Twenty-first-century trade agreements increasingly are a source of international law on investment and competition. With chapters contributed by leading practitioners and academics, this volume draws upon investor-state arbitration and competition/antitrust disputes to focus on the application of economics to international trade law and specifically WTO law. Written in an accessible language suitable for a broad readership while providing concrete insights designed for the specialist, this book will be of use to those active or interested in the related fields of trade disputes, competition law, and investor-state arbitration.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) recently celebrated twenty years of existence. The general wisdom is that its dispute settlement institutions work well and its negotiation machinery goes through a phase of prolonged crises. Assessing the World Trade Organization overcomes this myopic view and takes stock of the WTO's achievements whilst going beyond existing disciplinary narratives. With chapters written by scholars who have closely observed the development of the WTO in recent years, this book presents the state of the art in thinking about WTO performance. It also considers important issues such as the origins of the multilateral system, the accession process and the WTO's interaction with other international organisations. The contributions shed new light on untold stories, critically review and present existing scholarship, and sketch new research avenues for a future generation of trade scholars. This book will appeal to a wide audience that aims to better understand the drivers and obstacles of WTO performance.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) recently celebrated twenty years of existence. The general wisdom is that its dispute settlement institutions work well and its negotiation machinery goes through a phase of prolonged crises. Assessing the World Trade Organization overcomes this myopic view and takes stock of the WTO's achievements whilst going beyond existing disciplinary narratives. With chapters written by scholars who have closely observed the development of the WTO in recent years, this book presents the state of the art in thinking about WTO performance. It also considers important issues such as the origins of the multilateral system, the accession process and the WTO's interaction with other international organisations. The contributions shed new light on untold stories, critically review and present existing scholarship, and sketch new research avenues for a future generation of trade scholars. This book will appeal to a wide audience that aims to better understand the drivers and obstacles of WTO performance.

The WTO allows its members to retaliate in the face of continued non-compliance. After more than ten years' operation and ten arbitration disputes, this volume assesses the law, economics and politics of trade sanctions in WTO dispute settlement. Including more than thirty contributions from leading academics, trade diplomats and practitioners, it offers a thorough analysis of the legal rules on permissible WTO retaliation as well as an assessment of the economic rationale and calculations behind the mechanism. In addition, it provides first hand experiences of those countries that have obtained WTO authorisation to retaliate, ranging from the United States and the EC to Mexico and Antigua. In this assessment, the question of how to make the system work also for small countries is paramount. Finally, the volume spells out lessons that could be learned from related fields such as remedies for non-compliance in investment arbitration and competition or anti-trust regimes.

This book was first published in 2008. Assume, for a moment, that the necessary tools are available to induce or even force states to comply with international law. In such a state of affairs, how strongly should international law be protected? More specifically, how easy should it be to change international law? Should treaties be specifically performed or should states be given an opportunity to 'pay their way out'? In the event of states violating their commitments, what kind of back-up enforcement or sanctions should be imposed? Joost Pauwelyn uses the distinction between liability rules, property protection and inalienable entitlements as a starting point for a new theory of variable protection of international law, placed at the intersection between 'European absolutism' and 'American voluntarism'. Rather than undermining international law, variable protection takes the normativity of international law seriously and calibrates it to achieve maximum welfare and effectiveness at the lowest cost to contractual freedom and legitimacy.

International investment law is one of the fastest growing areas of international law. It has led to the signing of thousands of agreements, mostly in the form of investment contracts and bilateral investment treaties. Also, in the last two decades, there has been an exponential growth in the number of disputes being resolved by investment arbitration tribunals. Yet the legal principles at the basis of international investment law and arbitration remain in a state of flux. Perhaps the best illustration of this phenomenon is the wide disagreement among investment tribunals on some of the core concepts underpinning the regime, such as investment, property, regulatory powers, scope of jurisdiction, applicable law, or the interactions with other areas of international law. The purpose of this book is to revisit these conceptual foundations in order to shed light on the practice of international investment law. It is an attempt to bridge the growing gap between the theory and the practice of this thriving area of international law. The first part of the book focuses on the 'infrastructure' of the investment regime or, more specifically, on the structural arrangements that have been developed to manage foreign investment transactions and the potential disputes arising from them. The second part of the book identifies the common conceptual bases of an array of seemingly unconnected practical problems in order to clarify the main stakes and offer balanced solutions. The third part addresses the main sources of 'regime stress' as well as the main legal mechanisms available to manage such challenges to the operation of the regime. Overall, the book offers a thorough investigation of the conflicting theoretical positions underlying international investment law, testing their worth by reference to concrete issues that have arisen in the jurisprudence. It demonstrates that many of the most important practical questions arising in practice can be addressed by a carefully dosed resort to theory.

How do trade agreements interact with agreements on human rights or the environment? In case of conflict, which agreement should prevail? Must trade disputes be examined only from the angle of trade rules or should account be taken also of non-trade values? Joost Pauwelyn considers these questions and reveals how the different rules of international law interact, with the aid of procedural guidelines when conflict occurs. This book interests trade diplomats, international civil servants, lawyers, NGOs and scholars of public international law and international trade law.

International organizations and other global governance bodies often make rules and decisions without input from many of the individuals, groups, firms, and governments that are affected by them. The standards of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, for instance, developed by a small number of states, govern financial markets and the safety of bank deposits in over a hundred jurisdictions. Historically, the interests of developing countries, as well as non-commercial and diffuse interests within countries, have been excluded or disregarded in global governance. Scholars and practitioners have criticised this democratic deficit and called for greater participation of such marginalized stakeholders. Against this background, international institutions have introduced a variety of reforms with the goal of increasing and facilitating the participation of these excluded stakeholders. This book brings together an expert group of scholars and practitioners to investigate the consequences of stakeholder participation reforms in the global governance of health and finance: What reforms have been introduced? Have these reforms given previously marginalized stakeholders a voice in global governance bodies? What effect have these reforms had on the legitimacy and effectiveness of global governance? To answer these questions, the book examines treaty-based intergovernmental organizations alongside newer forms of global governance such as trans-governmental regulatory networks, multi-stakeholder partnerships, and private standard setting bodies. Through a series of paired comparative analyses, the book provides insights into the experiences of large emerging and smaller or lower income developing countries (Brazil v. Argentina, China v. Vietnam, India v. the Philippines) in a diverse set of organizations, including the World Bank and the World Health Organization, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, the International Accounting Standards Board, Codex Alimentarius Commission and more.

Many international norms that have emerged in recent years are not set out in formal treaties. They are not concluded in formal international organizations. They frequently involve actors other than formal state representatives. In the realm of finance, health, security, or the environment, international lawmaking is increasingly 'informal': It takes place in networks or loosely organized fora; it involves a multitude of stakeholders including regulators, experts, professional organizations and other non-state actors; it leads to guidelines, standards or best practices. This book critically assesses the concept of informal international lawmaking, its legal nature, and impact at the national and international level. It examines whether it is on the rise, as is often claimed, and if so, what the implications of this are. It addresses what actors are involved in its creation, the processes utilized, and the informal output produced. The book frames informal international lawmaking around three axes: output informality (novel types of norms), process informality (norm-making in networks outside international organizations), and actor informality (the involvement of public agencies and regulators, private actors, and international organizations). Fundamentally, the book is concerned with whether this informality causes problems in terms of keeping transnational lawmaking accountable. By empirically analysing domestic processes of norm elaboration and implementation, the book addresses the key question of how to benefit from the effectiveness of informal international lawmaking without jeopardizing the accountability necessary in the process of making law.

Twenty-first-century trade agreements increasingly are a source of international law on investment and competition. With chapters contributed by leading practitioners and academics, this volume draws upon investor-state arbitration and competition/antitrust disputes to focus on the application of economics to international trade law and specifically WTO law. Written in an accessible language suitable for a broad readership while providing concrete insights designed for the specialist, this book will be of use to those active or interested in the related fields of trade disputes, competition law, and investor-state arbitration.

One of the most prominent and urgent problems in international governance is how the different branches and norms of international law interact and what to do in the event of conflict. With no single 'international legislator' and a multitude of states, international organisations and tribunals making and enforcing the law, the international legal system is decentralised. This leads to a wide variety of international norms, ranging from customary international law and general principles of law, to multilateral and bilateral treaties on trade, the environment, human rights, the law of the sea, etc. Pauwelyn provides a framework on how these different norms interact, focusing on the relationship between the law of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and other rules of international law. He also examines the hierarchy of norms within the WTO treaty. His recurring theme is how to marry trade and non-trade rules, or economic and non-economic objectives at the international level.

This book was first published in 2008. Assume, for a moment, that the necessary tools are available to induce or even force states to comply with international law. In such a state of affairs, how strongly should international law be protected? More specifically, how easy should it be to change international law? Should treaties be specifically performed or should states be given an opportunity to 'pay their way out'? In the event of states violating their commitments, what kind of back-up enforcement or sanctions should be imposed? Joost Pauwelyn uses the distinction between liability rules, property protection and inalienable entitlements as a starting point for a new theory of variable protection of international law, placed at the intersection between 'European absolutism' and 'American voluntarism'. Rather than undermining international law, variable protection takes the normativity of international law seriously and calibrates it to achieve maximum welfare and effectiveness at the lowest cost to contractual freedom and legitimacy.

Economic globalization and respect for human rights are both highly topical issues. In theory, more trade should increase economic welfare and protection of human rights should ensure individual dignity. Both fields of law protect certain freedoms: economic development should lead to higher human rights standards, and UN embargoes are used to secure compliance with human rights agreements. However the interaction between trade liberalisation and human rights protection is complex, and recently, tension has arisen between these two areas. Do WTO obligations covering intellectual property prevent governments from implementing their human rights obligations, including rights to food or health? Is it fair to accord the benefits of trade subject to a clean human rights record? This book first examines the theoretical framework of the interaction between the disciplines of international trade law and human rights. It builds upon the well-known debate between Professor Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, who construes trade obligations as human rights, and Professor Philip Alston, who warns of a merger and acquisition of human rights by trade law. From this starting point, further chapters explore the differing legal matrices of the two fields and examine how cooperation between them might be improved, both in international law-making and institutions,in dispute settlement. The interaction between trade and human rights is then explored through seven case studies:freedom of expression and competition law; IP protection and health; agricultural trade and the right to food; trade restrictions on conflict WHO convention on tobacco control; and, finally, human rights conditionalities in preferential trade schemes.

The WTO allows its members to retaliate in the face of continued non-compliance. After more than ten years' operation and ten arbitration disputes, this volume assesses the law, economics and politics of trade sanctions in WTO dispute settlement. Including more than thirty contributions from leading academics, trade diplomats and practitioners, it offers a thorough analysis of the legal rules on permissible WTO retaliation as well as an assessment of the economic rationale and calculations behind the mechanism. In addition, it provides first hand experiences of those countries that have obtained WTO authorisation to retaliate, ranging from the United States and the EC to Mexico and Antigua. In this assessment, the question of how to make the system work also for small countries is paramount. Finally, the volume spells out lessons that could be learned from related fields such as remedies for non-compliance in investment arbitration and competition or anti-trust regimes.