and students at the Joint Military Intelligence College. The purpose of the book is to provide an academic resource for students, teachers, and practitioners of intelligence. The growth of the field as an academic discipline has been accompanied by a growth in its body of literature, and some of the most significant writings have come from a center of excellence in the field, the Joint Military Intelligence College. Those presented here represent a cross section of sub-disciplines, some with a very timely element, some timeless. This product has been reviewed by senior experts from academia and government, and has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review, Washington Headquarters Services, Department of Defense.

The purpose of this book is to inform the larger community of federal government agencies, including law enforcement, national security, and other interested entities, as well as the citizens of this country and beyond, about the intelligence analytical capabilities existing in local and state levels of law enforcement.

The case study presented here illustrated the combination of personality and process that resulted in the establishment of NIMA in 1996. It has been written specifically for those who are studying Congress and the U.S. Intelligence Community. It highlights the role of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees and how those committees interact with other committees. It augments the few good sources that exist on this very narrow subject.

Assigned to the National Indications Center, Cynthia Grabo served as a senior researcher and writer for the U.S. Watch Committee throughout its existence (1950 to 1975), and in its successor, the Strategic Warning Staff. During this time she saw the need to capture the institutional memory associated with strategic warning. With three decades of experience in the Intelligence Community, she saw intelligence and warning failures in Korea, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Cuba. In the summer of 1972, the DIA published her "Handbook of Warning Intelligence" as a classified document, followed by two additional classified volumes, one in the fall of 1972 and the last in 1974. These declassified books have now been condensed from the original three volumes into this one. Ms. Grabo's authoritative interpretation of an appropriate analytic strategy for intelligence-based warning is here presented in a commercial reprint of this classic study. (Originally published by the Joint Military Intelligence College)

This book examines ways in which intelligence develops its characteristic standards of accuracy and duty. It considers the effects of formal legal codes and democratic oversight, but a principal conclusion emerging from it is the importance of professional training. Its implicit sub-text is indeed that standards of intelligence analysis and integrity should be properly taught, and not just caught by osmosis from one's seniors. It also examines intelligence professionalism in a laboratory almost completely unknown to Anglo-Saxon readers, certainly to this one. Intelligence institutions have evolved in the last decade in the new, democratic Latin America at roughly the same pace as the successor systems that developed at the same time in the former Warsaw Pact countries of Eastern and Central Europe; and the two sets of development are of comparable international significance. Yet hardly anyone in Europe knows anything about Latin American intelligence, and the same ignorance exists in considerable measure in the United States. The gap is filled here by accounts of intelligence structures and recent developments in seven of the Latin American countries, along with 5 three conceptual articles that relate these country-by-country accounts to the semi-hemisphere as a whole..

Teaching Intelligence at Colleges and Universities- Conference Proceedings: 18 June 1999

Learning With Professionals: Selected Works from the Joint Military Intelligence College is a collection of writings by present or former faculty and students at the Joint Military Intelligence College. The purpose of the book is to provide an academic resource for students, teachers, and practitioners of intelligence. The growth of the field as an academic discipline has been accompanied by a growth in its body of literature, and some of the most significant writings have come from a center of excellence in the field, the Joint Military Intelligence College. Those presented here represent a cross section of subdisciplines, some with a very timely element, some timeless.This product has been reviewed by senior experts from academia and government, and has been approved for unrestricted distribution by the Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review, Washington Headquarters Services, Department of Defense.

The title chosen for this book carries two meanings. The more straightforward interpretation of "Bringing Intelligence About, '' and the principal one, refers to the book's coverage of wide-ranging sources and methods employed to add value to national security-related information-to create "intelligence.'' A second meaning, not unrelated to the first, refers to the responsible agility expected of U.S. intelligence professionals, to think and act in such a way as to navigate information collection and interpretation duties with a fix on society's shifting but consensual interpretation of the U.S. Constitution