This book provides both an introduction to the philosophy of scientific modeling and a contribution to the discussion and clarification of two recent philosophical conceptions of models: artifactualism and fictionalism. These can be viewed as different stances concerning the standard representationalist account of scientific models. By better understanding these two alternative views, readers will gain a deeper insight into what a model is as well as how models function in different sciences. Fictionalism has been a traditional epistemological stance related to antirealist construals of laws and theories, such as instrumentalism and inferentialism. By contrast, the more recent fictional view of models holds that scientific models must be conceived of as the same kind of entities as literary characters and places. This approach is essentially an answer to the ontological question concerning the nature of models, which in principle is not incompatible with a representationalist account of the function of models. The artifactual view of models is an approach according to which scientific models are epistemic artifacts, whose main function is not to represent the phenomena but rather to provide epistemic access to them. It can be conceived of as a non-representationalist and pragmatic account of modeling, which does not intend to focus on the ontology of models but rather on the ways they are built and used for different purposes. The different essays address questions such as the artifactual view of idealization, the use of information theory to elucidate the concepts of abstraction and idealization, the deidealization of models, the nature of scientific fictions, the structural account of representation and the ontological status of structures, the role of surrogative reasoning with models, and the use of models for explaining and predicting physical phenomena.

This book provides both an introduction to the philosophy of scientific modeling and a contribution to the discussion and clarification of two recent philosophical conceptions of models: artifactualism and fictionalism. These can be viewed as different stances concerning the standard representationalist account of scientific models. By better understanding these two alternative views, readers will gain a deeper insight into what a model is as well as how models function in different sciences. Fictionalism has been a traditional epistemological stance related to antirealist construals of laws and theories, such as instrumentalism and inferentialism. By contrast, the more recent fictional view of models holds that scientific models must be conceived of as the same kind of entities as literary characters and places. This approach is essentially an answer to the ontological question concerning the nature of models, which in principle is not incompatible with a representationalist account of the function of models. The artifactual view of models is an approach according to which scientific models are epistemic artifacts, whose main function is not to represent the phenomena but rather to provide epistemic access to them. It can be conceived of as a non-representationalist and pragmatic account of modeling, which does not intend to focus on the ontology of models but rather on the ways they are built and used for different purposes. The different essays address questions such as the artifactual view of idealization, the use of information theory to elucidate the concepts of abstraction and idealization, the deidealization of models, the nature of scientific fictions, the structural account of representation and the ontological status of structures, the role of surrogative reasoning with models, and the use of models for explaining and predicting physical phenomena.

"How to Play Dialogues" constitutes the first introduction to Dialogical Logic aimed at the practice of dialogic containing precise comments on solutions to exercises in first-order classical, intuitionistic and elements of propositional modal logic. It is the first part of the work "The Dialogues of Logic," conceived in two separate autonomous texts on dialogical logic. The two texts should provide together a comprehensive technical and philosophical overview of the dialogical approach to logic.

Este libro pone al alcance del lector no especializado la obra cardinal de Gottlob Frege, padre de la filosofia analitica. De facillectura y compresion, la pluma de Stepanians nos conduce vivamente por el entramado primordial del significados y sentidos vislumbrados por una de las mentes mas brillantes de la historia del pensamiento y que aun sigue siendo uno de los pensadores menos leidos en lengua castellana.

Logique Dynamique de la Fiction is a masterly piece of work and a substantial contribution to a disciplined understanding of human thought and discourse about the unreal. It is, in that very respect, a logic working at the very heart of les sciences humaines. M. Redmond's command of the literature - actually of the several literatures associated with each of the constituent parts of his synthesis - is not only substantial and comprehensive; it is also rather breath-taking. Equally impressive is the technical assurance displayed by the formal development of the constituent logics, and the virtuosity with which they are adapted to the purposes of his project. ...] On the other hand, I find myself rather captivated by the insight that the practices of fiction - its writing and its reading - possess an inherently dialogical structure, and with it, the idea that to get the semantics of fiction right it will be necessary to dynamize the underlying logic. John WoodsBien que la logique de la non - existence a t d velopp e d?'s les d buts de la philosophie analytique, il a fallu attendre les travaux de John Woods en 1974, afin que les relations entre logique et litt rature, notamment sur la question de la fictionalit, commencent tre consid r es. Le d veloppement de ces liens entre logique et litt rature sera-t-il fructueux la fois pour la philosophie de la logique, pour l'analyse philosophique de la litt rature et, plus g n ralement, pour l'analyse de la fictionalit C'est cette question que le pr sent ouvrage propose d'apporter des l ments de r ponse. Shahid Rahman

Hugh MacColl (1837-1909) fut un mathematicien et logicien qui passa les premieres annees de sa vie en Ecosse. Apres quelques annees de travail en differents lieux de Grande-Bretagne, il s'installa a Boulogne-sur-Mer (France), ou il developpa la majeure partie de son oeuvre et devint citoyen francais. Hugh MacColl fut connu en son temps pour ses contributions novatrices dans le monde de la logique. MacColl represente la premiere approche du pluralisme logique. Sa premiere contribution pour l'algebre logique du 19 DEGREESieme siecle fut son calcul qui n'autorise pas seulement une classe d'interpretation (comme dans l'algebre de Boole) mais aussi une interpretation propositionnelle. MacColl donna une preference a l'interpretation propositionnelle en raison de sa generalite et l'appela logique pure. Le connecteur principal de sa logique pure est le conditionnel et par consequent, son algebre contient un operateur specifique pour cet operateur. Dans /Symbolic Logic and its Applications/ (1906) (reimprime dans notre volume), MacColl publia la version achevee de sa(ses) logique(s) ou des propositions sont qualifiees soit de certaines, soit de impossibles, soit de contingentes, ou encore de vraies ou de fausses. Apres sa mort ses contributions au monde logique ne semblent pas avoir recues ni les remerciements ni les etudes systematiques qu'elles auraient meritees. Plus encore, nombre de ses idees furent attribuees a ses successeurs; les exemples les plus connus sont: la notion d'implication stricte, la premiere approche formelle de la logique modale et la discussion des paradoxes de l'implication materielle, habituellement attribuee a C.I. Lewis. Il en va de meme pour ce qui est de ses contributions a la logique probabiliste (probabilite conditionnelle), logique plurivalente (relationnelle), logique de la pertinence et logique connexe. Le fait qu'il ait aussi explore la possibilite de construire un systeme formel capable de raisonner avec des fictions est moins connu. Ce dernier point semble etre lie avec sa reconstruction formelle du syllogisme aristotelicien par le biais de la logique connexe. Le present volume comprend une reimpression des principaux ecrits logiques de Mac

Ce livre est le premier volume d'un ouvrage, Logique Dialogique: une introduction, concu selon deux parties autonomes sur la logique dialogique. Les deux volumes fournissent neanmoins, a un niveau technique et philosophique, une vue d'ensemble de l'approche dialogique de la logique. Constituant un support efficace et didactique pour apprendre les fondements et la pratique de la logique dialogique, elles s'adressent ainsi tant aux professeurs et enseignants pour la preparation de cours qu'aux etudiants qui veulent se former individuellement. Le premier volume, Methode de Dialogique: Regles et Exercices, constitue la premiere introduction a la pratique de la dialogique et contient des commentaires precis sur la solution d'exercices divers de logique classique de premier ordre, de logique intuitionniste et de logique modale propositionnelle. Le present volume est lui-meme ecrit en deux parties. La premiere etant ecrite pour le lecteur non specialise envisage, pour apprendre a jouer avec des dialogues, un point de vue analogue a la facon dont on apprend a jouer a des jeux conventionnels comme les echecs par exemple: on se familiarise avec les regles qui gouvernent les figures, les regles du developpement du jeu et finalement les regles qui produisent les strategies gagnantes. La deuxieme partie contient une formulation plus precise de ce qui a ete presente et travaille dans la premiere section. Elle se termine sur une justification de la correspondance entre la dialogique et le calcul des sequents. Le second volume presente un contenu plus avance incluant la metatheorie correspondante.