Future demographic developments in Europe will be caused by the specific economic, social and cultural context, and will, in turn, have a major influence on future economic and social conditions. To the extent that demographic trends differ across countries, separate countries may face different social and economic problems. As demographic trends tend to have long-lasting effects, it is important to assess the possible consequences of future demographic developments at an early stage. Within the European context, the question can be raised whether the socioeconomic and cultural dimensions of society are dominated by convergent or divergent forces, and what the consequences are of these assumed convergent or divergent tendencies for long-term future demographic developments in the countries of Europe. Since there is no unambiguous answer to this question, this book describes two alternative scenarios for Europe's future population. In the Uniformity scenario, convergent forces are dominant. This will eventually lead to a situation where only marginal economic and cultural differences exist across Europe. Trends in fertility and mortality will converge up to the year 2050, although over time patterns may differ across countries as a result of their different initial states. In contrast to the Uniformity scenario, a Diversity scenario is constructed where cultural, economic and demographic characteristics remain significantly different across countries. This book is the result of close collaboration between researchers from the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) and Statistics Netherlands (SN). Although the project was a joint effort by all researchers involved, the book has assumed the form of an edited volume, with separate chapters by small groups of authors. The authors are, of course, responsible for writing their own contributions, but they were often involved to a certain extent in the realisation of some of the other chapters as well.

The aim of Diversity in Family Formation is to examine changes in the start of the family formation process. Rather than giving a rough overview of demographic changes in many countries, a comparison of differences in changes in family formation and fertility behaviour between Belgium and The Netherlands is interesting for various reasons. First, even though the economic and cultural differences between these countries are relatively small there is one important difference: Belgium is predominantly Catholic, whereas The Netherlands has about equal proportions of Catholics and Protestants. Second, if the Second Demographic Transition implies that there is one common pattern of change in different European countries and that differences across countries are due to the fact that countries are in a different stage of the transition process, and if it is assumed that the transition process started earlier in Protestant countries than in Catholic countries, one would expect The Netherlands to be in a further stage of the transition process than Belgium. Thus an in-depth comparison of changes in family formation and fertility behaviour between both countries may give us more insight in the question of whether there is one common transition process. The comparison of fertility and family survey-data in both countries brings us to the core question of whether there is one common explanation for differences between countries in various types of fertility and family behaviour under consideration, namely fertility regulation, the choice of living arrangement after leaving the parental home, and the labour force participation of mothers.

Future demographic developments in Europe will be caused by the specific economic, social and cultural context, and will, in turn, have a major influence on future economic and social conditions. To the extent that demographic trends differ across countries, separate countries may face different social and economic problems. As demographic trends tend to have long-lasting effects, it is important to assess the possible consequences of future demographic developments at an early stage. Within the European context, the question can be raised whether the socioeconomic and cultural dimensions of society are dominated by convergent or divergent forces, and what the consequences are of these assumed convergent or divergent tendencies for long-term future demographic developments in the countries of Europe. Since there is no unambiguous answer to this question, this book describes two alternative scenarios for Europe's future population. In the Uniformity scenario, convergent forces are dominant. This will eventually lead to a situation where only marginal economic and cultural differences exist across Europe. Trends in fertility and mortality will converge up to the year 2050, although over time patterns may differ across countries as a result of their different initial states. In contrast to the Uniformity scenario, a Diversity scenario is constructed where cultural, economic and demographic characteristics remain significantly different across countries. This book is the result of close collaboration between researchers from the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) and Statistics Netherlands (SN). Although the project was a joint effort by all researchers involved, the book has assumed the form of an edited volume, with separate chapters by small groups of authors. The authors are, of course, responsible for writing their own contributions, but they were often involved to a certain extent in the realisation of some of the other chapters as well.

The aim of Diversity in Family Formation is to examine changes in the start of the family formation process. Rather than giving a rough overview of demographic changes in many countries, a comparison of differences in changes in family formation and fertility behaviour between Belgium and The Netherlands is interesting for various reasons. First, even though the economic and cultural differences between these countries are relatively small there is one important difference: Belgium is predominantly Catholic, whereas The Netherlands has about equal proportions of Catholics and Protestants. Second, if the Second Demographic Transition implies that there is one common pattern of change in different European countries and that differences across countries are due to the fact that countries are in a different stage of the transition process, and if it is assumed that the transition process started earlier in Protestant countries than in Catholic countries, one would expect The Netherlands to be in a further stage of the transition process than Belgium. Thus an in-depth comparison of changes in family formation and fertility behaviour between both countries may give us more insight in the question of whether there is one common transition process. The comparison of fertility and family survey-data in both countries brings us to the core question of whether there is one common explanation for differences between countries in various types of fertility and family behaviour under consideration, namely fertility regulation, the choice of living arrangement after leaving the parental home, and the labour force participation of mothers.