The 2010 Deepwater Horizon incident produced the largest oil spill that has occurred in U.S. waters, releasing more than 200 million gallons into the Gulf of Mexico. BP has estimated the combined oil spill costs--cleanup activities, natural resource and economic damages, potential Clean Water Act (CWA) penalties, and other obligations--will be approximately $41 billion. The Deepwater Horizon oil spill raised many issues for policymakers, including the ability of the existing oil spill liability and compensation framework to respond to a catastrophic spill. This framework determines (1) who is responsible for paying for oil spill cleanup costs and the economic and natural resource damages from an oil spill; (2) how these costs and damages are defined (i.e., what is covered?); and (3) the degree to which, and conditions in which, the costs and damages are limited and/or shared by other parties, including general taxpayers. The existing framework includes a combination of elements that distribute the costs of an oil spill between the responsible party (or parties) and the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF), which is largely financed through a per-barrel tax on domestic and imported oil. Responsible parties are liable up to their liability caps (if applicable); the trust fund ...

Air emissions from outer continental shelf (OCS) operations are subject to different regulatory programs, depending on the location of the operation. The Department of the Interior (DOI) has jurisdiction over OCS sources in federal waters in the western Gulf of Mexico and most of the central Gulf. In addition, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74), transferred air emission authority in the OCS off Alaska's north coast from the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to DOI. EPA has jurisdiction over sources in all other federal waters. The primary difference between the EPA and DOI programs is rooted in the different statutory authorities: the 1990 Clean Air Act (CAA) and the 1978 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). The primary objectives of these statutes are different-air quality versus offshore energy development. The two regulatory programs reflect these underlying differences. For much of the past 30 years, these differences received little attention, primarily because most of the federal oil and gas resources in EPA's jurisdiction have been subject to moratoria. In 2008, moratoria provisions expired, potentially opening many of the areas in EPA's jurisdiction to oil and gas leasing activity. If more OCS areas in EPA's jurisdiction are open for oil and gas leasing, policymakers interest in these differences will likely increase. For OCS sources in EPA's jurisdiction, requirements depend on whether the source is located within 25 miles of a state's seaward boundary ("inner OCS sources") or beyond ("outer OCS sources"). Inner OCS sources are subject to the same requirements as comparable onshore emission sources, which vary by state and depend on the area's air quality status; outer sources are subject to various CAA provisions, including the Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program. In contrast, OCS sources in DOI's jurisdiction are subject to air emission requirements only if emissions would "significantly affect" onshore air quality. A key difference between the EPA and DOI programs is the federal emission threshold that would subject a source to substantive requirements. For sources in EPA's jurisdiction, this is the PSD threshold of 250 tons per year (tpy) of regulated emissions. Sources that exceed this level would likely be subject to Best Achievable Control Technology (BACT) and other provisions. States' analogous thresholds that apply to inner OCS sources may be more stringent. By comparison, a DOI OCS source applies an exemption formula, based on distance from shore (e.g., a source 30 miles from shore would have an emission threshold of 990 tpy). If a source remains subject after this step, it must conduct air modeling to assess whether its emissions would have a significant effect on onshore air quality. In effect, this two-step process constitutes a much less stringent threshold than EPA's 250 tpy threshold. Another substantial difference is the time frame allotted to the agencies for reviewing a potential source's permit (EPA) or activity-specific plan (DOI). In addition, the EPA permit process allows greater opportunity for input from the public. In particular, EPA's Environmental Appeals Board offers parties a powerful tool to compel agency review. Therefore, two identical operations, located in separate jurisdictions, could face considerably different requirements and procedural time frames. Some stakeholders would likely argue that the additional opportunities for public involvement in EPA's permit process help create a balance between resource development and environmental concerns. Others would likely contend these steps present unnecessary burdens and timing uncertainty in the process.

The impacts of an oil spill depend on the size of the spill, the rate of the spill, the type of oil spilled, and the location of the spill. Depending on timing and location, even a relatively minor spill can cause significant harm to individual organisms and entire populations. Oil spills can cause impacts over a range of time scales, from days to years, or even decades for certain spills.

Market-based mechanisms that limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions can be divided into two types: quantity control (e.g., cap-and-trade) and price control (e.g., carbon tax or fee). To some extent, a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade program would produce similar effects: Both are estimated to increase the price of fossil fuels, which would ultimately be borne by consumers, particularly households. Although there are multiple tools available to policymakers that could control GHG emissionsa "including existing statutory authoritiesa "this report focuses on a carbon tax approach and how it compares to its more frequently discussed counterpart: cap-and-trade. If policymakers had perfect information regarding the market, either a price (carbon tax) or quantity control (cap-and-trade system) instrument could be designed to achieve the same outcome. Because this market ideal does not exist, preference for a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade program ultimately depends on which variable one wants to controla "emissions or costs. Although there are several design mechanisms that could blur the distinction, the gap between price control and quantity control can never be completely overcome. A carbon tax has several potential advantages. With a fixed price ceiling on emissions (or their inputsa "e.g., fossil fuels), a tax approach would not cause additional volatility in energy ...

Superfund is the federal government's principal program for cleaning up the nation's contaminated waste sites and protecting public health and the environment from releases of hazardous substances. Enacted into law as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, P.L. 96-510), the program became known as Superfund because Congress established a large trust fund - originally supported by taxes levied on specific petroleum products and chemicals - to provide the majority of the program's funding needs. Although the 26-year-old program has seen less attention compared with earlier years, Superfund issues continue to generate debate. This report provides a background and overview of the Superfund program and examines four topics that received interest in recent years.

Market-based mechanisms that limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions can be divided into two types: quantity control (e.g., cap-and-trade) and price control (e.g., carbon tax or fee). To some extent, a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade program would produce similar effects: Both are estimated to increase the price of fossil fuels, which would ultimately be borne by consumers, particularly households. Although there are multiple tools available to policymakers that could control GHG emissions-including existing statutory authorities-this report focuses on a carbon tax approach and how it compares to its more frequently discussed counterpart: cap-and-trade.

In the absence of a federal climate change program, a number of states have taken actions that directly address greenhouse gases (GHGs). States' efforts cover a wide range of policies. Although much of the early activity was largely symbolic, the more recent state actions have been more pragmatic. The states' motivations may be as diverse as the actions themselves. Some states are motivated by projections of climatic changes, while others expect their policies to provide economic opportunities or other co-benefits, such as improvements in air quality, traffic congestion, and energy security. Another driver behind state action is the possibility of catalyzing federal legislation.

The federal budget deficit has exceeded $1 trillion annually in each fiscal year since 2009, and deficits are projected to continue. Over time, unsustainable deficits can lead to reduced savings for investment, higher interest rates, and higher levels of inflation. Restoring fiscal balance would require spending reductions, revenue increases, or some combination of the two. Policymakers have considered a number of options for raising additional federal revenues, including a carbon tax. A carbon tax could apply directly to carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, or to the inputs (e.g., fossil fuels) that lead to the emissions. Unlike a tax on the energy content of each fuel (e.g., Btu tax), a carbon tax would vary with a fuel's carbon content, as there is a direct correlation between a fuel's carbon content and its CO2 emissions. Carbon taxes have been proposed for many years by economists and some Members of Congress, including in the 112th Congress. If Congress were to establish a carbon tax, policymakers would face several implementation decisions, including the point and rate of taxation. Although the point of taxation does not necessarily reveal who bears the cost of the tax, this decision involves trade-offs, such as comprehensiveness versus administrative complexity. Several economic approaches could inform the debate over the tax rate. Congress could set a tax rate designed to accrue a specific amount of revenues. Some would recommend setting the tax rate based on estimated benefits associated with avoiding climate change impacts. Alternatively, Congress could set a tax rate based on the carbon prices estimated to meet a specific GHG emissions target. Carbon tax revenues would vary greatly depending on the design features of the tax, as well as market factors that are difficult to predict. One study estimated that a tax rate of $20 per metric ton of CO2 would generate approximately $88 billion in 2012, rising to $144 billion by 2020. The impact such an amount would have on budget deficits depends on which budget deficit projection is used. For example, this estimated revenue source would reduce the 10-year budget deficit by 50%, using the 2012 baseline projection of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). However, under CBO's alternative fiscal scenario, the same carbon tax would reduce the 10-year budget deficit by about 12%. When deciding how to allocate revenues, policymakers would encounter key trade-offs: minimizing the costs of the carbon tax to "society" overall versus alleviating the costs borne by subgroups in the U.S. population or specific domestic industries. Economic studies indicate that using carbon tax revenues to offset reductions in existing taxes-labor, income, and investment-could yield the greatest benefit to the economy overall. However, the approaches that yield the largest overall benefit often impose disproportionate costs on lower-income households. In addition, carbon-intensive, trade-exposed industries may face a disproportionate impact within a unilateral carbon tax system. Policymakers could alleviate this burden through carbon tax revenue distribution or through a border adjustment mechanism. Both approaches may entail trade concerns.

Instituting policies to manage or reduce GHGs would likely impact different states differently. Understanding these differences may provide for a more informed debate regarding potential policy approaches. However, multiple factors play a role in determining impacts, including alternative design elements of a GHG emissions reduction program, the availability and relative cost of mitigation options, and the regulated entities' abilities to pass compliance costs on to consumers. Three primary variables drive a state's human-related greenhouse gas (GHG) emission levels: population, per capita income, and the GHG emissions intensity. GHG emissions intensity is a performance measure. In this book, GHG intensity is a measure of GHG emissions from sources within a state compared with a state's economic output (gross state product, GSP). The GHG emissions intensity driver stands apart as the main target for climate change mitigation policy, because public policy generally considers population and income growth to be socially positive. The intensity of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions largely determines overall GHG intensity, because CO2 emissions account for 85% of the GHG emissions in the United States. As 98% of U.S. CO2 emissions are energy-related, the primary factors that shape CO2 emissions intensity are a state's energy intensity and the carbon content of its energy use. Energy intensity measures the amount of energy a state uses to generate its overall economic output (measured by its GSP). Several underlying factors may impact a state's energy intensity: a state's economic structure, personal transportation use in a state (measured in vehicle miles travelled per person), and public policies regarding energy efficiency. The carbon content of energy use in a state is determined by a state's portfolio of energy sources. States that utilise a high percentage of coal, for example, will have a relatively high carbon content of energy use, compared to states with a lower dependence on coal. An additional factor is whether a state is a net exporter or importer of electricity, because CO2 emissions are attributed to electricity-producing states, but the electricity is used (and counted) in the consuming state. Between 1990 and 2000, the United States reduced its GHG intensity by 1.6% annually. Assuming that population and per capita income continue to grow as expected, the United States would need to reduce its GHG intensity at the rate of 3% per year in order to halt the annual growth in GHG emissions. Therefore, achieving reductions (or negative growth) in GHG emissions would necessitate further declines in GHG intensity.